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Narrating *Islam*

Interpretations of the Muslim World in European Texts

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
CDRSEE	Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe
DfES	Department of Education and Skills
DTV	Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag (German publisher)
EU	European Union
GCSE	General Certificate of Secondary Education
HAB	Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel
KP	*Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Russian newspaper)
KS	Key Stage
MERIP	Middle East Research and Information Project
NART	National Archive of Republic of Tatarstan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRK	National-Regional Component
OFSTED	Office for Standards in Education
OMSA	Orenburg Mohammadan Spiritual Assembly
QCA	Qualifications and Curriculum Authority
SOVA Center	Russian human rights NGO
TASSR	Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Acknowledgements

Introduction: interpretations of the Muslim world in European texts

Gerdien Jonker and Shiraz Thobani

As communicative beings, humans narrate the world as one means of engaging with it. Narrations assume many different forms, from everyday conversational exchanges to the handing down of cherished myths from one generation to the next, from the media's reporting of small and large events to the politician's oratorical presentations on the state of the nation.

Narrations range from the creative productions of novelists on the complexion of societies and the complexities of individual lives to prescriptive textbook formulations on the world as it was and as it should be, initiating the young into their origins and their place in the scheme of things. We narrate, and through narrating, seek to shape or engage with the world according to our beliefs and perceptions. Collective identity is the outcome of narratives that create group cohesion. Their antithesis is constituted by those narratives that tell us who we are not. Through these forms of renderings, we convey to ourselves where we draw our borders, who the 'others' are, and how they differ from us. Narrating 'us', on the one hand, and differentiating the 'others', as a supposedly contrasting activity, are in essence two sides of the same coin.

In *Narrating Islam* we deal with pedagogic representations of religious, cultural and ethnic groups, founded on long and embedded histories of alterity, as they have evolved in Europe and neighbouring regions. The project came into being through a series of conferences and workshops that explored the history and spread of narratives on

Islam and Muslims as they are told in school textbooks and as promoted or sanctioned by policy frameworks, national historiographies and the popular media in different regions of Europe and surrounding zones. Contributors come from universities and research institutes as far apart as Kazan on the Middle Volga, Pristine in Albania, Bari, Florence, Rome, Barcelona, Rabat, London and Braunschweig, each adding a piece to the kaleidoscope that makes up the narratives on Islam in Europe and nearby regions.

In the European context, our distinctive perspective lies in the hypothesis that textbook narratives on Islam have their roots in foundation scripts that once were and today still present one of Europe's basic identifiers of belonging and not belonging. In medieval times, the narratives on Islam synthesized the Church's perceptions of a foreign religion and became incorporated in its theological knowledge. At the turn of the modern age, in the dispute between Protestants and Catholics, they passed from learned (doctrinaire) theological perceptions to textbook narratives with a wide mass distribution. This new appearance was closely connected to the emergence of history textbooks. We therefore expect Islam narratives to run like a red thread through the period of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the age of Enlightenment, colonial rule, the birth of the nation-state, the migration phase and the globalization era, taking on the role of the 'other' in each different framework.

In tracing the narratives on Islam, we seem to encounter a script in almost all European textbooks that shares some basic features. Locally, historical experience and imagination may differ, lending the renderings a different flavour or different thrust. Chronologically, they are inserted in the master narratives somewhere between the eighth and eleventh centuries, revealing representations originating in and locked to medieval times. The main building blocks comprise (1) Muhammad and the birth of Islam, (2) Islam threatening Europe (depending on the region: Spain, Charles Martel, Turks before Vienna, Tatars), (3) the Crusades and (4) the present, which is depicted in almost all textbooks through references to migrants, fundamentalism, a clash of cultures and oppressed women. These are

narratives with a strong religious focus that are unable to explain the reality of social coexistence and do not offer an informed view on Muslim cultures, histories and contemporary societies. The question is, with what aims are they told in the textbooks? What has kept these narratives on Muslims and Islam fixed in their place over such a prolonged span of time?

To answer these questions, we adopt the *longue durée* approach to the study of historical writing; we follow the narratives that appear in the textbooks of different European regions, trace their course through time and examine the impact of important historical thresholds. This book can therefore be read as a kaleidoscope of the European *longue durée* to which the narrating of Muslims as meaningful others is central. The contributors to this work do not, in overall terms, deploy a comparative approach by cross-referencing national contexts using quantitative determinants. Rather, they examine different countries as case studies across a changing historical field from a long-term and exploratory perspective.

On the whole, the contributions reveal that pedagogical narratives are institutionalized accounts of the 'right' way to look at things; they supply ready-made answers to critical questions and allow their users to make a rapid association between the past and present without having to concern themselves with an entire history. In that sense, European narratives on Muslims can be perceived as presenting short cuts to acquired historical tendencies and cultural suppositions about the 'other'.

European knowledge of Muslims

What was known in Europe about Muslims before the Crusades and how soundly based was this knowledge? What can we say about the nature of the master narratives that came to be generated from the medieval period onwards about Islam and Muslims? While the *Crónica mozarabe* of AD 754 reports Carolingian resistance to the Arab raids at Tours and Poitiers, the historian Michael Borgolte believes that Poitiers was by no means as decisive a battle between Christians and Muslims as its nineteenth-century portrayals suggest. In fact, in his view, there was nothing particularly special about the Arab raids,

given the many other immigrants and pillagers on Europe's borders at the time.[1] Almut Höfert, in her seminal work on the 'Turkish peril', comes to the same conclusion.[2] It was only with the military forays towards Jerusalem that a war epic began that was needed to conceal the fact that, first, the Muslims actually considered the 'Franks' to be quite an uncivilized lot and, second, the encounter with Islamic civilizations and cultures had engendered feelings of inferiority in the Europeans.[3]

The contradistinction Christian/non-Christian first flared up as an important act of self-ascertainment during confrontations with Muslims in Palestine, Sicily and Spain. This distinction initially went hand in hand with the idea that 'Europe' was the point of reference for collective self descriptions. However, such shifts are slow and anything but continuous. The following three constellations of events and outcomes are relevant in this regard (drawing on Peter Burke):[4]

- The differences between the Eastern and Western Churches lost significance in the face of the Turkish peril, and Europe is now described as a Christian territory.
- The conquest of new regions shifted the horizon towards the Atlantic world; it coincided with the completion of the Reconquista in 1492 as an event marking a sharp rupture between European and Muslim civilizations. 'Moors' in Spain and Ottomans in the Balkans were seen to belong to a different religion, so therefore were Europe's 'others'. This reinforced European identity.
- The religious schism following the Reformation epitomized a deep division and marked a crucial turning point. 'Europe' emerged during that period of upheaval as a form of self assertion, with an hypostasized Islam acting as the point of negative reference.

In this context, the 'Turkish peril' catalysed the establishment of both external and internal boundaries in Europe; in medieval travel reports and encyclopaedias Muslims were already being depicted as

the devil incarnate and the Koran as a phantasmagoria of lies.[5] From the middle of the fifteenth century onwards, when Latin Christendom came face to face with the militarily superior Ottomans, the knowledge being passed down became the foil against which empirical reports – and thus new knowledge about the Ottomans – were presented. In the context of the printing revolution around 1500, which created new opportunities to duplicate ideas and enabled the rapid spread of a media-propagated image of the Turks, this knowledge aggregated into an 'antagonist narrative'.

On the threshold of the eighteenth century, admiration became mixed with disdain in representations in which the Ottomans were depicted as exaggeratedly exotic and effeminate. In that century of enlightenment and science, scholars also attended to the Koran, in particular by translating it. While it is true that translators' opinions of Islam – which they always proclaimed in the introductions to their works – tended to centre on exposing a 'web of lies', at the same time efforts to approach the text with academic and scientific rigour also gained ground.[6] In Germany, the foundations were laid for the philological analysis of the corpus of Islamic traditions. In France, the Netherlands and Britain, knowledge about the Muslim world was filtered through the experiences of colonial administrations. Edward Said's thesis of the potent link between colonial power and Orientalist constructions is of particular relevance here.

It is difficult at present, though highly desirable, to establish how these different strands of intelligence produced by litterateurs, philologists and philosophers entered the body of European knowledge that characterized the nineteenth century. The richly illustrated volume *Mythen der Nationen* indicates, however, that in the course of the construction of the nation-state, Islam was assigned a precise place in the popular culture of many European countries.[7] It was a conflict-laden portrayal consisting primarily of a string of armed disputes, with Islam, whether in the guise of Arabs, Ottomans, Tatars or Turks, perceived 'as Europe's most dangerous and enduring enemy, as Europe's antithesis and negation'.[8] A succession of academics who studied, over the course of the twentieth century, the corpus (now spanning more than 1000 years) of European source

texts on Muslims concluded that it was the Muslim populations at Europe's margins that were the catalyst for European self perception, and that this applied in particular to the borders of southeastern Europe, where Europe's insecure identity is still kept alive today.[9]

The *longue durée* of textbook narratives

The *longue durée* approach is based on the long-term observation of events. In his history of the Mediterranean world, Fernand Braudel painted a unifying picture of barely perceptible changes that became describable only over a prolonged period.[10] This method of investigation can also be applied to the collective imagination and mindset of a society. From the sociological viewpoint, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's[11] work on institutionalization was a *locus classicus*. It supported the view that the transmission of knowledge builds up into underlying conceptual strata that assume a foundational status and shape subsequent events. Like landscapes, societies and their languages also have durable structures that change slowly and that invite long-term historical enquiry. The formulation of the self as opposed to the 'other', for instance, is often an outcome of slow processes of social interactions and projections. Braudel drew attention to the narrative of the Crusades, a train of thought on both sides of the Mediterranean that became fixed through endless repetition over and beyond long periods of time until it presented the respective 'fitting' perception.

History textbooks are an interesting medium in which to examine the sedimented perceptions of a society in relation to its images of the self and the 'other'. Unlike works of literature, school textbooks are the result of political and social negotiations. They can be offered as instruments of educational change, but need to be backed by concerted political will and social consensus. Unlike novelists, authors of school textbooks do not write after their own inspiration; more often than not they continue the story of what already existed in previous textbooks as secured knowledge in accordance with political guidelines and social expectations. History textbooks can thus be viewed as a semantic reservoir in which images of former generations

are layered on top of one another, prone to be repeated and recontextualized from different perspectives and with varying patterns of interpretation. In textbooks, old thoughts can unexpectedly reappear and new ideas are incorporated only slowly, generally following a thorough societal censuring process. With regard to history textbooks, the observation of the historian Reinhart Koselleck can be applied: the images of a society are like geological deposits that can be mined at any time.[12]

European narratives on Muslims present a case in point. Three of the contributors to this book engage with the pathways and contingencies of *longue durée* narrations. Gerdien Jonker deals with the emergence of Protestant and Catholic narratives on Muslims in Germany between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, arguing that they were used as leverage in the confessional struggle at first, but later served to mark the border of descriptions of the self (Chapter 1). While focusing on the Iberian Peninsula, Mercè Viladrich-Grau lines up eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholarly authors who strengthened the Catholic perspective by narrating the Iberian Muslim past. She uncovers traces of their work in history textbooks, children's poems and pedagogical theories, and reveals that stigmatizing representations of Islam and Muslims are deeply embedded in school history, both in Catalonia and the rest of Spain (Chapter 2). Marat Gibatdinov follows the translation of European texts into Russian as a starting point for the Russian Orthodox textbook narrative on Muslims. By the end of the nineteenth century, the textbooks of the Jadidi movement in Kazan had started to challenge the Orthodox view, but the 1917 revolution nonetheless adopted it. Recently, both narrations were fortified during an intense exchange between Moscow and Kazan – coined by some as a 'textbook war' – on the place of Muslims in Russia (Chapter 3).

Contemporary approaches
The media revolution at the end of the twentieth century overlaid existing *longue durée* perceptions with a torrent of new images. Contemporary researchers are now debating whether the previous model of the 'antagonist narrative' continues to inform the selection

of new images[13] or whether current challenges like terrorism, EU enlargement, the imposition of new EU standards and immigration are making an impact on former historical representations. Since the end of the Second World War, the cold war, changing demographies and the impending entry of Turkey into the European Union have coloured debates on the form and content of 'Europe' and, through this, it seems, a new pattern of inclusion and exclusion is starting to emerge.

This is the context in which seven of the contributors to this volume tell their story. Luigi Cajani focuses on the historical debate in the Council of Europe to trace the changing positions of scholars between the 1950s and 2000 on the historical status and location of the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim world (Chapter 4). Benoît Challand (in Chapter 5) and Antonio Brusa (in Chapter 6) look at the reappearance of old stereotypes in new Muslim populations, the former from the perspective of gendered identities as reflected in visual images in French, German and Italian contexts, and the latter from the viewpoint of popular and cultured portrayals in Italian school texts. Taking a different perspective, Adrian Brisku looks at how changes in the 'inner periphery' are narrated in Albanian texts. Declaring itself in 1973 as the world's first atheist state, communist Albania sought to define the identity of its subjects through a denial of religion, whereas in post-communist Albania, by contrast, religious diversity is acknowledged within the framework of Europeanness (Chapter 7). In another contrasting context, Mostafa Hassani-Idrissi, analysing three generations of Moroccan textbooks, discusses shifting representations of Europe brought about by policy changes in the independence, 'Islamist' and modern phases (Chapter 8).

The last two contributions, dealing with Russia and Great Britain respectively, address the latest turn of the screw. Irina Kuznetsova-Morenko traces the most recent media representations of Muslims in Russia and Tatarstan following the hostage crisis in a Moscow theatre in 2002 (Chapter 9). Shiraz Thobani is concerned with constructions of the Muslim past that became inscribed in the English national curriculum in the neo-conservative 1980s and 1990s, the historiographical underpinnings of which have come

under increasing interrogation since the 7 July 2005 bombings in London (Chapter 10).

Textbook narratives of cultures and civilizations may well draw on semantic reservoirs that are centuries old, but at the same time they also seek to shape their readers' future destinies. Particularly in times of radical social shifts, the interface between past and future is subjected to conscious deliberation, when historical continuities and disjunctions are not assumed as given but explicitly questioned and scrutinized. In the present climate, we find Europe in the midst of redefining itself politically and culturally, as indeed are other regions globally, including Muslim states and societies. The story of Islam and Muslims in Europe, a story of longstanding otherness, is only one among many historical narratives of cultural negotiation across the globe calling for informed correction. How civilizational histories and cultural encounters are to be narrated in the current realignments is gaining new urgency, in the face of the increasing inadequacy of inherited paradigms of representation. Contemporary social change offers unique prospects for researchers to investigate the nature of the interplay between past constructions and future imperatives in the textual space that defines contemporary education. Seizing the moment, with this book we seek to open up an area of enquiry that has hitherto been largely neglected and that invites fresh probing.

Notes

1. Michael Borgolte, *Juden, Christen, Muselmanen: Das Erbe der Antiken und die Wurzeln Europas*, Munich: Siedler, 2006, p. 259.
2. Almut Höfert, *Den Feind beschreiben: Türkengefahr und europäisches Wissen über das osmanische Reich 1450–1600*, Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003.
3. Franco Cardini, *Europa und der Islam: Geschichte eines Missverständnisses*, Munich: C. H. Beck, 2000; Josep Fontana, *Europa im Spiegel: Eine kritische Revision der europäischen Geschichte*, Munich: C.H. Beck, 1994.
4. Peter Burke, 'Did Europe exist before 1700?' *History of European Ideas*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1980, pp. 21–9.
5. Höfert, *Den Feind beschreiben*.
6. Marc-Olivier Rehrmann, *Ehrenthron oder Teufelsbrut? Das Bild des Islams in der deutschen Aufklärung*, Zurich: Spur Verlag, 2001.
7. Monika Flacke (ed.) *Mythen der Nationen: Ein europäisches Panorama*, Berlin: Koehler & Amelang, 1998.

8. Francois Etienne and Hagen Schulze, 'Das emotionale Fundament der Nationen', in Monika Flacke (ed.) *Mythen der Nationen: ein europäisches Panorama*, Munich-Berlin: Koehler & Amelang, 1998, p. 18.

9. Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997.

10. Fernand Braudel, 'Histoire et sciences sociales', *Annales*, vol. 14, 1958, pp. 710–18.

11. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit, Eine Theorie der Wissenssoziologie*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1969.

12. Reinhart Koselleck, *Zeitschichten*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003, p. 9.

13. Kai Hafez and Carola Richter, 'Das Islambild von ARD und ZDF', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 2007, pp. 26–7; and Höfert, *Den Feind beschreiben.*

Chapter 1

The *longue durée* of the Islam narrative: the emergence of a script for German history education (1550 to 1804)[1]

Gerdien Jonker

In this chapter I propose to investigate the origins and history of the 'Islam' narrative in German textbooks. I ask when and how medieval Europe's view of 'Islam' was turned into a textbook account of events. I also ask how this view became welded into the competing narratives of two Christian confessions in Germany, and what imprint they left on the secularized history narrative of the nation-state under study. I start from the thesis that certain narratives on Islam present a basic European script *(Leitvorstellung)*, which is also apparent in history text-books elsewhere in Europe. Although the account of events embodies a basic European narrative, its individual components and recent modifications are rooted in a history of *longue durée* that is coloured locally by different historical events. My second point of departure is that on many occasions over the course of time different alternatives are offered, which, had they been chosen, may have taken the narrative on Muslims and Islam in a quite different direction. However, the capacity of the narrative to draw distinctions between descriptions of the self ('us') and descriptions of the others ('not us') determined what choices were made.

A preliminary narrative map of the various regions of Europe reads like a kaleidoscope of different experiences. Stories from Spain and

Italy concentrate on encounters in the Mediterranean Sea and the Reconquista; those from the central European countries of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy harp on about the 'Turkish peril'; in Russia old stories about bloodthirsty Tatars are told and retold; the colonial experiences of England, France and the Netherlands are kept alive through debates on immigration; and the Germans enrich the basic European narrative with tales of 'guest workers' who started coming from Turkey in 1970, and then of the 'women' who followed in their wake.[2]

Current German textbook narratives include the following themes:

- 'Muhammad and the birth of Islam',
- 'the Koran and the religious duties of Muslims',
- 'Jihad and Arab culture in Spain',
- 'the Christian Crusades' followed by 'life in the Holy Land', and
- 'the meeting of religions past and present'.

Towards the end of the general narrative, when the ground is being prepared for the material to be taught in the tenth grade, some history books introduce the theme of 're-Islamization and fundamentalism'. Other textbooks deal at this point with topical issues ranging from the 'headscarf controversy', through 'the construction of mosques in German cities' to the question of whether Turkey can ever be part of the European Union (EU). The most recent books contain photographs of Bin Laden and of the Twin Towers burning on 11 September 2001 and discuss the 'clash of civilizations'.

Some important features have already emerged from this kaleidoscope. First, Muslims fulfil the role of meaningful others in school books across Europe, and in each region this role is linked to safeguarding the relevant cultural and political framework. Second, to a greater or lesser extent Muslims and Islam are presented in school books in exclusively religious terms. Third, these narratives neither describe Muslim societies today nor add to an understanding of their cultures and history. Why then should Islam narratives feature in almost all European history textbooks and what functions are ascribed to them?

Of all the European history textbooks, the German ones seem to contain the oldest narratives on Islam. They include images that were already present during the Reformation, were incorporated into history books in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, in the nineteenth century, made a significant contribution to the formation of European nation-states. In this chapter I examine three thresholds that functioned as critical junctures before the period of the nation-state. The four sections into which I have divided the chapter follow these thresholds.

In the first section ('In search of divine signs') I examine the perceptions through which the Protestant reformers expressed their conviction that contemporary history was working in favour of their reform. At that stage the narrative had not yet emerged, but single elements were being prepared.

In the second and third sections ('False prophets: A Jesuit view of history' and 'The Protestant reaction') I am concerned with the emergence of the Islam narrative in scholarly historical representations during the period immediately preceding the Thirty Years' War. It was here that the two prototypes were born that would serve as references and models for succeeding history textbooks: the Catholics reconfigured their traditional ecclesiastical knowledge on Muslims whereas the Protestants drew from the narrative elements of the earlier generation.

In the fourth section ('Moulding the past into history instruction') I finally trace the genesis and pathway of the history school book in the 1680–1750 period for which the textbook of the Joachimthaler Gymnasium in Berlin has been chosen as an example. It is at this point that we witness the birth of the textbook narrative on Islam.

In the conclusion, I take a short glance at eighteenth-century history teaching and trace a few instances that helped it advance from an obscure subject that had its place between singing and calligraphy into a major discipline. I conclude the chapter with the 1804 educational reform. As a result of this reform history instruction moved to the centre of the German gymnasium and was soon to become an instrument through which the Prussian nation-state would be able to mould its citizens. The explosion of the Islam narrative into a major

commentary covering between 60 and 150 pages that accompanied this development has been treated elsewhere.[3]

In search of divine signs

In the year 1550 a new type of church calendar appeared in central Europe; it introduced a new historical outlook and swiftly inspired numerous imitations. The Protestant jurist Paul Eber seems to have been among the first to advance the *Calendarium Historicum*.[4] Protestant theologians and educationists like Lucas Lossius, Jacob Frey, Caspar Goldwurm, Andreas Hondorff, Abraham Saur, Nikolaus Reusner, Johannes Manlius and Hieronymus Megiser soon followed suit, publishing numerous calendars in Latin. The educationist Lucas Lossius even called his after the Roman calendar *Cisio Ianus,* thus betraying the strong interest these men still had in placing themselves within the tradition of the Roman Catholic Church.[5] The reformer Philipp Melanchton wrote a preface for Eber's calendar entitled 'Six reasons by Philipp Melanchton why history should be kept in the Church and considered as such'. In his preface he gave voice to this novel, anti-Catholic perception of history, which, given that the majority of calendar compilers adopted his preface, seems to indicate that it was consensual. Thus, in the mid-sixteenth century, we encounter a group of men taking much care to ensure their place in the Roman Church tradition yet preparing a revolution in man's perception of history that will eventually bring about a rupture with that tradition.

It was not until the next generation that a decision was taken to publish the calendars in German. Paul Eber's sons translated and expanded their father's calendar and their work is a good illustration of how a new tradition was taking shape. The themed title of their calendar gives us some idea of its general direction:

> Paul Eber's *Calendarium Historicum*, that is, A General Calendar Which briefly Tells and Shows for Each Day throughout the Whole Year a renowned Story or a historical Account From the Holy Book and from Other (sources) Of what in past and present Times now and again happened in the World: Com-

posed in Latin 30 Years ago, now put into German as best as possible by his Sons for the Common Fatherland and complemented by many new Accounts.[6]

By referring to it as 'Paul Eber's *Calendarium Historicum*', the sons left one in no doubt that they were following in their father's footsteps. 'For Each Day' the calendar had adopted the days of the week as the smallest unit in which historical happenings were being remembered, a classical point of departure that forced Eber to fit his historical account of the world into 365 compartments. His sons continued this ordering. However, if their father still paid respect to the martyrs and saints of the past, his sons added 'many new Accounts', including the recent clashes with the Ottomans.

Through these calendars, the leaders of the Reformation took a selection of contemporary historical events as proof that their God was still intervening in history and sending messages to His Protestant followers. In the process, the Catholic Church calendar, with its traditional saints and collection of Roman historical facts, had suddenly lost much of its significance. Now the demand was for the facts of salvation on which believers could ponder and be strengthened in their self-formulated faith. Consequently, the historical calendar of Eber's sons proclaimed on 1 July that 'on this day … the king of Mauretania rejected the Turkish faith and converted to Christianity, and was christened together with a large number of his followers, in the year 1569.'[7]

On 22 July another calendar told us that 'in the year AD 1456, Jànos Hunyadi, father of King Matthew of Hungary, fought bravely against the Turks when they invaded Belgrade. If Mohamet, the Turkish Sultan, had conquered Constantinople three years previously, now he was badly wounded by a swift arrow.'[8] These are but two examples from a whole catalogue of historical entries and observations. Tales about the Saracens, their miraculous conversion and the conquering of cities stood next to the appearance of comets in the form of a Turkish sabre and the head of the last emperor of Constantinople on a stake. Had they been systematically arranged, they would have read as a series of confrontations with Muslim neighbours from the Crusades to the present. However, the Protestant authors did not order them. In this

era of religious reform, they were bent on proving that God was on their side and that He sent them signs in the form of contemporary events, in order to strengthen His struggling community in its faith. In other words, the reformers saw contemporary history working in favour of their reform. By fitting their perceptions into the Roman Church calendar, they were attempting to counteract the Church's official views and to create a new continuity.

Philipp Melanchton's preface was a help to anyone wishing to interpret the contemporary signs correctly. It was possible to read from history, he argued, how God assembled his Church, how He provided miracles and signs and set an example of Himself in the Church leaders. This was of course primarily in relation to the martyrs of the early Church, 'due to deaths and martyrs who suffered because of their knowledge of Christian teachings'. But although they were still valid, these stories had faded into the far distance for the Germans, who were at that time in revolt against the Pope and the deplorable circumstances in the Catholic Church. Instead, reformers showed an interest in collecting martyr testimonies 'up until our last times'. Of the latter, the martyr calendar of the Protestant theologian Hondorff offers an interesting example. Here too, the themed title points to the main interest:

> *Calendarium sanctorum et historiarum.* Or the holy Martyr Histories as from the beginning of the World up until our last times for the true testimony of Christ our Lord and Saviour who suffered and were persecuted under cruel pains and torture and finally robbed of their lives thus departing to the eternal Heavenly Fatherland.[9]

Who provided these martyr stories 'up until our last times'? The fact that Melanchton's preface was also printed in numerous anti-Turkish pamphlets clearly suggests that he saw these martyrs as the victims of the Ottoman attacks. The overlaps between calendar and anti-Turk literature are indeed striking. Andreas Hondorff even added a complete description of the Ottoman Empire to his calendar.[10]

The struggle for religious reform that took place in central Europe

in the sixteenth century placed increasing distance between the pro-
testers and their Catholic 'mother' Church. Alongside the new Church
regulations, the reformers conjured up an image of their Ottoman
neighbours as the epitome of the religious 'other' and their religion as
a threatening ideology. The entire sixteenth century reverberated with
threatening scenarios and apocalyptic ideas. As announced in the
Revelation of John, the world was believed to be nearing its end.[11]
Thomas Münzer, the leader of the peasants, estimated the date for the
apocalypse at 1550; the reformer Martin Luther believed it would take
place around 1600. A central 'sign' that made them see things this way
was that the Catholic Church was behaving in an 'ungodly' manner and
had turned out to be the long-announced 'Antichrist'. A second
important 'sign' that the world was nearing its end was perceived to be
the presence of the Ottomans who were preparing to conquer central
Europe. Originally settled in the south of the Balkans, the Ottoman
armies were gaining ground on the Holy Roman Empire,[12] most
unjustly, as the reformist preachers soberly ascertained:

> The Turk has neither the right nor the command to initiate
> battle and to attack countries that do not belong to him. His
> warfare, therefore, is nothing but cruelty and robbery. For he is
> not quarrelling out of need; nor must he protect the peace
> within his country such as an upright leader would do; rather,
> he seeks to steal other countries and to destroy those who do
> not and have not hurt him, just like a pirate or roadside thief.[13]

The fact that they attacked and were successful in doing so was
registered with shock. The reformer Martin Luther even attempted to
provide an explanation for this in his sermons. For, in popular percep-
tion, their military successes had given rise to the suspicion that the
Turks were simply adhering to the better religion. Luther found
himself confronting the task of strengthening the young Protestant
Church in its faith. Resorting to the concept that presently 'many
martyrs are entering heaven' was of great help in this regard:

> Where we are unable to convert the Saracens, much less the

Turks, may we in turn remain firm and strong in our faith, and not be moved by the fact that the Saracens and Turks have experienced vain victory and fortune against the Christians, while we have had much misfortune in the fight against them, until they became the rulers of the world, always reigning with great honours and possessions; we, however, were inferior, with great shame and destruction. … Therefore, the blood of Christ must be shed from the beginning of the world until its end, so that many martyrs will enter heaven.[14]

Far less sobering were the popular pamphlets traversing central Europe at the time. The image of the cruel Turk murdering and burning his way through the lands, skewering small children as he went, was illustrated in bright colours in wood engravings and songs. These were complemented by lampoons against the 'Türcken' as well as reports written by former prisoners of war. There was a lively interest in this 'other' religion, seen as the cause for the aggressive behaviour of the Ottomans and the key to their success. In popular opinion, the Koran was even taken to be what Luther called the 'Fanfare of Holy War'.

To reformist theologians Martin Luther, Philip Melanchton and John Calvin, however, with their acts of war the Ottomans were also re-enacting the divine drama. What was happening out there was history according to God's will, a will the apostle John had already described in his Apocalypse and that He sent to the protesting German Church as a sign. It was only logical to look upon the Ottomans as 'God's scourge' (Luther) and the embodiment of the previewed 'Gog and Magog'. For the preachers, they were a kind of 'disciplining cane' that God had sent to strengthen the Christians in their faith. The Ottoman threat was thus converted into a sermon motif with which the protesting Christians, who meanwhile were exploring a great many religious options, might be called to order. A religion-oriented interest in Europe's Turkish and Arabic neighbours emerged, and with it a screen on which one's own religious self-perception, marked by religious claims to autonomy, revolt and apocalyptic ideas, could be reorganized and understood.

Luther published his theses in 1517. The Ottoman armies conquered Rhodes in 1515, Belgrade in 1518 and Mohács in Hungary in 1522. They arrived in Vienna for the first time in 1527. In other words, the Reformation and the attacks by the Ottoman army took place simultaneously. The humanists had prepared the Reformation. Indeed, from 1517 onwards, events pertaining to the Reformation seemed to summersault, yet they were 'home made' and at no time perceived as externally initiated; rather, they were seen as actions of purely domestic origin. The appearance of the Turks on the country's borders, on the other hand, had not been planned at any time and had hardly been foreseeable; accordingly, it was regarded as foreign and external interference. The unfitting events of contemporary history, namely the Reformation and the Ottoman military successes, were thus brought into context; or, to use the words of Reinhart Koselleck, a simultaneity of the non-simultaneous occurred. Had the Native Americans crossed the ocean in rowing boats to wreak their revenge on their 'discoverer', they would probably have become the centre of Reformist attention. As it happened, it was the Ottomans who set an example – a divine theatre in which Christianity played with divided roles and that provided a positive sign for the diverging Protestants. This does not yet result in a coherent narrative on the Muslim foe, but the strands of it collected here will feed the Protestant one that emerges some time later.

False prophets: a Jesuit view of history

The decisive step towards turning this *mélange* of historical facts and fiction into a history textbook for use in schools was taken not by a Protestant but by a Catholic educator.[15] In 1597 the Jesuit Oratio Tursellini,[16] school director of several newly founded Jesuit colleges in Italy, produced an elegantly written account in Latin, in which he arranged historic material in a continuous line from the creation until 1595.[17] In this book, which might be considered one of the first new-style history textbooks, Tursellini took the decisive step of freeing the calendar entries from their temporal day-by-day constraint, ordering them year-by-year instead. Far from repeating the unruly bunch of entries or confirming their aim as divine 'signs', Tursellini re-created

the internal cohesion of the Catholic Church while re-embedding its course with the help of a historical narrative. To reach this aim, he recounted the course of history 'from the beginning' of the creation as described in the Old Testament to explain the role of the Church as sole heir to the Christian revelation and sole interpreter of its history.[18] Having installed this centre, he could then dismiss the Protestant reform and Ottoman threat as treacherous incidents on the periphery.

When established in 1540, the Jesuit order found its Church on the defensive while at the same time expanding on a worldwide scale. At this tumultuous moment it took the decision to become the *Militia Christi* and to spread the faith in the new world (its external mission), while at the same time combating and regaining lost terrain on 'the German illness' (its inner mission). Its instrument of attack was to educate a new elite.[19]

The preface to the French translation of 1708 contains a short biography of Tursellini that mirrors the image the order nursed of itself. Tursellini, it states, was a sweet man, a born educator with an enormous talent for shaping young people's lives. Born in 1540, the Jesuit order destined him early on to become a teacher, a mission he fulfilled with dedication for 45 years as, among other things, rector of the Jesuit colleges in Florence and Rome. Tursellini was a learned man who compiled Latin grammars and glossaries, edited the Jesuit missionaries' first letters, wrote a biography of the founder of his order Xavier de Loyola and, towards the end of his life, compiled the book he continued to call a 'chronicle' but that was freely translated as *Histoire universelle* (1708) for the French edition. Although Tursellini nowhere states explicitly that he wrote his book for the benefit of his pupils, the French translator, a Jesuit padre, insisted that he made amendments only '*à rendre cet ouvrage utile au jeunes gens*'. From his later position in time, the translator crafted it as a history book that could be used in class instruction, but it seems that Tursellini was not yet sure about that.

The reader may have become aware by now that by following a collection of historic 'facts' about the Ottoman enemy we have now entered into the wider area of history writing, which, in time, would be adapted for schools. At the time of its emergence, however, this was

not at all clear. The constant changes in the title of Tursellini's account suggest that it was yet to find its new location: it had a long way to go from *Chronicon* (1597) to *Ristretto* (1637) to *Storia del Mundo* (1650) to *Historiarum* (1650) to *Histoire universelle* (1708). Whereas Tursellini still opted for Seneca's *Ab urbe condito*, 'From the foundation of the city', as a fitting subtitle, it took time to alter this into *Ab origine mundi*, 'From the beginning of the world' (1630).

Written in the last years of what could be described as an exceedingly unquiet century, Tursellini's master narrative reinstalls the Catholic Church and those who support it as the one and only centre of the world. In history, if one could summarize its purpose, man may read God's divine intention, learn about the Church as His legitimate representative on earth, and trace the enemies of the Church against whom time and again it successfully defended itself. People, movements or occurrences that threatened its peace are not allotted much space in this account: they are either dismissed in half sentences or not mentioned at all.

Of the ten chapters in his book, only the last one covered the period immediately before the one on which he focused (1400–1595). The manner in which he ignored the main happenings that uprooted the Church during that time suggests that we are dealing with a very serious bone of contention. The narrative centres on a string of faithful Austrian rulers – Maximilianus (1500), Carolus V (1520), Ferdinandus (1558), Maximilianus II (1565), Rodolphos II (1575), all described as virtuous men who, though threatened by the impious Ottoman armies at Bihazc, Mohács and Vienna, kept true to the Catholic faith. The narrative simply ignored whatever else happened at that time, which included the movement of Johannes Hus, Martin Luther's declaration and the Lutherans who followed suit, as well as the Dutch, Swiss and English, who all experimented with new Church orders. Martin Luther's name only pops up to introduce the founder of the Jesuit order:

> While Martin Luther, a Saxon monk supported by Duke Frederick, through the furious declarations he made in the Duchy of Saxony, tore at the sovereign position of the Holy

See, Ignatius de Loyola, who has since become the founder of
the Society of Jesus, distinguished himself with a large repu-
tation of saintliness. It seems that God himself wanted to
oppose this new troupe of holy athletes against the doings of
such infamous deserters of the Catholic faith.[20]

The nine parts that preceded Tursellini's contemporary theatre
carefully prepared the reader for it, narrating history as the deeds of
saints and emperors who had laid the foundations for and steered the
Church through time. The only other personae from the past allowed a
place in their ranks had to offer meaningful examples of otherness,
which Tursellini used to exemplify and underline the uniqueness of
Christian history. The prophet Muhammad's entry was a good example
of this technique. He was introduced as an illustration of what
happened when an emperor failed to live up to true faith, hinting at
the way the Church dealt with heretics, like for instance Luther, who
arrived later in time.

The story of Muhammad started with Heraclius, the unfaithful
Christian emperor whom Tursellini, when recounting the rulers of the
Byzantine Empire, critically typified as a *monothelitarum*, a member of
one of those Nestorian sects in the Middle East that erroneously
denied the trinity. *Monothelitarum deinde errore implicitus, imperator nullus
fuit*,[21] runs his conclusion – 'of such a ruler one can only expect serious
trouble' and, sure enough, trouble soon entered in the person of the
prophet Muhammad:

Some years before, Mahomet, Arab or Saracen by birth, a
monster who has been fatal to the Christian faith, started to
give violent blows to the Roman Empire. This false prophet,
who was a Christian borne from a pagan father and a Jewish
mother, insinuated that he had special encounters with the
Archangel Gabriel. And while he made use of the Nestorian
monk Sergius in order to better confirm his cheat, he formed a
monstrous sect made up of Christianity, Judaism and Paganism.
Such is the origin of the Empire of the Saracens.[22]

This coarse little biography undoubtedly summed up the Church's long memory of the origins of Islam. Considered a Christian of mixed descent who mingled with and cunningly made use of Nestorians (whom the Church regarded as dangerous sectarians), Muhammad was portrayed as a 'monster' and the originator of a 'monstrous sect'. In later editions of Tursellini's book, another telling sentence adorned the narrative: 'At first he posed as a prophet, but once he had put himself at the head of a troupe of bandits, he established this pernicious religion with violence, introducing it first to Arabia.'[23] The addition of this sentence viciously turned what was deemed a Christian sectarian into a criminal heading a group of armed bandits who helped him to force his ideas on others. The combination of these two elements, the treachery of the Church and using violence to achieve his aims, structured a narrative of 'otherness' that still resonates in our time. Henceforth, these two elements dominated all references to Muhammad in historical narratives designed for educational purposes in Catholic countries; and, after some twisting about, they were also adopted in Protestant history books (see below).

Tursellini betrayed his aim through the way in which he depicted Luther and Muhammad in his account of history, for instead of trying to settle what happened in the past or to discern between truth and falsehood, he juxtaposed the outer and inner enemies of the Church. He presented both Muhammad and Luther as the originators of sectarian movements, the gist of which was encapsulated in their personal behaviour. He called Muhammad 'the false prophet', but Luther did not even receive that seal: they were merely referred to in the text as 'infamous deserters'. According to the narrative, both men received help from an unfaithful Christian ruler (Emperor Heraclius and Duke Frederick respectively). Both managed to threaten the Church, Muhammad through dealing out 'violent blows' and Luther with 'furious declarations'. Between the two there was, however, one important difference, which seemed to point to a future solution. In Muhammad's case, a treacherous monk offered him a chance to make himself trustworthy in the eyes of his followers. The high treason perpetrated by this monk was remedied in the sixteenth century by the saintly Ignatius de Loyola, whom God

had sent to push back the sectarians and whose followers were introduced as 'holy athletes', a strong expression designed to leave no doubt that, this time, the situation was in hand.

The ecclesiastical memory we have just considered was not quoted to reappraise its contents, let alone throw a critical eye on its roots. It was summarized solely to sting Protestant 'heretics', while at the same time reassure the faithful that the Church was still going strong. (No doubt, it was also used to frame the Ottomans, but that falls outside the scope of this contribution.) The locus in which the summary was offered, a historical account from the creation to the then present day, may be considered one of the passages through which medieval ecclesiastical knowledge about meaningful others travelled from an elite theological framework to an educational frame with a mass distribution. In other words, the traditional ecclesiastical lore expressed in sermons and learned theological treaties, in which Islam had been perceived as a deviating Christian heresy, was reconfigured and moulded into a narrative that connected Muhammad, Saracens and Ottomans. In the history of European history textbooks it marks an important moment in time. It was here that the fictitious account of Muhammad and 'his' religion, which still dominates the history textbooks of many European countries, took a point of departure.

In the nineteenth century, history textbooks for use in Austrian schools made the juxtaposition more explicit, recounting how Luther and his 'sect' helped the Ottomans gain territory on the Austrians. According to the textbooks, first Luther refused to pay money towards the Balkan 'Crusade' that the Church was organizing at the time, and second he 'helped' the Saracens by weakening Christianity. Some textbooks even suggest that both 'sects' can be reduced to the same heresy.[24]

However, this was still a long way off. Notwithstanding the remark of the French translator who wanted to adapt it to the needs of young people, it is unclear what place Tursellini's book occupied in Catholic school instruction between the time of its first appearance and the end of the eighteenth century. Until 1762, when the Jesuit order was expelled from France, schools in Catholic countries did not recognize history as a subject other than when considering the training of future

rulers and magistrates, for whom knowledge of history and geography was considered necessary as indirect forms of advice. Students may, however, have been encouraged to read and discuss this history book not in the regular curriculum but in the academies that the Jesuits founded in their own colleges.[25]

The Protestant reaction

Protestant readers seem to have been among the first to receive Tursellini's account of history and, to all appearances, it offended them.[26] The German Protestant minister Johannes Clüver,[27] for instance, sat down 20 years later to compose a learned answer, which was published in 1631 in Leiden and reprinted at least a dozen times.[28] Apparently, the minister wanted to create an antidote to Tursellini, a 'true' view of history in which God sided with the Protestants.

In his answer, Clüver abandoned the Protestant tendency to accumulate fact and fiction in historical calendars and instead adopted Tursellini's structure of a lineal narrative from the creation to what was then the present day. Starting with Adam and Eve and the biblical story of the creation, he too stepped from ruler to ruler and from reign to reign. Again, the account was divided into ten parts and again historical 'facts' were evoked to explain occurrences in the present. Notwithstanding this structural sameness, the internal differences between the two narratives were huge. As one might expect, the confessional struggle that shook middle Europe at the time of writing also dictated the direction of the narrative. Part ten ended with the *Tumultus Austriacus*, the Austrian military actions against the Bohemian Protestants in 1618 that started the military clash that later became known as the Thirty Years' War. Moreover, whereas the 'facts' of far-away history basically remained the same, contemporary history bore very different names and faces. Instead of Catholic kings, we met Johannes Hus, Johannes Comenius, Desiderius Erasmus, Martin Luther, John Calvin and other learned *doctore*s who gave shape to the Reformation. In his introduction, Clüver mentioned that he used no fewer than 600 sources to compose his work. On leafing through the 900 pages that make up his book, I could not help but wonder how many historical calendars might have been among them. In his account

of the Turkish approach to the Balkans, beside his empirical obser-
vations on the Ottoman Empire and its geographical spread, we again
meet the comet in the form of a Turkish sabre and the head of the last
Byzantine emperor on a stake. Alongside the Catholic account, the
writer maintained that 'Muhammad's religion' was a Christian inven-
tion, but he considerably weakened the role of its prophet. According
to him, the prophet Muhammad was not the bandit leader of a violent
sect, as in Tursellini's account. Rather, he was a poor orphan suffering
from epilepsy, whom the monk Sergius had misused for his own
sinister purposes:

> During that time, in the year of our Lord 623, occurred the
> manifestation of the pseudo prophet Mahumet the Saracene. As
> he was poor and an orphan, he made himself useful for his
> superior, with the name of Chadiga, first as a merchant then as
> her spouse. … Chadiga was quick to recognize that her hus-
> band suffered from an epileptic disease, which he tried to hide
> from her through a web of lies in which he claimed that the
> archangel Gabriel appeared to him. But it was the lying monk
> Sergius, banned from Byzantium because of the Nestorian
> heresy and supported by the treacherous Jews, who claimed
> new revelations that would honour the son of Maria as the great
> prophet and the light of all people but denied the existence of
> God and that of God's son.[29]

Admittedly, picturing the prophet as a poor, mentally ill man did no
justice at all to the religion of the Ottomans, but that was not the aim
of the narrative. Rather, by downplaying Muhammad's role as the
founder of a world religion, it reinforced the Catholic account of the
origin of Islam as a Christian heresy, but contradicted the implications
that Catholic authors attached to it, suggesting instead that the event
pointed towards the Church's present waywardness. Again, the
narrative was not isolated. Clüver clearly constructed the preceding
chapters to prepare for his final attack on the Catholic Church, which
he accused of being Magog, the sign of the devilish powers indicating
the end of the world as announced in the Apocalypse of St John.

Through this learned exchange, the construction of the past was introduced as a lever in the confessional struggle.[30] To stress their point, the authors used whatever seemed appropriate from their confessional point of view. Catholic authors showed no visible interest in gathering empirical data. All that was 'known' about Islam was traditional lore handed down by a Church that had always considered Muslims a corrupted part of the Christian mission. German Protestants saw the Ottoman foe from a different perspective. Luther regarded Ottomans as God's 'scourge' or 'disciplining cane'; he therefore gathered news accounts, which he read as 'divine signs', to show the young Protestant community that God was on their side. In his wake, learned authors published many historical calendars in which such 'signs', facts that were partly rooted in empirical experience, were gathered. Clüver continued this tradition and consequently included a wide but unsystematic range of observations based on empirical knowledge derived from the military encounters of earlier generations.

Such are the narrative differences between the two books. Nonetheless, for both authors Muhammad embodied a meaningful 'other' and describing this otherness helped them to draw confessional boundaries in the present. These historical accounts were never intended to study Ottomans, Muslims, the Muslim world, the prophet Muhammad or the religion of Islam for their own sakes. The centre of the narrative was firmly positioned 'here', in the Catholic Church for the one, in Protestant reform for the other. Whatever happened on the periphery in a faraway past was of minor importance and whenever the authors allowed such stories to enter their narrative, they only served to stress the border that Catholics and Protestants were drawing between them.

The learned exchange also served as a foundational moment for the production of history textbooks. Whereas for the next century teaching history in Catholic regions remained an extramural subject to prepare future monarchs for their responsibility, Protestants in Germany soon started to use these historical accounts as a means of teaching children the right way to perceive the world. In the next section I shall explain how this was done.

Moulding the past into history instruction

The Thirty Years' War between Catholics and Protestants (1618–48) was in many ways a dramatic break. The German population was reduced from 16 to 11 million people during this time and, with only a few exceptions, the many German earldoms, duchies and kingdoms were divided into Catholic and Protestant states. Most of the north affiliated to Luther (41 per cent) and most of the south to the Pope (58.6 per cent).[31] The Reformation was, however, not only a struggle for freedom of worship; it was also a battle for education, of which the Lutherans were the victors.[32] Luther wrote 'To the magistrates of all the German cities; that they may erect Christian schools and take care of them. Let the children come to me and do not refuse them' for the benefit of Lutheran princes and magistrates, appealing to their responsibility to seize the task of education from the Church and to deal with it independently.[33] In the sixteenth century, 101 schools were founded (of which only ten were Catholic), and during the Thirty Years' War further schools were started without hindrance.[34] After the war the Lutheran states made schooling obligatory by law.[35] Equally, the many new Protestant Latin and council schools began to produce their own school textbooks in German and indeed in the very subjects that still carry the function of inspiring identity – history and geography.

Until then school history had consisted of a random collection of facts put together for the purpose of complementing the subject of Latin with factual knowledge.[36] The many editions and widespread use of history compendiums *a studioso iuventute* by authors of late antiquity such as Pomponius Laethus[37] or Valerius Maximus[38] demonstrate that in the meantime this approach to history continued to be employed in schools. At the same time, however, in Lutheran cities such as Gotha, Erfurt, Jena, Nuremberg, Helmstedt and Berlin, clusters of academics emerged to write a new history book for 'their' school under the patronage of a prince. These clusters usually included the headmaster of the grammar school, the local vicar, a theologian, a specialist in early languages and a publisher.[39] These books were more than mere collections of facts taken from the Protestant Church calendar, for attempts were made to present the full range of historical knowledge within a concise and useful structure. As a rule, the master narrative

followed Tursellini's example and made history appear as a straight line from the creation of the world to the present, along which German kings and Church reformers were lined up alongside the Old Testament heroes, Church martyrs and Christian emperors who had gone before them. History and geography compendiums thus emerged, which were repeatedly restructured and extended across several generations until they gave voice to a master narrative that corresponded to the ideas of the Lutheran princes and experts. The following example may provide a more detailed view of this process.

In 1682 Johannes Gerlach Wilhelmi, headmaster of the Joachimthaler Gymnasium in Berlin,[40] published a short essay in German contemplating the history of the whole world, starting with the creation and stepping through time from ruler to ruler until the account reached into the seventeenth century.[41] This small book evidently attracted a readership beyond the school. In any case, some time later the publisher decided to extend the original 154-page edition to 1070 pages.[42] The text was divided into five parts to correspond with the five world empires; to a modern reader the result looked like a hotchpotch of knowledge about the Bible, antiquity and the history of the Church, complemented by a compilation of more recent calendar texts from the Crusades to Ottoman defeats and up to the sighting of a comet's tail in the shape of a Turkish sabre. Ultimately, they were all short items of information with the only recognizable structure being their chronological order. 'Under Pope Urbano in the year 1095, the Christians reconquered the Holy Land, and maintained their hold on it for 88 years. In this time, the *Ordo Canonicorum seu Regularium* had emerged in the year 1070, as well as the Brunone Carthusians.'[43]

The second book was clearly a failure, or at least it was never republished. As early as 1723, however, Hilmar Curas wrote a new *Introduction to universal history* and it remained in print until 1774.[44] Curas, a learned savant and teacher at the same school, continued the work of his predecessor with so much educational gusto that his book was soon translated into other European languages, among them Dutch and Russian (see also Chapter 3 by Marat Gibatdinov in this volume).

Rather than dividing the world into empires, Curas took a teleo-

logical path based on salvation history and divided the past into three
Christian-flavoured periods that focused on the story of Christian
salvation – 'From the Creation to the Great Flood'; 'From the Great
Flood to the Birth of Christ'; and 'From the Birth of Christ up until
the present'. He divided the respective material into questions and
answers, borrowing his didactic method from the Protestant
catechism, which, since Luther's time, had instilled the basic facts of
Protestant faith into many generations of German children with the
help of the question and answer technique.

As they did not belong to salvation history, Turks entered the
narrative through the back door in the following manner:

> *What should you remember about Constantino Paleologo?*
>   He was the last Christian emperor, and it was during his
> lifetime that the Turks conquered Constantinople.
>
> *What happened to the emperor when the city was handed over?*
>   He lost his life when the city was handed over; his head was
> placed on a pole and carried around by the Turks. The city was
> plundered; nothing was spared from destruction and cruelty.[45]

This short entry on the Turks seemed to inspire a need for more
information, for Curas added an eight-page annexe to the book
entitled '*On the Turks*'. This annexe marked the beginning of the school
textbook narrative on 'Islam', producing an approach that is still used
in history textbooks in German schools. '*Who was this Mohamet?*'
concerned the life of the prophet. '*How did he establish this religion?*' was
followed by a generalizing judgement of Islam. '*How did things continue?*'
led to a history of the early Islamic empires and their threat to
Christian lands. The colonization of the Iberian Peninsula was intro-
duced with '*Which countries were seized by the Saracens?*' And numerous
other questions on the 'Turkish threat' provided opportunities to des-
cribe contemporary happenings.

Half a century later, the book was extended further. This time the
theologian and historian Matthias Schröckh[46] took it upon himself to
rephrase the simple questions and answers of his predecessor in a two-

volume work of 900 pages, later reprinted under the title *World History for Children* until well into the nineteenth century.[47] With 50 pages on Muhammad, the Saracens and Turks, Schröckh was anticipating the extended narratives on 'Islam' that would dominate nineteenth-century history books. The learned textbook writer Ludwig Bauer, for instance, dedicated 160 pages to Islam and that was not unusual.[48]

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the troubles of earlier times seemed far away. The acute threat of war had faded into the distance; erudite Lutherans were expressing interest in Islam as a 'natural religion' and in the Ottomans as the producers of exotic cultural goods. The stories of a *Thousand and One Nights* were translated into several European languages and they opened people's minds to a new and mysterious world. Scenes from everyday Turkish life were depicted in Meißen porcelain figures; the Prussian king made the Turkish ambassador a gift of the Islamic graveyard in Berlin;[49] and Schröckh wrote a mainly secular history of the world in which he approached Islam as a world religion and viewed it from a rational perspective. The narrative, however, remained that of his predecessor: Muhammad was still associated primarily with 'his' religion and the narrative still suggested that, as 'they' attacked 'us', 'we' had to defend 'ourselves' with the help of the Crusades.

This marks Muslims as generic aggressors and draws distinctions between descriptions of the self and of meaningful others, be they the Ottoman armies before Vienna or the Tatars in Poland. At first the connection was not always indicated between the Arab natives of Jerusalem and the Ottoman armies in the Balkans; many history books even omitted the topic of the Crusades altogether. Near the end of the eighteenth century, when the course of history began to move towards nation building, the connection between the two rapidly became more firmly established until Arab and Turkish societies eventually appeared in history textbooks solely under the heading of 'Islam'.

The above genealogy of school textbook authors who provided Berlin grammar schools with history books, as well as with thoughts on the uses of history, from 1682 until the mid-nineteenth century, found its counterpart in all Lutheran states. Catholic educational classes, however, fell by the wayside.[50] Although the Society of Jesus

was publishing history textbooks for use in German schools as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, it did not share the spirit of the Enlightenment and earlier Catholic perceptions continued to inform its treatment of Islam.[51]

The Protestant educational reform produced a novel and very creative elite. The famous poets and thinkers of the eighteenth century, Kant, Goethe, Klopstock, Schiller, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, E. T. A. Hoffmann, Hölderlin and the Humboldt brothers received a Protestant education, often with a Pietist tinge. Where did history appear in the education of these men? Immanuel Kant, who went to school in the 1730s, had religious education, Latin and Greek in the mornings and Hebrew and mathematics in the afternoons. At lunch time, he could opt to learn history, handwriting or singing. But history apparently bored him, for 'the history lessons, which mostly consisted of the history of the Old and New Testament, appeared to the pupils to be a mere extension of their religious education'.[52] Towards the end of the century, however, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel[53] was able to find many a positive element in Schröck's compendium, basing on it his concept of a pragmatic history. In 1785, the 15-year-old wrote in his diary: 'I think a pragmatic history is one that does not narrate mere facts, but also develops the character of a famous man, a whole nation, its customs, traditions, religion and the various changes and variations of these from those of other peoples and nations.'[54]

In other words, times were changing. The past started to point to the future; knowledge of it was supposed to bring individuals and nations progress. The present became the stakeholder of a contingent and transitory modernity that prepared for the future.[55] In this time of transformation, writing history advanced to a leading discipline that was to reflect principles of philosophy but also the origins and substance of one's own nation. In 1804, history was promoted to one of the main school subjects. Curas's narrative concept, which accommodated knowledge of the Muslim neighbour, now advanced towards defining a nation that was coming into being. Not only in Germany but also in at least fifteen European nations that were in the process of emergence, the narrative on Islam became a space for national self-definition.[56] Finally, in 1871, with the founding of the German nation-

state, it was anchored under the keyword 'Crusades' in the national school curricula where it remains to this day.

Conclusions

At the beginning of the pathway that marks the course of the Islam narrative through time, there was a contingent moment. The Reformation and the appearance of the Ottoman armies on Austria's borders occurred simultaneously. The mere coincidence of those two happenings cannot be stressed enough. It could have been the American Indians, or the heathen Scandinavians, or maybe even the Chinese from the other side of the earth who threatened the equilibrium. As it happened, it was the Ottomans who stumbled upon the scene and became embroiled in the unfolding confessional struggle.

History became important in and through the confessional dispute. All of a sudden the past was no longer a well-known country over which the Church presided, in which it placed its religious beacons as it thought fit and from which it drew its legitimacy. Scrutinizing this legitimacy, the young Protestant community also claimed history to be on its side, interpreting the 'signs' of contemporary events as God's messages, letting its followers know that He supported their endeavour. Only when the past was disputed, within the context of a confessional framework that was about to break apart, was modern history writing created.[57]

Ottomans are perceived from within two frameworks. One is based on the ecclesiastical lore of the Catholic Church, which was formerly diffused in devotional contexts. In the struggle it was transformed into a concise (and vicious) account that associated Muhammad with treason and aggression, with a little of the script linked to the historical appearance of Saracens and Ottomans. The other framework started from contemporary empirical observations – raids, military clashes, glimpses of the Ottoman court and of Ottoman manners and food, comets that took the form of an Ottoman sabre and all those rumours that appear in times of impending war, including misleading war propaganda.

All this served to describe the emerging confessional 'us'. The border being drawn was to protect 'us' from the competing confessional

claim. Describing Muslims and their religion was only one pawn in this game, yet another means of accusing the other confessional party of 'letting the enemy in', or of not being 'up to par' through heresy, or of having turned into the Antichrist Magog who announces doomsday and the end of the world.

Eventually, in a genesis that experienced many contingencies, around 1670 all this resulted in a textbook narrative on Islam. It surfaced in all the history textbooks of all the Protestant circles that took the education of their children into their own hands. Catholic educators in other European countries only joined the chorus some fifty to a hundred years later and when they did they stuck to their own blueprint.[58] A kaleidoscopic picture emerged of Tatars, Ottomans, Saracens and Arabs fastening onto a religion associated with aggression. In the course of time, some of the actors in this narrative disappeared, others made their entry, but the image persisted of aggressive people who used their religion to legitimate their aggression.

In textbooks in Germany today the narrative of Muslims and Islam is still based on Muhammad and 'his' religion, on *jihad* and Crusades, on religious encounters and fundamentalism, which is the modern word for aggression. Along its pathway, no elements emerged that were able to narrate the historicity of events or to open a window on the cultural and historical depth of Muslim societies – the narrative that marked the border between 'us' and 'them' took care of that. It is time to ask to what extent this historical legacy is still relevant to representations of belonging in Europe.

Notes

1. This text is dedicated to the librarians of the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, Braunschweig, who have never tired of laying out their treasures before me and answering my questions. My thanks also go to the Herzog August Library (HAB) in Wolfenbüttel, and the Research Library at Gotha for the useful material I was able to discover in these institutions.

2. See Gerdien Jonker, 'El islam en los libros de texto alemanes: la historia de una narración educacional', in Luigi Cajani (ed.) *Conociendo al otro: el islam y Europa en sus manuales de historia*, Madrid: Santillana, 2008, pp. 37–72;; and Gerdien Jonker, 'Imagining Islam: European encounters with the Muslim world through the lens of German textbooks', in Hakan Yilmaz and Cagla

Aykas (eds) *Rethinking Europe through rethinking Islam*, London: I.B.Tauris, 2009.

3.   See Benoît Challand in this volume.

4.   Paul Eber, *Calendarium historicum conscriptum à Paulo Ebero Kitthingensi*, Wittenberg: xcusum in officina haeredum Georgii Rhav, 1550. This calendar was published in 1550, 1559, 1564, 1566 and 1571 in Latin initially, then from 1582 to 1605 in German; with each new edition it became enriched with new entries.

5.   Lucas Lossius, *Cisio Ianus, hoc est, Kalendarium syllabicum L. Losii: contines dies anni, menses, festa sanctorum, rationem veterum notandi tempora, per kalendas, Nonas, et Idus; Item, indices seu tabellas insigniorum historianum mundi et ecclesiae*, Vitebergae: Officina Cratoniana, 1551. *Cisio Ianus* marks the introductory sentence of the Roman calendar, which states: 'The first month is dedicated to you, Janus, as is the first of everything, as you have the ability to see everywhere at once', cf. Jörg Rüpke, *Zeit und Fest: Eine Kulturgeschichte des Kalenders*, Munich: C. H. Beck, 2006, pp. 107–11. Rüpke's book on calendars first alerted me to the possibility that a straight line might lead from here into the history instruction of the eighteenth century.

6.   Paul Eber, *Paul Eber Calendarium Historicum, das ist, Ein allgemein Calender in welchem uff ein jeden tag durchs ganze jar eine namhafte Geschichte oder Historien aus heiliger schrifft und sonsten so sich voriger oder neulicher Zeit hin und wider in der Welt zugetragen kürtzlich vermeldet und gezeiget wird: Vor XXX Jaren in das Latein übertragen, izt aber von seinen Sönen dem gemeinen Vaterlande zum besten verdeutschet und mit vielen neuen Historien vermehret worden*, Witteberg: Georgii Rhav, 1582.

7.   Ibid.

8.   Michael Beuthner, *Calendarium Historicum: Tagbuch, Allerley Furnhemer, Nahmhafftiger unnd mercklicher Historien aus vielen inn sechserley Sprachen alt und new beschriebnen Chronicken mäniglichem zu sonderem Lust und Nutz mitt fleiß zusammen gebracht durch Michaelem Beuthner von Carlstatt*, 1557.

9.   Andreas Hondorff, *Calendarium sanctorum et historiarum. Oder der heiligen Marterer Historien so von anfang der Welt biß auff unsere letzte zeiten umb warer bekenntniß Christi unsern Herrn und Seligmachers gelitten und verfolgt seindt worden auch endtlich mit grausamen peynen und marter ihres lebens beraubet und also in das Ewig Himmlisch vaterlandt verreiset*, Frankfurt am Mayn: Peter Schmid, 1575.

10. Translated from Antoine Gueffroy, *Le Grand Turc*. For these and other anti-Turkish writings, see Almut Höfert, *Den Feind beschreiben: Türkengefahr und europäisches Wissen über das osmanische Reich 1450–1600*, Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003.

11. Reinhart Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985, p. 20.

12. In 1352, Ottoman henchmen secured the Byzantine crown in the Balkans. In 1366, they made Edirne their capital city; about one hundred years later they conquered Constantinople. Between 1450 and 1820 the Ottoman Empire

bordered on the Holy Roman Empire, the territory covered today by Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. A series of frontier clashes between the Habsburg and Ottoman armies took place mainly on the territory of Hungary.

13. Ioannes Rosinus, 'Preface', *Antiturcica Lutheri: Das ist, Vom Kriege und Gebet wieder den Türcken und von desselben Alcoran ettliche Schrifften des thewren und werthen Mannes Gottes Doctoris Martini Lutheri …; Sampt angehengten etlichen deß Herrn D. Lutheri Propheceyungen, von den künfigen grossen Unglück über Deudschland; Auch … andechtigen Gebetlein, … in Druck zusammen geordnet, Durch Ionannem Rosinum Prediger zu Naumburg*, Leipzig: Neuauflage Ahasver Fritsch, 1595.

14. Martin Luther, 'Preface', *Verlegung des Alcoran Bruder Richardi Prediger Ordens Anno 1300. Verdeütscht durch D. Mar. Lu. MDXXXXII*, Wittenberg: Johannes Lütt, 1542.

15. See Chantal Grell, 'Die Säkularisierung des frühneuzeitlichen Geschicht-sunterrichts in Frankreich. Der unfreiwillige Beitrag von Charles Rollin', in Hans-Ulrich Musolff, Juliane Jacobi and Jean-Luc le Cam (eds) *Säkularisierung vor der Aufklärung? Bildung, Kirce und Religion 1500–1700*, Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 2008, pp. 139–57; Gérard Laudin, 'Changements de paradigmes dans l'historiographie allemande: les origines de l'humanité dans les histoires universelles des années 1760–1820', in Chantal Grell and Jean-Michel Dufays (eds) *Pratiques et concepts de l' histoire en Europe: XVIe–XVIIIe siècles*, Paris: Sorbonne, 1990, pp. 249–75; Uwe Neddermeyer, 'Das katholische Geschichtslehrbuch des 17. Jahrhunderts: Orazio Torsellinis "Epitome Historiarum"', *Historisches Jahrbuch*, vol. 108, pp. 469–83. Munich: Alber Neddermeyer, 1988.

16. Oratio Tursellini or Orazio Torsellini, born 1545 in Rome as the son of a simple fish monger, entered the Jesuit order at an early age, was trained as an educator and headed several Jesuit colleges in Italy before he died in Florence in 1595.

17. Horatio Tursellini, *R .P. Horatii Tursellini: Romani E Societate Iesu Epitomae historiarum. Ab urbe condito usque ad annum 1595*, Rome, 1597. First edition 1597 in Rome, with many reprints in Germany, Italy, England, Holland and France until about 1750; translations in French and Italian, each with an added chapter containing the latest facts of history, explanatory notes and an annotated register. The following quotes are taken from the 1630 edition. See Uwe Neddermeyer, 'Das katholische Geschichtslehrbuch des 17 Jahr-hunderts: Orazio Torsellinis "Epitome Historiarum"', *Historisches Jahrbuch*, vol. 108, Munich: Alber, 1988, pp. 469–83.

18. Helmut Zedelmaier, *Der Anfang der Geschichte: Studien zur Ursprungsdebatte im 18 Jahrhundert*, Hamburg: Meiner, 2003.

19. Ausstellungskatalog (1991) *Die Jesuiten in Bayern 1549–1773*, Ausstellungs-katalog der bayrischen Staatsbibliothek, p. 48; Chantal Grell and Jean-Michel Dufays (eds) *Pratiques et concepts de l'histoire en Europe: XVIe–XVIIIe siècles*,

Colloque tenu en Sorbonne les 22 et 23 mai 1989, Université de Paris IV: Paris-Sorbonne, 1990; Neddermaier, 'Das katholische Geschichtslehrbuch'; and Rudolph Stichweh, *Der frühmoderne Staat und die europäische Universität*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991, p. 224.

20. Horatii Romani Tursellini, *Historiarum, ab origine mundi, usque ad annum à Christo nato Mdxcviii. Epitomae Libri Decem*, Ultrajecti: Jacobum à Poolsum, 1630, p. 418.

21. Tursellini, *Historiarum, ab origine mundi*, p. 216.

22. Ibid., pp. 216–17.

23. Horatio Tursellini, *Histoire Universelle*, with notes on history, legend and geography translated from Latin by P. Tursellin Jesuite, 1708, p. 105.

24. Ludwig Schmued, *Leitfaden für den geschichtlichen Unterricht. Zunächst für die sechste Klasse der Bürgerschulen, Dir. Ludwig Schmued*, Wien: Verlag von A. Pichler's Witwe, 1875.

25. Chantal Grell, 'Die Säkularisierung des frühneuzeitlichen Geschichtsunterrichts in Frankreich: Der unfreiwillige Beitrag von Charles Rollin', in Hans-Ulrich Musolff, Juliane Jacobi and Jean-Luc le Cam (eds) *Säkularisierung vor der Aufklärung? Bildung, Kirce und Religion 1500–1700*, Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 1991, p. 256; Stichweh, *Der frühmoderne Staat und die europäische Universität* , p. 256.

26. Gérard Laudin, 'Changements de paradigmes dans l'historiographie allemande: les origines de l'humanité dans les histoires universelles des années 1760–1820', in Chantal Grell et Jean-Michel Dufays (eds) *Pratiques et concepts de l' histoire en Europe: XVIe–XVIIIe siècles*, Paris: Sorbonne, 1990, p. 249; Zedelmaier, *Der Anfang der Geschichte*, p. 15.

27. Johannes Clüwer or Cluvert (1593–1633) was born in Krempe in Holstein (northern Germany), studied theology and history at Rostock University and became a Lutheran Church deacon, later superintendent in Meldorf and Dithmarschen. In between he held a short professorship in Soroe in Denmark.

28. For this contribution we used the 1665 edition.

29. Johannes Clüver, *Historiarum totius mundi epitome, a prima rerum Origine usque ad annum Christi 1630*, Amsterdam: Ravesteyn, 1668, p. 345.

30. Chantal Grell and Jean-Michel Dufays (eds) *Pratiques et concepts de l'histoire en Europe: XVIe–XVIIIe siècles*. Colloque tenu en Sorbonne, 22 and 23 May 1989, Université de Paris IV: Paris-Sorbonne, 1990; Helmut Zedelmaier, *Der Anfang der Geschichte: Studien zur Ursprungsdebatte im 18 Jahrhundert*, Hamburg: Meiner Zedelmaier, 2003.

31. Atlas, *Große Atlas zur Weltgeschichte*, Braunschweig: Westermann, 1985, p. 106.

32. Laudin, 'Changements de paradigmes dans l'historiographie allemande'; Neddermeyer, 'Das katholische Geschichtslehrbuch des 17 Jahrhunderts'.

33. Martin Luther, *An die Radherren aller stedte deutsches lands: Dass sie christliche Schulen aufrichten und halten sollen. Lasst die Kinder zu mir komen und weret inen*

nicht, Wittenberg, 1525. Appearing in Wittenberg in 1525, it was reprinted in 1528, 1544, 1568, 1579, 1614 and 1620.

34. Heinz Schilling and Stefan Ehrenpreis (eds) *Erziehung und Schulwesen zwischen Konfessionalisierung und Säkularisierung. Forschungsperspektiven, europäische Fallbeispiele und Hilfsmittel*, Münster: Waxmann, 2003.

35. Ibid.

36. Manfred Fuhrmann, *Der europäische Bildungskanon*, Frankfurt: Insel Fuhrmann, 1999, p. 126.

37. *Pomponius Laethus: Compendium Romanae Historiae. A Julio Ceasare usque ad haec tempora, veteris & novis testamenti a studiosa juventute.* The HAB houses numerous prints of German publishing houses from between 1510 and 1698.

38. *Valerius Maximus: Dicta et facta memorabilia.* The HAB also houses numerous prints from the whole of Europe, including Hamburg, Strasburg, Venice, Frankfurt, Rome, Leiden and Berlin (from between 1514 and 1783).

39. The co-authors are usually mentioned in the dedication, such as in the early historical work of Lutheran inspiration, the *Historicae Geographicae* by Sebastian Schröter, which was published in Erfurt as early as 1614.

40. Johannes Gerlach Wilhelmi (1636–87) lived in Berlin and dedicated his life to teaching and organizing the library of the viscount of Brandenburg.

41. Johannes Gerlach Wilhelmi, *Historia universalis, in welcher in kleinen Periodis oder Exercitiolis der Jugend das Studium historicum wird vorgebildet, zu dem Ende, daß sie zugleich mit der Composition auch die vornehmsten Geschichte und Ordnung der Zeiten erlernen möge*, Berlin: VölckerWilhelmi, 1682.

42. Johannes Gerlach Wilhelmi, *Universal-Historie in kleine Periodos oder Exercitia eingetheilet, umb der Jugend das studium historicum angenehme zu machen, Johann Gerlach Wilhelmi. Jetzund vermehret, und biß auff gegenwärtiges 1696. Jahr continuiret, heraußgegeben*, Berlin: VölckerWilhelmi, 1696.

43. Ibid., p. 112.

44. Hilmar Curas (dates unknown) was secretary at the Prussian court, historian and 'writing master' in Berlin.

45. Hilmar Curas, *Einleitung zur Universal Historie, Worinnen die merkwürdigste Begebenheiten von Anfang der Welt bis auf diese Zeit, in Fragen und Antwort kurz vorgetragen werden, nebst einem Anhang der türkischen Historie*, Berlin: Gottlieb Nicolai, 1723, p. 188.

46. Johann Matthias Schröckh or Schroeckh, born in Vienna in 1733 and died in Wittenberg in 1808 was a historian and man of letters.

47. Matthias Schröckh, *Einleitung zur Universalhistorie: zum Gebrauche bey dem ersten Unterrichte der Jugend; nebst einem Anhange der Saechsischen und Brandenburgischen Geschichte Hilmar Curas ganz neu umgearb, berichtigt u zum Gebrauch d. Schulen bequemer gemacht von Johann Matthias Schroeckh*, Berlin: Nicolai, 1774.

48. Ludwig Bauer, *Allgemeine Weltgeschichte für alle Stände mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Geschichte der Religionen sowie das Bedürfniß der gebildeten Jugend beiderlei Geschlechts, bearbeitet und bis auf das Jahr 1835 fortgeführt*, Stuttgart, 1836.

49. Marc-Olivier Rehrmann, *Ehrenthron oder Teufelsbrut? Das Bild des Islams in der deutschen Aufklärung*, Zurich: Spur Verlag, 2001.
50. Laudin, 'Changements de paradigmes dans l'historiographie allemande'.
51. Historischer Anfang, *Kurze und leichte Weise, die catholische Jugend in der Historie zu unterrichten, für die Schulen der Gesellschaft Jesu in der ober-teutschen Provinz. NN*, Augspurg: Wolff. See also the contribution of Viladrich-Grau in this volume.
52. Manfred Kühn, *Kant: Eine Biographie*, Munich: DTV, 2007, p. 68.
53. Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831).
54. Quoted in Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben*, Darmstadt: WB, 1844/1998, p. 8. The original quote in German reads: 'Eine pragmatische Geschichte ist, glaub' ich, wenn man nicht bloß Facta erzählt, sondern auch den Charakter eines berühmten Mannes, einer ganzen Nation, ihre Sitten, Gebräuche, Religion und die verschiedenen Veränderungen und Abweichungen dieser Stücke von anderen Völkern entwickelt.'
55. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, 'Modern, Modernität, Moderne', in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds) *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Munich: Klett-Cotta, 1978, part 4, pp. 93–131.
56. Monika Flacke (ed.) *Mythen der Nationen: Ein europäisches Panorama*, Berlin: Koehler & Amelang Flacke, 1998.
57. A reappraisal of the relationship between Antiquity and modernity takes place towards the end of the eighteenth century only. Until then, the ideals of the antique authors govern arts and history writing alike. See Gumbrecht 'Modern, Modernität, Moderne', p. 105; and Zedelmaier, *Der Anfang der Geschichte*.
58. Neddermeyer, 'Das katholische Geschichtslehrbuch des 17 Jahrhunderts'.

Chapter 2

Representations of Muslim Andalus in the scholarly historical texts of Catalonia (1714–1900)

Mercè Viladrich-Grau

Spanish historiography barely acknowledges the existence of Muslim societies on the Iberian Peninsula between 711 and 1492. As a result, inimical old blueprints of Muslims and Islam are still being perpetuated in regional educational practices, which hamper our understanding of the past, especially of the history of Arab-Islamic civilization in Western Europe. In this chapter I shall take a look at Catalan scholarly and educational narratives on Islam and Muslims. By 'Catalan narratives' I mean books written in Catalan by authors who are representative of Catalan culture, but who nonetheless draw from earlier sources in Spanish. The texts I have singled out for this purpose were used for teaching children in Catalonia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The examples shed light on how earlier constructions of Islam served as a basis for modern Catalan school book narrations about Muslim 'others'. It is my belief that the Catalan narrative that absorbed earlier narrative traditions occupies a distinguished place in the formation of European narratives on Muslims and Islam.

Despite a rich array of educational material, hardly anyone has analysed Catalan school books and manuals from the viewpoint of representations of 'the other'. Likewise, no one has yet tried to recon-

struct the *longué durée* of their ideological foundations on Islam. In attempting to analyse how old mental conceptions were kept so firmly on track, I shall look at the development of more than two hundred years of history textbooks. References to their medieval background will illustrate the richness from which the narratives were drawn and which they hide from view. The *longue durée* approach applied here helps to retrace the narrative pathway, to localize the main decisions behind it, and to clarify its influence on the hegemony of narratives in the present.

Modern historians have already identified the European tendency to associate Islam and its prophet with diabolical forces and have drawn our attention to the attempts of past theologians and historians to destroy a 'monster' who supposedly threatened the European project of economic and political 'progress'.[1] European history took for granted that Muslim powers in the Mediterranean had to be eradicated to make way for the city-states that were emerging at the end of the Middle Ages on the northern shore of the Mediterranean (Genoa, Pisa, Venice, Marseilles, Barcelona) and supporting commercial and colonial expansion.[2] However, the modern trend in sound historical scholarship is very recent and as yet insufficiently well established to erase well-worn representations and deeply rooted ideologies that have lasted for centuries.

The *longue durée* approach provides an essential tool with which to understand the common memory of the Muslim past in this part of Europe and aptly illustrates how this memory has been transported in scholarly and educational narratives over time. A series of images or themes that keep recurring in education manuals, academic works and popular culture not only shape but also channel the long history of disagreement between Christian and Muslim civilizations. The lengthy time span during which these images have been forged lasts from the early Christian texts that describe the conquest by the Umayyad armies of the Iberian Peninsula until such recent and controversial events (as far as historical analysis is concerned) as the Spanish Civil War of 1936–39.

For a start, it is necessary to clarify that throughout Iberian history and into the present Muslims have been placed in a series of confusing

and overlapping categories. Although the wide range of available terms might suggest diversity, most of them refer to a generic homogeneity around practitioners of Islam – Moors, Mohammedans, Arabs, Muslims, Saracens, Mudejar and Ottomans. The present-day list also includes Berbers, Maghrebians and Islamists. The terms have been and continue to be used interchangeably in Catalan and Castilian. All these terms – and *moro* is the one that appears most frequently in the chronicles and historical documentation – impose a generic homogeneity on a collective. Historically and socio-politically, the word *moro* refers to a highly questionable stereotype that serves to reinforce social stigmatization. The etymology of the word derives from the Latin *maurus*, originally a geographical name ascribed to the inhabitants of the province of the Roman Empire known as Mauritania Tingitana. With the Arabization of North Africa, however, the reference underwent a series of transformations. From the outset, and shifting depending on the socio-cultural context, *moro* could be regarded positively or negatively, which was something that also applied to the other terms. Thus, perceptions of Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula have not always been entirely negative or static – rather, one must account for a process of slow change and stabilization according to shifting cycles of political and social conditions.[3]

This ambiguity in the terminology has allowed historians to use terms like 'Maurofilia' or 'Islamofilia' as positive words for 'the other' in the various stages of contact with Muslim civilizations in al-Andalus. Among frequently-cited examples of such positive stereotypes[4] are the gentlemen of Moorish Granada, the image of the Spanish-Moroccan wars, the respectful approach of at least one sector of Spanish and Catalan Orientalism, a longing for the old generation of Spaniards living in the protectorate of Morocco, and contemporary literature. The opposite assignation, 'Maurophobia' or 'Islamophobia', has been preached for much longer. The mass media seem largely responsible for determining what terms are in vogue at any given time, including representations of Muslims in textbooks. Although Muslim immigration to Spain comes predominantly from Morocco, the media continue to use geopolitical referents to northwest Africa, with a clear preference for the word 'Maghrebians'. The very common use of the

collective 'Muslim' suggests a tendency to overlook the existence of religious differences.

Fighting the Moors, an Iberian established way of life

One of the most ancient historical records of the Spanish conquest, the so-called *Mozarabic Chronicle of 754*,[5] describes the Ummayad dynasty's occupation of the Iberian Peninsula between 711 and 754. The term 'Mozarabic' can be translated as 'Arabized' and it refers to the Christians who lived under Arab domination, especially in the southern territories, and who led the first revolts against the Arabs. The chronicle is a masterpiece of the history of al-Andalus, and one of the most important primary sources on Muslim rule in the Iberian Peninsula. Mozarabic authors wrote it during the rule of the first Andalusian emirs and it remains one of the best available sources of information for the period, better than the later and more imprecise Arabic historiography we have at our disposal. The chronicle conveys strong feelings against Muslims and Islam: the defeat of the Visigoth kingdom of Hispania is portrayed as a divine punishment for disobeying Christian rule, just as the corruption and social perversion of the time is depicted as the fatal consequence of the arrival of the Muslim enemy. Therefore, strictly speaking, we can go back to the eighth century to trace the formation of an identity defined in opposition to Arab/ Muslim identity. We cannot yet speak of the birth of a national identity (or identities) let alone of a global Spanish identity, but we can trace a shared affinity against Muslim rule.

After the defeat of the Christians in the eighth century, numerous events highlight the confrontation between the Christian indigenous populations and Muslim societies established in the West. In the long run, these historical facts are transformed into epic episodes and literary renderings in which the confrontation with, and victory over, Islam are exalted as elements of nation building. The process of transformation provides historiography with its most significant subjects like the myth of the Apostle Santiago, Saint James the Great,[6] and the Christian pilgrimage during the Middle Ages. An important element in the rising consciousness of Christian identity was the cult of the apostle Santiago, which came into being during the first period of

Muslim rule, and in the centuries that followed was modelled into an image of the 'patron saint' fighting back the Muslims. Another heroic personality of great renown, the historic figure of El Cid Campeador (who died in 1099), poses as the paladin of the Reconquista, and his heroic deeds form the backbone of a fundamental text for the Castilian language entitled *El Poema del Mio Cid* (The Lay of El Cid). El Cid is the protagonist of the struggle for political power and survival, conquering lands, prestige spoils and booty, while spreading his reputation across the southern frontier of Castile.

Historians called the historical and territorial process of Christian expansion the 'Reconquista'. The term embraces the whole period of the Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula between the first Muslim invasion (*c.*720) and the end of the Kingdom of Granada (1492), a period characterized by the pursuit of territorial control over and against Muslim societies around the Iberian Peninsula. Since the Christian Spanish kingdoms only came into existence after the Muslim invasion, the term is historically inaccurate, despite the efforts of some monarchies to pose as direct heirs to the ancient Visigoth kingdom. In retrospect, the Reconquista has become associated with the idea of the Crusades, but they were a much later phenomenon, given form and voice only in 1095 through the proclamation of Pope Urban II for the recovery of the Holy Land. While the Crusades targeted the Near East, the Reconquista was the European laboratory for waging religious warfare against 'unbelievers', pagan cults and heresies. The Reconquista signalled not only a rivalry between different (Christian) feudal regimes in their historical and demographic territorial spread, but also an ideological quest to abolish all cultural elements, including languages, knowledge, religious traditions and ways of life associated with the preceding Muslim civilizations. As Maureen Purcell has recognized, it can be regarded as a particular case of the Crusaders' movement in the Middle Ages:

> Campaigns against the Moors in Spain were already an established way of life when the first Crusaders set off for Jerusalem. Though final victory over the Moors was to wait until 1492, their progress into Europe itself had, in effect, been

arrested as far back as the era of Le Cid. Thereafter expulsion of the Moors became in a sense a national problem, rather than one which vitally concerned the West as a whole. Crusade to the Holy Land, going beyond national boundaries, could fire the imagination of Christendom more than the still desperate, but not generally threatening, situation in Spain.[7]

If an understanding of the history of encounters and confrontations with Muslim rulers and dynasties on European soil is necessary to the Iberian nations' formative processes, then the same can be said of their historical and ideological attempts to abolish Muslim civilizations. The Spanish historiography of al-Andalus was launched at the same time as the disappearance of the Andalusian political entity, and the attitude it adopted towards its subject was similar to the Orientalism defined by Edward Said.[8] While European Orientalism served the ideological construction of the East and supported colonial and imperial expansion, Spanish Orientalism – whether Catalan or Castilian – focused on Muslim societies that had already been destroyed.

Spanish Orientalism, with a focus on Arabists, came from the work of numerous intellectuals seeking to discover the Andalusian past; they then used their historical knowledge to justify destructive behaviour. It has been remarked that in no other European national school does the ethnocentric tradition weigh as heavily on present-day historiography as it does in Spanish Arabism.[9] As a result, the traditional trends of historiography persist in the collective unconsciousness, especially in that of historians, who tend to make the history of al-Andalus look like an appendage of Spain's history, and provide arguments for the 'necessity' to reconquer the land, to set up a Catholic monarchy and to subjugate and eventually expel the religious minorities of Muslims and Jews.

Medieval Catalan narratives on fighting the Moors

In the medieval period, the different Spanish Christian communities only slowly gained strength, fighting one another and battling for territorial expansion against the Arabic-Muslim Andalusian societies that had settled on the Iberian Peninsula. Indeed, the coming into being of Christian Spain is closely linked to this particular series of

confrontations. The coexistence of Muslim collectives in fact helped the construction of different Christian collectives and collective consciousnesses, embodied in the kingdoms of León, Castile, Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia and Portugal. 'Spain' can be considered as much the result of mutual internal influences and interventions as of intense battles and carving out external borders.

This also raises questions of Catalan representations of coexistence with Muslims. What specific Catalan attitudes were adopted over centuries of confrontation? Did they differ from other positions in other Iberian lands? Ultimately, what role did fighting Muslims play in nation building in Catalonia? Can we detect a specific Catalan view of this confrontation in history textbooks, children's books or in recreational and educational activities carried out in childhood?

Like many European nations, Catalonia has its epic texts that can be viewed as foundational of the Catalan nation and language. A good example is the so-called *Grans Cròniques* written in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by James I (of Aragon), Bernat Desclot, Ramón Muntaner and Pere III, and covering the period from 1208 to 1385.[10] Those centuries were decisive for spreading the political domination of Catalonia and the Catalan language to other territories along the Mediterranean coast, such as the kingdoms of Valencia and Majorca in the Balearic Islands. Eventually, these areas were conquered from Muslims. The chronicles were based on a deep Christian identification and were essential for the development of Catalan national identity. The religious spirit shows in many details. *Llibre dels fets del rei en Jaume*, for instance, recounts how the Catalan king conquered the city of Majorca, which was under Muslim rule (1228). In this episode, the king described with the following words the miraculous intervention of St George when his armies entered the city:

> When they moved and the knights and servants approached the valley, the soldiers heard a voice screaming: 'Santa Maria, Santa Maria!' … These words did not come out of their mouths, but the more they moved forward the better they could be heard, and were repeated about thirty times. … And when the knights entered (the passage), the voices stopped. When the knights

arrived, a few hundred soldiers had already entered the city on foot. And the Saracen king of Majorca and his soldiers fired on our knights. If our soldiers had not entered before, all those would have been killed. The Saracens told us later that they saw a white knight enter their city, and we believe that he was St George, and we believe that he participates in many battles between Christians and Saracens.[11]

Medieval Catalan historiography is not particularly derogatory about Muslims. Creating an image of the 'other' is important because it helps to create one's own image and consolidate awareness of oneself. Medieval chronicles are a mirror of the expectations of their authors, men of empire who encounter themselves in the process of defining an enemy. Divine intervention in favour of Christians does not, however, prevent them from recognizing humanity among Muslims. We can therefore conclude that there is no single vision of the Muslim in the Middle Ages in Catalonia, but this consideration depends both on the observer when the historic moment occurs and on how time and circumstances alter it before it reaches us. Undoubtedly, over the years and with the organization of the Crusades at the European level, the fear, focusing initially on the invader or the enemy, subtly moves towards Muslims, targeting the specific identity of the enemy. The enemy can occasionally become a human being, or even an angel, as defined by the same king: 'Ben Abet [one of the leaders of Muslim Majorca] sent us a friendly message and a generous gift: that is, twenty beasts of burden loaded with meat, and goats, chickens and grapes … so that King James saw in him an angel, although Muslim.'[12]

The *Catalan Cròniques* had a vigorous originality and showed great literary and artistic merit; in fact, they succeeded in launching a Catalan literary tradition that lasted throughout the fifteenth century. Medieval and modern literary roots lie in the model created by the great chroniclers, who expressed fiction as if it were historical fact and who drew from a wide repertoire of myths and heroes – cavalry action was set in ancient times and in more or less imaginary places where events occurred that were far removed from the real world. The most prominent examples of these are Catalan chivalry texts like Ramon

Llull's *Llibre de l'ordre de cavalleria*, novels like *Curial i Güelfa* (anonymous, *c.*1432–68) and *Tirant lo Blanc* by Joanot Martorell (Valencia 1490), which are still widely studied in secondary schools.

Chivalry literature could possibly be considered a key transmitter of medieval representations of Muslims into Renaissance literature, from where bits and pieces have entered school textbooks as established facts. Chivalry books are a fantasy genre, in which it is possible to idealize knights, depict Muslims as fighters and set out some vital rules and moral precepts for educational purposes. Like the literature of chivalry, the academic discipline of Renaissance history also shows how political issues result from human moral decisions. Thus, an autonomous subject, the Renaissance, becomes an essential part of the *Studia Humanitatis*, in that it provides role models of moral behaviour. I believe that this is the transit point towards educational knowledge and a subject that deserves further investigation.

One of the most peculiar approaches to Muslims comes from the Franciscan religious order, which was particularly inclined to exegesis and medieval preoccupations with the Antichrist and demonization of non-Christians, Muslims or Jews.[13] Franciscans were the first to carry out missionary work, sometimes at extreme risk, in the Muslim-ruled cities of Seville and Valencia, and even in the Maghreb. Franciscan spiritual teachings, which were disseminated among lay Christians over the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, advocate imitating Jesus and the apostles and following a personal vocation to holiness that is neither apart from the world nor reserved for isolated monastery monks.[14] This intention to bring the Christian message to a wide audience turns Franciscan ideology into an instrument in the service of popular education. The missionary spirit illuminates an educational and moralistic work written by the Franciscan priest and accredited theologian Francesc Eiximenis (born in Gerona between 1327 and 1332 and died in Perpignan in 1409),[15] who studied at several schools of his order and completed his intellectual training at Oxford University. In 1374, thanks to the patronage of the royal family, he won the title of master of theology at Toulouse University, travelled to Paris to complete his academic education and, on his return to Catalonia, divided his time between teaching and politics. From 1384

to 1408 he lived in Valencia, where he preached, served as a counsellor of the royal council and wrote most of his works. In 1408, as a reward for his loyalty, Pope Benedict XIII entrusted to him the bishopric of Elna and gave him the honorary title of patriarch of Jerusalem. Eiximenis died shortly after moving to Elna. He devoted his life to promoting Christian civic and religious education, achieving great success among the nobility and the urban middle classes. His extensive work has as its primary objective the civic and religious education of the laity. It offers a clever synthesis of scholastic thought, presented in 'a simple and rude manner', that is, in a clear, precise and enjoyable prose. His contribution to Catalan literature lies precisely in the high quality of his prose, his ability to narrate simple scenes and local customs, and his popular language.

Eiximenis wrote in Latin, but also and above all in Catalan, for he wanted to disseminate key points of morality and Christian faith. His works contain the ethical and moral recommendations considered desirable for the human and spiritual formation of a Christian. Among his many observations on education, Eiximenis discussed how to acquire wisdom, underlined the important role of cities as centres of knowledge, and emphasized principles for the education of children and daughters (he included a catechism especially for female audiences, Te Llibre de les dones/Book of Women, 1396). The friar also entered the medieval classroom to comment on the stature of the teacher, the role of orality, and the playful aspect of learning, and he discussed an ideal life as being devoted to study and learning.

Between 1379 and 1386 Eiximenis wrote his masterpiece *Lo Crestià*, an encyclopaedia on ethical and social matters. Through his comments on food and table manners, he characterized several European nations, which he distinguished by their ritual behaviour and eating habits. Among others, he exalted the Catalan nation and referred to the Saracens:

> Catalans eat in a more correct manner than other nations. …
> Catalans cut their meat in a more polished way … whereas the
> French, Germans, English and Italians cut bread into pieces
> and dip it, and make their napkins so miserable and dirty. …

> Catalans are happy to eat twice a day, while other nations have no restraint. Germans, for example, rise (from their beds) during the night to eat. The French drink without restraint. … Eating with many from a single dish is not educated. That is what Saracens do when they eat couscous, all with their hands from a single dish, which is not polite.[16]

The text refers to Muslims as part of a larger group of 'others' in the European nations. It is a good example of the kind of self-description for which the perception of others is essential. While describing table manners, the writer claims the superiority of his own group over all neighbours, whether Christian or Muslim. What does this tell us about medieval Spanish perceptions of Muslims? We have seen that Islam played a decisive part in the construction of Christian identity. The text shows that at the time there was no hard and fast division between 'Europeans' and 'non-Europeans'. Muslims were not the only meaningful 'others' against which the Christian inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula defined themselves. The passage indicates a yet undifferentiated notion of the 'other', which would later be confined to Muslims and Jews. What makes this text particularly valuable is the reference to everyday life as expressed in the summing up of table manners. It emphasizes how deeply the cultural dominance of nationality is taking root in late Catalan medieval society. The cultural irreverance of those who eat with their hands does not allow the implied 'us' to live with them. The same could be said of the historical awareness of the Catalan nation, reflected in its differentiation from other European people. In sum, not just political power, nationality or language determined the differences between communities; material culture also played a part in it.

A century later the Reconquista culminated in the taking of Granada in 1492, but this did not signal the end of the struggle against Muslims. Rather, the end of the Reconquista coincided with the clash between Western European powers and the Ottoman Empire, which at the time was leading in the Muslim Mediterranean. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Christians and Muslims in the Mediterranean expressed their enmity through piracy. As a result,

thousands of Christians (mainly Spaniards and Italians) and Muslims were reduced to the status of slaves, and thousands of boats were attacked, sunken or confiscated. The confrontation noticeably affected maritime traffic and economic activities.[17]

The Inquisition's pursuit of Muslim converts on Spanish soil is another tale of confrontation. On 9 April 1609, Philip III of Spain ordered the expulsion of the Moors, descendants of those members of the Muslim population who, thanks to the pragmatics of the Catholic monarch, had converted to Christianity a century earlier. Those who survived the cleansing remained a target for the Inquisition and gave scholars a chance to repeat and rephrase the many negative stereotypes about Muslim culture already in existence and to create fantasies about the underground religious practices of the Moors.[18]

The Catalan school does not want to die

The War of the Spanish Succession was vitally important to the history of Catalonia. The dispute between supporters of the Bourbon Philip V of Spain (1683–1746) and of Archduke Charles VI of Austria (1685–1740) was complex. It developed in the course of various European and peninsular incidents and was affected by a confluence of dynastic, diplomatic and military factors. In fact, under the guise of a conflict over dynastic inheritance between Austria and Bourbon, what was really at stake was a struggle between two European powers for hegemony in Europe and the colonies.

In a first attempt to make Spain a centralized state after the Bourbon army's victory in 1716, Catalonia was subjected to a set of decrees known in Spanish as the *Decretos de Nueva Planta*. The prolonged presence of Austrian and Bourbon armies had created a climate of violence. The Bourbon repression and cruelties inflicted during the occupation brought a sense of defeatism and demoralization, which gripped large sections of Catalan society. Catalonia was subjected to Spanish authority and lost all its institutions.[19] The Catalan language was banned in public, academic and official circles, but a more thorough review of the facts revealed that the legal bidding of Spanish as the sole language of the territory had to allow some exceptions. However, since Catalan was the only language in the region that the

parisioners spoke and understood, the Church became a crucial upholder of linguistic resistance. Priests and religious intellectuals, among whom Baldiri Reixac i Carbó (1703–81) was notable, controlled education and, before the publication of Rousseau's *Emile*, provided rectories and parish schools across the country with religious manuals, catechisms and books on morality and ethics. At the turn of the modern age the medieval narrative on Islam passed from a learned theological to a religiously tinted educational narrative, which appeared tightly bound to the introduction of history textbooks.

Educational ideas evolved on the Iberian Peninsula with the arrival of new scientific theories, including Enlightenment ones, with phren-ology, psychology and cognitive sciences tackling religion and influenc-ing teaching at schools. A strong commitment and requirement to introduce the Spanish language to children generated the need for manuals and a series of works were produced for teaching children Spanish grammar. One, *Gramática Catalana–Castellana*, written by Magi Pers i Ramona (1803–88) and published in Barcelona in 1847, reflected the huge efforts made to instil Spanish in Catalan-speaking children. The author stated that his work was created so that 'the native people of the country could understand the language of Cervantes'. Pers i Ramona, who was a tailor by profession, is reputed to have introduced the phrenology of Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828), which was applied later to schools and school books. He funded and directed the *Revista frenológica: publicación destinada a difundir en todas las clases de la sociedad el conocimiento de la frenología* (Vilanova i la Geltrú 1852–54), and published the essay *Ensayo filosófico o sea filosofía positiva sobre la naturaleza moral e intelectual del hombre* (Barcelona 1861). Pers i Ramona believed that knowledge of man's intellectual and emotional nature was significant to social knowledge. Among collective activities he stressed religious practices, which are seen as restraints to human progress in civilization and, in his references to religion, some interesting passages can be found that refer to Arabs and Islam:

> Arabs also have an intellect, but they do not cultivate it. In that nation perceptiveness rules over thought, and animal attitudes rule over morality. This is why they show very little humanity.

On the other hand, selfishness and bad faith are prominent. History teaches us their success in arts and science, so it is fair to say that, given the right circumstances, some of them are talented and capable of developing.

Gifted minds also hide among the Moors. We are all aware of their achievements in arts, sciences and literature. Without their zeal for fine arts we would not have as many monuments as we have today, and without these monuments we would have never learnt about the old civilizations that populated our land. Our territory is now a beautiful country, but Islamic religious fanaticism may be an obstacle to progress. The tribes or Moors of the coast of northern Africa are intelligent and exceptionally shrewd and artistic. We know that the Romans considered them faithless people. And the French, since the conquest of Algiers, have sufficient proof of it.[20]

The decisive factor in this negative view of Arabs is their religious affiliation, Islam. It makes them fanatics and irrational beings, since their innate intelligence and capabilities range them between 'the elite of mankind'. Pers i Ramona, like other supporters of a naturalist (or physiological) conception of man,[21] saw the facial angle or inclination of the forehead as a parameter to measure human intelligence. In this respect he placed Arabs, Turks, Persians, Armenians and Indians alongside Caucasians, considering them all to belong to the most intelligent group of human beings on the planet and establishing a difference between them and Semite peoples:

The naturalists have divided the human species in many races: we admit four quite different types: (1) The white or Caucasian, also called the Jafet race because it claims descendancy from Jafet. This is the big European family, to which we must add Arabs, Turks, Persians, Armenians and most of Indostan. It is the more active race, more intelligent and more civilized. Individuals have smooth, black, brown, sometimes blonde hair; their noses are often aquiline. … The facial angle of the first two races is 85 degrees. In the Semitic race it is 75 degrees.[22]

Pers i Ramona (editor of *Revista frenológica* 1852–54) believed that knowledge about the nature of intellectual and emotional states was essential for understanding society. Important in this regard were religious practices, which he felt measured the degree of human civiliz-ation and progress. In the middle of the nineteenth century phrenology became one of the most controversial elements of Catalan cultural life. In a divided society with severe tensions, the doctrine polarized people's positions on various elements of progress, including conten-tious social reforms, the role of religion in the new industrial society, and early childhood education. The influence of phrenology also grew in the writings of hygienists who aimed to reform medicine and Spanish society through an emphasis on education. Because religion still played a major role in mid-nineteenth-century Catalan society, accusing Catalan phrenology of materialism and fatalism forced its practitioners to stress the morality of the doctrine of Gall and his absolute compliance with the principles of Catholic dogma. The prominence of Catholic dogma and the control the Church exercised over practically the entire educational system lead us back to the analysis of the textbooks that religious Catalans produced in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Revitalization of educational theories in Catalonia: modern times, old confrontations

The arrival of new scientific theories at the beginning of the eighteenth century saw the birth of a pedagogical movement led by the Catholic Church to socialize, educate and transmit moral and ethical values. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, mainly through the efforts of several religious teachers and the school books they produced, pedagogy was born as a new practice. The religious manuals, catechisms and books on morality and ethics the Catholic Church produced at this time remained in use until the second half of the twentieth century and were widely used as reading and writing materials by rectories and parish schools across the country. To conclude, I introduce some important authors and offer readings from their books.

Josep Balari i Jovany (1844–1904) of Barcelona was the publisher

of a fourteenth-century educational text called *Lo Crestià*. He was also a philologist, historian and the author of *Orígenes históricos de Cataluña*, a highly valued and widely used history textbook published in Barcelona in 1899. Of Italian descent and with excellent language training, Josep Balari i Jovany fostered sound research techniques among young people eager to discover the treasures of Catalonia's past. His experience and tenacious and patient work laid the foundations for a Catalan historiography of institutions, mores and ways of thinking. His comments on different waves of Muslim invasions of Catalonia suggested that they caused devastation, depopulation and the abandonment of large tracts of agricultural land. He also referred to the importance of these events in creating a historical memory that would last for centuries and get passed on from generation to generation:

> The territory of present-day Catalonia, in the space of four centuries after the eighth century, had to suffer different raids that devastated it. In the ninth century [it] was the victim of the straps of the Franks and the consequences of the rebellion of Gotish Aizon; in the tenth century [it] suffered the intrusions of Almanzor's army; in the eleventh century that of the captain's son, called Abdelmelik; in the twelfth century [it] had to endure the invasion of the Almoravids.[23] …
>
> The acts of barbarism carried out by the Saracens were etched in the memory of men from generation to generation. The three outcomes studied before [devastation, depopulation and loss of much agricultural land], as immediate results of Muslim invasions, are summarized in written awards for many properties located within the terms of the castle of La Guardia in Montserrat, made in the year 1155, in favour of the monastery Sant Cugat del Valles, to which it had belonged by previous concessions by the lords of the castle, [and] that had been nearly forgotten because of the prolonged persecution by the Saracen. The awards mention that … almost no inhabitant of this region ignores that the sword of cruel pagans has been baiting us for a long time in us, because castles were destroyed,

villages depopulated, churches razed and the land turned barren.[24]

Norbert Font i Sagué (Barcelona 1874–1910) was a priest, geologist, speleologist and writer who often travelled across the Maghreb and northern Africa. He links us with the highest Orientalist traditions in Catalonia. He wrote *Breu compendi de la historia de la literatura Catalana* in 1900 and *Historia de Catalunya*, a history school book that was probably published for the first time in 1899 and reprinted many times before the Spanish Civil War. Both works were published in a series of school manuals sponsored by the great patron and active promoter of Catalan education and culture Eusebi Güell i Bacigalupi (1846–1918).

In Font i Sagué's *Historia de Catalunya* we read that: 'The Arabs took possession of almost all of Catalonia and incited its reconquest, which ended with the restoration of the Catalan language, religion and nationality and independence for the Catalans.'[25] The quotation illustrates how the 'other' was portrayed as being responsible for its own persecution. Other assertions illustrate the consolidation of a Catalan national self-identity through the projected repulsion of the 'other'. Also interesting are the references to the founding of this identity on Hellenic and Hebrew cultures, clearly intended to create a greater distance from the Arab past. At the end of the book we can find the passage entitled 'Catalonian contribution to civilization', where we read as follows:

> This noble nation has rendered a great service to both European and Spanish civilizations … it introduced Greek and Latin cultures to Spain, adopted Christianity (the source of all progress) and, thanks to the effort of its army, was the first Spanish nation to be free of Arabs. Catalonia helped other Spanish nations evict the Arabs from their territories.[26]

If ever there was to be a school bestseller in Catalonia it would surely be the reading book *Lo trobador Català*,[27] a collection of poems by the primary schoolteacher Antoni Bori i Fontestà (1862–1912).

These poems powerfully endorse Catalonia by attesting, for example, that 'due to its climate and industry, its honesty and pride, Catalonia will always be the most productive, the most beautiful and the richest region of Spain.' The poems, which remained in print until 1963, also embody a collection of popular traditions, such as the Easter scene of 'killing the Jews'. In fact, its original Catalan title was *A matar jeus* (*To kill Jews*) and it contains expressions such as 'let us sweep them off the earth', 'let us draw them into hell' or 'let us kill demons, let us kill Jews'. Muslims are portrayed in a section called '*Per la Patria*', in which they are accused of being traitors who viciously destroyed towns – 'Our perseverance made the Moors tremble in Wad Ras and Tetuan' (two sad episodes of the 1859–60 Spanish–Moroccan War fought in northern Morocco). 'The pride of our brave race is demonstrated in the persons of El Cid and King James I the Conqueror.'

The images of Muslims evoked in these textbooks transmit a representation of social groups of unknown people and situations that is probably incomprehensible to the parameters of self knowledge, yet is nonetheless used to explain Catalan history and justify its evolution. In this process, the group, set against the collectivity of 'others', finds autonomy, becomes a frame of reference and provides an understanding of 'normality'. In training children and young people Muslims have long played a prominent role as 'others', with all the cultural and political implications this might entail.

Conclusion

The Catalan textbooks cited in this chapter are only some examples of many that could be used to illustrate the existence of a stigmatizing and deeply-rooted view of Islam and Muslims in school history books in Catalonia and the rest of Spain. These conservative currents in historiography have been present for centuries and have had a strong influence on the compilation of educational materials and in their ideological transmission in primary- and secondary-school classrooms. Undoubtedly, this vision of Muslims reflected in the historical texts has quite a lot to do with the fact that their authors were religious priests who were deeply committed to the Catholic ideal. Catholic morality and behaviour helped create ideological models and

perceptions of 'the self and the other' that remain in the collective unconscious of most citizens of the Iberian Peninsula.

The events of the twentieth century are, however, a real testament to a profound revitalization of Catalonian schools. The large number of studies undertaken, the dedication of hundreds of private and public schoolteachers, and the contributions of regional and national politicians and intellectuals all played their part in strengthening the Catalan educational tradition and in granting unlimited use of whatever resources were at hand. The 'educational revival' movement launched in 1888 at a pedagogy congress held to celebrate the universal exhibition in Barcelona took on a totally Catalan character. During the 15-year period between 1892 and 1907 very serious attempts were made to solve the problems of the schools and of national culture.

The early decades of the twentieth century were highly contentious times in Spain; the ideological revolution, social confrontations and Spanish colonial activities in North Africa generated a series of social problems that undoubtedly affected the sphere of early childhood education. The radical reorganization of the school system continued until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, yet, despite its importance, the reorganization has never been studied from the perspective of understanding the memory of Muslims in Catalan educational narratives. I have presented just a few examples from some of the material that sits gathering dust on the top shelves of our libraries, but I earnestly believe that it should become a subject for further study over the next few years.

Notes

1. Miquel Barceló, '… Per serraïns a preïcar … o l'art de predicar a audiencies captives', *Estudi General*, vol. 9, Gerona, 1989, pp. 117–32; John V. Tolan, 'Un cadavre mutilé: le déchirement polémique de Mahomet', *Le Moyen Âge*, no. 104, 1998, pp. 53–72; John V. Tolan, *Les Sarrasins: l'Islam dans l'imagination européenne au Moyen Âge*, Paris: Aubier, 2003.
2. Robert I. Burns, *Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Crusader kingdom of Valencia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; Eloy Martin Corrales, 'Maurofobia/islamofobia y maurofilia/islamofilia en la España del siglo XXI', *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, Barcelona, nos 66–7, 2004, pp. 39–51.
3. Josep Lluís Mateo Dieste, *La hermandad hispano–marroquí: política y religión bajo el Protectorado español en Marruecos (1912–1956)*, Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra,

2003, shows that the Spanish occupation of Morocco at the end of the nineteenth century was ideologically justified by the arguments of the geographical proximity and the racial fusion between Iberian and Maghrebian populations.

4. Eloy Martín Corrales, 'Maurofobia/islamofobia y maurofilia/islamofilia en la España del siglo XXI'.

5. José E. López Pereira, *Crónica Mozárabe de 754*, Saragossa: Textos Medievales, 1998.

6. Saint James Apostle or James the Great, the brother of John (possibly the Evangelist) martyred at the hands of Herod Agrippa I (ruled AD 1–44). With Peter and John, James was one of Jesus's closest friends during his ministry. The legend has it that when the apostles divided the known world into missionary zones, the Iberian Peninsula, as a well-established part of the Roman Empire, fell to James. Early in the ninth century a hermit known as Pelayo had a vision that led to the authentication of some relics near the Atlantic coast of northern Iberia. During this period, Christian Iberia needed a new inspirational focus against Muslims. The purported tomb of the apostle gave rise to a pilgrimage that has never been forgotten.

7. Maureen Purcell, *Papal crusading policy: the chief instruments of papal crusading policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the final loss of Jerusalem to the fall of Acre, 1244–1291*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975, p. 66.

8. Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage, 1979.

9. Thomas F. Glick, 'The Hispanic American', *Historical Review*, vol. 51, no. 3, August 1971, pp. 535–7; James T. Monroe *Islam and the Arabs in Spanish scholarship (sixteenth century to the present)*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970.

10. Stefano M. Cingolani, *La memòria dels reis: les quatre grans cròniques*, Barcelona, Base, 2007.

11. King James I, *Llibre dels feits*, in Ferran Soldevila (ed.) *Les Quatre Grans Cròniques*, Barcelona: Selecta, 1983, Chapter 71, p. 41b. Author's translation from the following Catalan original: '*E, quan venc que tots se mogren, los cavallers e els servents e s'anaren acostant al vall on era lo pas, tota la host a una vou començà a cridar: Sancta Maria, Sancta Maria! E aquest mot no els eixia de la boca, que quan l'havien dit sempre s'hi tornaven, e així com més lo deïen més pujava la vou; e això dixeren be trenta vegades o pus. E, quan los cavalls armats començaren a entrar cessà la vou. E, quan fo feit lo pas on devien entrar los cavalls armats, havia ja bé llaïns de cinc-cents hòmens a peu. E el rei de Mallorques ab tota la gent dels sarraïns de la ciutat foren ja tots venguts al pas, e estrenyeren en guisa los de peu que i eren entrats, que si no entrassen los cavallers armats eren morts. E segons que els sarraïns nos contaren, deïen queviren entrar primer a cavall un cavaller blanc ab armes blanques; e açò deu ésser nostra creença que fos sant Jordi, car en estòries trobam que en altres batalles l'han vist de crestians e de sarraïns moltes vegades.*'

12. Vicent Martines, *Temps de Croada, Temps creuats: el Xarq al-Andalus, un espai d'osmosi*, Onda: Ajuntament d'Onda, 1991, pp. 74–5.

13. David Burr, 'Antichrist and Islam in medieval Franciscan exegesis', in John V. Tolan (ed.) *Medieval Christian perceptions of Islam*, New York: Garland, 1996, pp. 131–52.

14. John V. Tolan, *Les Sarrasins*.

15. The work and personality of Francesc Eiximenis have led to an extensive bibliography; editions of studies can be found at: http://www.uoc.edu/lletra/noms/feiximenis/. See also: http://www.eiximenis.narpan.net/

16. Josep Balari i Jovany (ed.) *Regles de bona criança en menjar, beure y servir á taula tretes de lo terç del crestiá del P. M. Fr Francesch Eximenis (segle XIV)*, Barcelona: Estampa de Fidel Giró, 1889. '*Com Catalans menjen pus graciosament e ab mjllor manera que altres nacions … Catalans tallen la carn netament e polida … e altres nacions axi con ffranceses, alamanys, engleses e ytalichs ne fan troços … e sullen lo pa e la tovalla, per força, les quals coses son fort miserables e sutzees … Car catalans son comunament contents de menjar dues uegades lo dia; mas les altres nacions noy tenen cap, ans nj ha qui se leuen a menjar, aixi com alamanys, e altres beuen sens manera, axi com los ffranceses … Menjar molts en vna escudella, axi com fan los serrajns, no es nodriment, majorment prenent la ujanda ab tota la ma plena, axi com ells fan lo cuscuço.*'

17. Eloy Martín Corrales, 'De cómo el comercio se impuso a la "razzia" en las relaciones hispano-musulmanas en tiempos del quijote: hacia la normalización del comercio con el norte de África y el levante otomano a caballo de los siglos XVI y XVII', *Revista de Historia Económica*, vol. 23, 2005, pp. 139–59.

18. Eloy Martín Corrales, *La imagen del magrebí en España: una perspectiva histórica. Siglos XVI–XX*, Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2002; Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, *Los moriscos en el pensamiento histórico: historiografía de un grupo marginado*, Madrid: Cátedra, 1983; Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, *La imagen de los musulmanes y del Norte de África en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII. Los caracteres de una hostilidad*, Madrid: CSIC, 1989; José M. Perceval, *Todos son uno. Arquetipos, xenofobia y racismo: la imagen del morisco en la historiografía española durante los siglos XVI y XVII*, Almería: Insituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1997.

19. Josep M. Torras i Ribé, 'La Guerra de Sucessió a Catalunya', *Quadernos del Museu d'Història de Catalunya*, vol. 8, no. 14, Barcelona, 2008, pp. 29–47.

20. Magí Pers i Ramona *Ensayo filosófico ó sea filosofía positica sobre la naturaleza moral é intelectual del hombre*, Barcelona: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Narciso Ramírez, 1861, p. 186. Author's translation from the Spanish original.

21. David Nofre, 'Saber separar lo bueno de lo malo, lo cierto de lo incierto: la frenología y los médicos catalanes, *c.*1840–*c.*1860', *Scripta Nova: Revista electrónica de geografía y ciencias sociales*, no. 11, 2007, pp. 229–55.

22. Pers i Ramona, *Ensayo filosófico ó sea filosofía positica sobre la naturaleza moral é intelectual del hombre*, p. 63, translation from the Spanish original by the author.

23. Josep Balari i Jovany, *Orígenes históricos de Cataluña*, Barcelona: Hijos de J. Jesús, 1899, p. 274.

24. Ibid., p. 282

25. Translation by the author from Norbert Font i Sagué, *Història de Catalunya*, Barcelona: Estampa La Catalana, 1899, p. 14.
26. Ibid., p. 169.
27. Antoni Bori i Fontestà, *Lo trobador Català: llibre de lectura en vers destinat als col·legis de noys y noyas, de Catalunya*, Barcelona: Impr. i lib. de Montserrat de Hereus de J. Roca i Roca, 1892.

Chapter 3

Cross-referencing images of Muslims and Islam in Russian and Tatar textbooks (1747–2007)

Marat Gibatdinov

Comparisons between Tatar and Russian history textbooks reveal the existence of two confessional approaches to the representation of Islam within the same 'secular' system of Russian education. Although the Tatar and Russian educational systems were subjected to the same secularization processes and were united under the same communist roof at the start of the Russian Revolution, both still carry their older narrative traditions as well as deeply rooted prejudices against one another. As a result, current textbooks offer very different images of Islam and Muslims. This difference cannot be properly understood without a historical retrospect.

To provide this it will be necessary to look first at what different stages in the country's history Tatar and Russian Orthodox textbook narratives on Muslims and Islam were produced and then question which of these features persist in today's textbooks. To contextualize this information, it might be helpful to bear in mind the very different frameworks in which history textbooks were produced in Russia and in Tatarstan.[1] Situated as it is on the 'frontier' between Europe and Asia, Tatarstan contains a mix of cultures and religions and, during the tenth century, the Middle Volga area also formed a frontier between Muslim and Christian spheres of influence. As a result, the indigenous population of this area has had long experience of living together under both Muslim (since 922) and Christian (since 1552) rule. This

virtually permanent experience of common life naturally resulted in numerous crossovers of customs, traditions, ideas and world views. The Russian 'centre', however, did not have that experience, and so built on mono-ethnic and mono-religious historical views.

For a very long period Russian education developed under the umbrella of the Orthodox Church and when in 1740, under the banner of religious tolerance, the Empress Catherine called for educational reform, it turned out to be predominantly Russian centred. The 'periphery', mainly Muslim-dominated regions that included Tatarstan, was expected to finance and organize its own teaching programmes.

One should not, however, underestimate the strong influence that German historiography had on Russian historical science. In fact, the first academic historians to work in the newly founded St Petersburg Academy, August von Schlezer and Gerhard Miller,[2] had received their training in Leipzig, and introduced to Russia not only the current historical debates but also the attitudes and stereotypes towards Islam found in the German history textbooks of the time. The periphery[3] meanwhile organized education in *madrasah*s, with images of Islam produced in a traditional religious context. The lack of balance between centre and periphery resulted in different time frames being developed for writing history for educational purposes. The first Russian Orthodox history textbook appeared as early as 1748. Economic growth and increased wealth in the periphery in the late nineteenth century set in motion the reorganization of the *madrasah* system, which led to the appearance of the first Tatar history textbooks in the 1890s.

In a forceful attempt to erase the institutional differences between centre and periphery, the 1917 revolution introduced one educational system for everybody. Although this step reduced educational differences between centre and periphery, it did not consider the perceptions of Muslims and Islam in different regions as equal. Rather, the educational system ignored the rich centuries-old experience of the periphery as a frontier between cultural and religious zones of influence. Communist education regarded religions as 'reactionary' and judged Islam and Muslims as such. Paradoxically, it continued the Russian Orthodox tradition of perceiving Islam as 'alien' to Russia.

Eventually, with the introduction of *perestroika* in 1985, the regions, among them Tatarstan, were allowed to produce their own textbooks on regional history. Thereupon, for the next 20 or so years, regional textbooks contained information on the frontier experience and treated Islam and Muslims as part of history. Then, in December 2007, a new law, proposing to give predominance again to the Christian Orthodox view, threatened to bring this period to an end. I believe that old prejudices and misconceptions about Muslims and Islam are continuing to be perpetuated in a new national framework in contemporary Russian history education. I shall attempt to demonstrate how perceptions of the 'other' arose in Russian history teaching and what choices have favoured their continuing use in the present.

Historical perceptions of Islam
in Russian Orthodox history textbooks

The first history textbook for use in Russian schools was a German import. In 1747, 25 years after its initial appearance in Berlin, *Introduction to general history* was translated into Russian.[4] The author, Hilmar Curas, was a schoolteacher at the royal and very Protestant Joachimthaler Gymnasium in Berlin, and his book had been well received in the reform-minded Prussian state. There was, however, a difference between the two versions. While the German original contained an appendix on 'Turkish history', in which the history of Muhammad and 'his' religion was summarized, the Russian version incorporated this information into the body of the text.[5] In the now empty appendix, the translator added a short introduction on the history of Russia. In this textbook, the image of Islam resonated mostly with wild stories about the prophet Muhammad, linking his biography to the history of the Ottoman Empire. The following two quotations give one some idea of how the link was forged:

> Turks have originated from Muhammad and are therefore named Muhammadans. This Muhammad was born in Arabia. His father was a pagan and his mother a Jewess. He was a merchant at first but having grown rich he started to think about the highest affairs and created the new Muhammadan

religion from different beliefs. The book containing this belief is called *The Alcoran*.[6] … Pupils and followers of this lying prophet diligently distribute his doctrine and they call themselves with the common name of Saracens … but in the Arab language their name means thieves and robbers.[7]

In Curas's account, one finds numerous myths that present Islam as a false religion and Muhammad as a false prophet and liar: 'This new religion he confirmed with false signs and different deceptions. … In a short period of time he also gathered a large variety of thieves and robbers into his grasp, all of them extremely ignorant and blinded people who followed a false and enticing doctrine.' The story of his death and burial, in particular, betrays the wish to prove the deception that Christianity ascribed to Islam:

> When Muhammad died, his body was put in an iron coffin and into the ceiling of his grave chamber an extremely strong magnetic stone was fixed, possessing the power to raise the iron coffin high above the floor and to suspend it in air in the centre of [the] chamber. And his followers divulged that he had ascended to heaven.[8]

In the second (1762) edition of the textbook, the myth about the flying coffin was omitted: 'Where was this Mahomet buried? In Medina in Arabia, where his coffin is in a marble mosque, which is very rich.'[9] It was, however, exchanged for another myth, this one dealing with the poisoning of the prophet: 'He predicted that three days after his death he would be revived. His servant, wanting to test this, administered him a poison. However, until now, he has not risen from the dead.'[10] As one can read from these few quotations, the wish to prove the deception of the Islamic faith focused on the argument that the 'falseness' of the prophet Muhammad culminated in his not being able to rise from the dead. The focus resulted in biased myth making, which probably at the time offered everyone a good laugh.

The same narrowness of perception was evident in the sections on the history of the Ottoman Empire. Of all the histories of Muslim

countries and cultures, the author only paid attention to the rise of the Ottoman Empire and to the Ottoman king whom Curas depicted as the winner of the Byzantine contest and successor of Byzantine imperial power. Within that context, however, the textbook contained many details of 'Turkish' atrocities as well as of the ruthlessness of different Muslim rulers and conquerors, among whom was Sultan Muhammad IV: 'To strengthen his authority, Muhammad IV ordered the execution of more than six million people by applying different modes of killing; he also broke the peace with the Christians that had lasted twenty years.'[11] In the short appendix dedicated to the history of Russia, Muslim people were only mentioned in connection with war and deliverance from the 'Yoke of the Golden Horde'.

> Ioan Vasilyevich[12] – a glorious name in history. During the internecine war, which occurred in the Horde between the different Khans … because of his courage, he released Russia from the Tatar yoke, … almost ravaging all of the Horde; he also conquered Kazan, whereupon he self-willingly installed the new Tsars for the Tatars.[13]

The aggressive position taken towards the Tatars in that appendix was sustained in later editions of the Russian textbooks, even more extensively and with further embellishments, until well into the nineteenth century. In all these books, the image of Islam was closely associated with aggression and military power. Thus, the horrors of the 'Yoke of the Golden Horde' were associated with Muhammad's 'aggressive wars', linked to the Crusades and Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, and generally regarded as the predecessors to the (then contemporary) Russian–Turkish wars and conquest of the Caucasus.

How then did the image of Muslims and Islam that Hilmar Curas had introduced into the Russian educational system resonate with the simultaneous declaration of religious tolerance? The answer is simple. The following quotation from the official policy of religious toleration, which Empress Catherine the Great had introduced in 1767, exposed the ruler's conviction that tolerance of other creeds could be a way of

attracting people to the only 'true belief', which was the Christian Orthodox faith:

> It would be a blemish for such a great state, which holds sway over so many different peoples, to prohibit or interdict their various beliefs. That would be harmful to the public tranquillity and the safety of the citizens. Persecution of the human minds irritates, but the permission to believe in one's own law mollifies even the most rigid hearts, as it suppresses quarrels that are opposed to the calmness of the state and the unity of its citizens. … Also, there is no other real means that enables us to bring all our sheep into the flock of the true believers, except through the reasonable permission of their laws as long as they do not contradict our orthodox faith and our policy.[14]

Throughout the history of the Russian Empire, Islam and other non-Christian religions had never been considered as equal to orthodoxy. Orthodox views and ideology permanently dominated education and other institutional fields. In the 1830s, this dominance was manifested in the official state ideology, as formulated by the minister of national education S. Uvarov, who invented the slogan 'orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality' (*pravoslavie, samoderzhavie, narodnost*). The words 'Christian', 'human' and 'patriotic' were equated with one another and, until the start of the twentieth century, the majority of Russian history textbooks also proceeded from the assumption of the 'incompatibility of Muslims with intellectual culture'.

In Muslim regions, the main objective of official educational policy was to reconcile Muslims and Christians. From the Russian point of view, however, this was not a two-way process, but one in which Muslims were familiarized with Russian Christian education. Because Muslim influence on Russian culture or education was thought to be undesirable, the government forbade Muslims to teach historical and philological subjects; they were only allowed to teach physical education and mathematical subjects. Teachers of humanities in the official 'Russian-Tatar schools'[15] were required to be Christians. Although Muslims were allowed to teach all subjects in private Muslim

schools (*mekteb*s and *madrasah*s), 'for pedagogical and moral reasons' the authorities preferred Christian teachers to teach the humanities.[16]

Russian textbooks emphasized the 'incompatibility of Muslims with intellectual culture' (*nesovmestimosti musul'manstva s umstvennoi kul'turoi*).[17] In the mid-nineteenth century a missionary pedagogue called Nikolai Ilminski developed a system of education for non-Russian people. Once it had been legalized through a decision of the imperial government, the Russian authorities officially approved Ilminski's position.[18] With this as a precedent, many authors of Russian textbooks approved the observations of the Orthodox missionary J. D. Koblov,[19] who thought that the 'small Muhammadan *inorodtsy*',[20] in fact 'all *inorodtsy* of the Volga area … have no historical past'.[21]

In accounts of the history of Russia (which are different from those on general history), the appearance of Islam was mainly through the story of 'Prince Vladimir's choice of belief'. Vladimir was portrayed as a Russian prince who lived at a time when Orthodox Christians were starting to take over from the earlier Muslim rulers in the so-called frontier regions. 'Vladimir's choice of belief' described the moment of his conversion from Islam to Orthodoxy. According to the story, Vladimir appreciated Muslim paradise without, however, appreciating the ban on alcohol. As the prince put it, 'wine means fun for Russians, there cannot be fun without it.' The prince also disliked Muslims for having 'poor temples, sad prayers and depressing faces'. Although the story came from a Russian chronicle dating back to the twelfth century, it seemed to have entered the textbooks at a much later period in time. It did not yet figure in the appendix to the second edition of Curas's textbook, which already contained an extended short history of Russia.[22] The only comment on Vladimir in the appendix was that he 'was a brave man because he conquered all the neighbouring peoples, the Pechenegs, the Poles, the Volga and Danube Bulgars and the Greeks. Once he was baptized, he exterminated their idols [1908].'[23]

Around 1900, the image of aggression and fanaticism projected as inherent to Islam became particularly accentuated in the textbooks:

War with the infidel and the spreading of Islam with weapons is

perceived as their greatest merit; Muhammad promises paradise for those who fall in battle for their belief [1900].[24]

The Koran founds its morals on obedience, abstention and the participation of the true believers in holy war with the purpose of destroying idolatry and of spreading Islam … *Holy war.* The first Arabs, armed with various weapons … promptly penetrated deep into other countries, and, fanaticized by their clerics, courageously fought with the enemy [1879].[25]

Again, Islam was portrayed as a false belief:

Under the secret leadership of Jewish and Christian sectarians, Muhammad declared himself in Mecca to be the prophet of the one God. The doctrine of Muhammad is referred to as Islam. … It is based on a collection of his false inspirations, known by the name of Koran. The religious doctrine of the Koran represents a mixture of borrowed knowledge from the Old Testament and different heretical Christian doctrines with Jewish ceremonies and Arabian traditions [1879].[26]

Early Muslims were presented as barbarians and fanatics:

After the conquest of Alexandria, Caliph Umar gave the order to burn all the books of the well-known library because: 'If they contain something similar to the Koran – that is, they are useless; if they contain something that is not present in the Koran – they are harmful.' For a number of weeks the public baths were heated with Greek manuscripts. However, such stories are not absolutely authentic [1865].[27]

The context, however, in which these historical 'observations' were being made differed considerably from the eighteenth century, when Russia opened its doors to Western Europe, simultaneously expressing its dislike of and non-connectedness with its eastern compatriots.

As can be gleaned from many examples around the turn of the century, the textbooks on the periphery faced Islamic revivalism, which

they associated with the long nurtured images of aggressive Muslims. The following two quotations give a taste of what was going on:

> At first, Russians were limited to defensive actions from attacks by the predatory tribes, but when General Ermolov was appointed, … our sovereignty gradually began to penetrate into the Caucasus mountains. … But the Russian successes were stopped by a new Muslim sect, Muridism. … With unusual speed, this sect reached the Caucasian mountains and the small tribes, which previously had been disconnected, were united in a common religious fanaticism [1870].[28]
>
> Over the last 20–30 years, there has been an especially brisk revival of Islam in the Tatar world, which is mixed with ideas of pan-Islamism. Wherever Islam exists, it gathers force for a persistent struggle against Christian civilization [1913].[29]

With the coming of age of the Russian periphery, which found expression in the different religious revivals as well as in educational reform, the textbooks started to be perceived as a threat to the (Russian) government, if not to civilization at large. This was the situation when thoughts of revolution began to gain impetus in the regions.

Historical perceptions of Islam in Tatar history textbooks

After the conquest of the Kazan Khanate (1552), when all state structures and Tatar institutions were destroyed, Tatar society survived in the countryside as a folk culture with a strong Islamic currency. Isolated from the rest of the Muslim world, Tatar Islamic institutes served mostly to preserve Islam and the memory of the Tatar nation within the framework of the Orthodox imperium. Thus, Tatar culture at that time preserved a tradition of medieval Muslim culture. In Tatar *madrasah*s, medieval scholarship prevailed. Tatar scholars concentrated mostly on spiritual subjects – the Koran, *hadith* and *shariah*, and refused to study the natural sciences.

This situation only changed in the middle of the nineteenth century when, as a result of liberal reforms in Russia, a new class of Tatar mer-

chants and manufacturers gained in strength and rivalled Russian entrepreneurs in the domestic and international markets. The new business class needed well-educated staff to lead Tatar business with modern management. The old-fashioned Tatar *madrasah* was unable to prepare its students for this type of work, so rich Tatar merchants, together with advanced Tatar scholars, initiated a school reform, which started by improving language teaching methods and introducing secular disciplines (like mathematics, geography, history, bookkeeping and medicine). As a result of this activity, a wider social movement of renewal (Jadidism) came into existence in Tatar society. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Jadidism became one of the basic tendencies in Tatar ideology.

Jadidism, derived from the Arabic *Usul Jadid* (*zhedid*) (new method), means Muslim reformism, which is a new method of teaching languages and a starting point for educational reform. Jadidism aspired to build bridges between modern Western knowledge and Muslim culture, to introduce modern sciences to traditional forms of Muslim knowledge. This involved the introduction of elements of secular mind-sets based on principles of rationality, universality and objectivity. Jadidism attempted to carry out a societal reform and was especially successful in the field of education. It surmounted religious self-isolationism by learning from Russians and Europeans how to facilitate Muslim progress into modernity, which it achieved through a synthesis of traditional and European cultural elements. The Jadidist movement changed the attitude of Tatar society towards modernity (in the areas of culture, education, policy and daily life) and set into motion a process of modernization of the entire Tatar society.[30]

In the short time span between the Tatar revival and the 1917 Russian Revolution, Tatars had their own education system, which functioned independently of the official school system of the Russian Empire. Traditional Tatar schools (*mekteb*s and *madrasah*s) received no state support and were financed completely by rich Tatar merchants and businessmen. When Tatar scholars started to publish their own history textbooks, they were therefore already accustomed to acting independently of the state. Between approximately 1890 and 1917, they created their own educational programmes, combining Islamic

religious education with secular education, which also included a history curriculum. The earlier *mekteb*s and *madrasah*s had only taught the history of Islam from a confessional point of view. The new Tatar schools, however, taught the history of Islam together with world history, the history of Russia (history of the state) and Turkic–Tatar history (ethnic history). According to Valiullin's calculations for the period, 1010 editions of textbooks were printed, while 740 textbook titles were produced, with an overall circulation of 5,016,630 copies. Of the 526 textbooks on religious disciplines, 206 were on the subject of Tatar literature, 102 on moral education (*adab*), 118 on Tatar and Russian languages and 41 on history, including 23 on the history of Tatar and Turkic people and 18 on world and Russian history.[31]


Figure 3.1: The number of Tatar textbook titles printed for the period 1891–1917, according to R. N. Valiullin.[32]

In the textbooks produced in this short historical period, Islam was pictured in a wholly positive way, presenting 'an Islamic view' of

history. Tatar textbooks always began with the phrase '*Bismillah ar-rahmaan ar-raheem*' (In the name of Allah, the beneficent, the merciful). Muhammad's name was always accompanied by the phrase 'peace and blessings of Allah be upon him'. All historic dates were shown in the Islamic (*Hijrah*) and Christian (Julian) calendar. Religious optimism also spoke from the short autobiographical notes that the authors inserted: 'First of all I started a book on the history of Siberia and I have already finished the first part. I intend to write some other books on Turkish history. May Allah bless my work!'[33] Or, as another claimed: 'We have written this book not for the sake of the future generations …, but in the hope that our fathers and grandfathers, having arrived in paradise, can read it. May Allah accept the prayers of our broken soul and give us what we hope for.'[34]

The first professional Tatar historians, men like Shihabetdin Marjani and Hadi Atlasi, were still Muslim clerics (*imam* or *mullah*). Rizaeddin Fahreddin was even a *mufti*. They still received a traditional *madrasah* education and an Islamic view of history came quite naturally to them. At the same time they tried to reform the obsolete interpretations of Islam and to adapt these to the call of the modern world. Also, since there were only a few Tatar sources in existence, many of which were fragmentary or not authentic, and given how difficult it was to write a Tatar national history without Russian sources and Russian textbooks, they adopted modern concepts of European and Russian historiography.

While drawing from the same sources, Russian and Tatar textbooks differed in their points of view. For one thing, Tatar authors perceived the past through the prism of Muslim cultural tradition, which enabled them to draw attention to the black holes in Russian historiography:

> As Kadi Rizaeddin repeatedly warns: 'Russian historical writings need to be studied very closely and carefully.' Russian annals accuse Tatars of all the troubles, … but the management of the Kazan state, descriptions of its areas, customs and occupations of the people, systems of education and other aspects of life are completely absent from the Russian annals. It is possible to

write a true history of the glorious Kazan people only by means
of true science.[35]

Or, as Hadi Atlasi, in his *History of Siberia*, explained:

> Actually, most Russian historiographers interpret the past in a
> prejudiced way, but there are also some who strive to attain
> scientific precision as a priority. We bow with gratitude to
> everyone who has been fair, who has worked for the benefit of
> our history, who renders invaluable services, … contributing a
> lot in order to preserve our history. … Also, it would be a good
> thing to translate documents and works of foreign scientists. …
> While working on this book, I used ancient Russian annals and
> documents and referred to the works of ancient and modern
> historians.[36]

Serious Tatar scientists of that time therefore understood clearly
that it was very difficult to write Tatar history without using other
people's sources and narratives. As there were very few original Tatar
sources available to them, Tatar researchers had no option but to look
for their own past mostly through the lenses of 'others' (whether
neighbouring people, foreign historians or travellers). It became neces-
sary for them to apply a 'Muslim prism' through which to rethink
critically the foreign sources and to 'separate the wheat from the chaff'.

The zeal and enthusiasm of the first Tatar historians influenced the
production of Tatar textbooks. They associated Islam with education,
knowledge (images of books), respect for science, and a high level of
culture and civilization (images of monuments). 'The most important,
great event of the five centuries from Oghuz to Genghis Khan was the
adoption of Islam by Turkic peoples, the assimilation of Muslim cul-
ture. Therefore this period of 500 years is called "Turkic peoples and
Islam".'[37] The Tatar scientists living in the Russian Orthodox Empire
certainly idealized the time when Tatars had their own independent
states and Tatar culture was blossoming as a Muslim culture:

> When this work was written, we followed our dear ancestors

and affairs which Islam recognizes as useful, on the most
reliable basis, in order to tell the modern world in clear terms
about our precious nation. Ah! Our hardworking and patient
ancestors! You recently lived in this country; you built and
provided Mosques and Madrasah(s). In Mahallas the Mosques
were full; the Madrasah(s) in the big cities and well-known
villages were full of students wearing turbans. Every year
hundreds of Imams were trained. … What has happened to all
this today?[38]

On the other hand, Tatar national activists (who were also his-
torians and authors of textbooks) strongly criticized contemporary
Muslim scholars and clergymen whenever the latter concentrated too
much on preserving the tradition and defending Islam against the
influence of Orthodoxy, while refusing to make it serviceable for the
Tatar nation:

> History is a unique science, because it could induce people to
> feel national respect. … But … our former Turkic scientists and
> Islamic theologians … researched only useless scholasticism,
> which brings harm on religion since it loosens the principles of
> Islam …, because the aim of Islam is to unite and pull together
> peoples.[39]

It becomes clear from these quotations that the majority of
reviewed textbooks presented Jadidist viewpoints. The authors of
these textbooks also used 'Islamic' arguments to legitimate secular
education (including a new conception of history) and new methods of
teaching.

The Orenburg Muhammadan Spiritual Assembly[40] even convened
special meetings of clergymen (Muslim authorities) to discuss popular
interpretations of the Koranic texts, and to substantiate Jadidist view-
points on education. The results of this discussion were published in a
report[41] that contained references to the Koran and *hadith* and
confirmed the need to study all 'Jadidist school subjects' (mathematics
and Russian), including civil history (history of Russia[42] and Tatar

history)[43] and the history of monotheistic religions (the study of 'other religions of Allah [*sic*] separately from a history of Islam').[44] It also recommended modern methods of training.[45]

Given that Jadidist activity basically involved everything to do with introducing standard history teaching as a school subject, in this chapter I shall confine my focus to the Jadidist textbooks.[46] However, having said that, I should mention that traditional 'Qadimist'[47] history textbooks continued to be produced alongside the Jadidist ones. One of these was Hisametdin Moslimi's *Tavarihy Bulgaria*.[48] The author of this highly popular textbook,[49] following the traditions of medieval Arab-Muslim authors, described Muslim saints and successors of the companions of the Prophet[50] in Volga Bulgaria, as well as miracles.[51] However, numerous mistakes and the semi-mythical character of this and similar books suggest that this literature is mainly religious in character.[52] Notwithstanding such trends, the Islamic character of Jadidist textbooks is not an artificial external cover designed to attract Muslims to new schools. On the contrary, given that Jadidists were convinced that religious education should be maintained as an essential prerequisite for the spiritual and moral development of their pupils, their Islamic perception must be considered a genuine part of their world view.[53]

The communist interlude and post-Soviet aftermath

In Soviet times, history education was under strict ideological control and all independent Tatar schools were closed. Within the framework of the Soviet educational system, regional TASSR[54] history textbooks provided only a brief interlude in the general history of the USSR (the official state history was highly ideological). TASSR or regional history (*kraevedenie*)[55] was presented in a very truncated course, which only covered the participation of Tatars and other peoples of the Tatarstan territories during the revolution and civil war. There was no mention of the positive role of Islam in Tatar history[56] and textbooks that 'incorrectly explained' such topics were forbidden. A regional committee of the Communist Party branded one such textbook 'harmful, counter-revolutionary, propagandizing obscurantism, and inadequate for the requirements of communist

education'. Authors were accused of having 'wrongly gauged the Jadidism movement, which should be unmasked ruthlessly as reactionary ideology of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism and its counter-revolutionary essence should be explained to pupils'.[57] As a result, the minister of education issued the following statement: '[I]n evaluations of social movements around 1900, emphasis lay on the fact that the bourgeois-nationalistic Jadidism movement was, from the outset, a reactionary counter-revolutionary movement and that Jadidists were the worst enemies of the working people.'[58]

The positive aspects of Muslim rule were ignored, and the ancient and medieval periods of its history were described very briefly and superficially, basically to show how they hindered the progress of Tatar and other 'eastern peoples'. Communist ideology dominated the textbooks and negatively evaluated the role of Islam in Tatar history:

> The primeval religion did not suit the ruling clique of the state. The uniform religion was necessary to hold the people in obedience and unification of the isolated tribes under one strong authority. This is why … Islam has officially been accepted, and has become a great political force in the hands of princes and feudal lords. All the social and political systems of Volga Bulgaria serve the interests of feudal lords and strengthen their authority.[59]

In the post-Soviet period, ideological restrictions and bans on the study of Islam and ethnic history were temporarily removed. Nonetheless, the Russian Federation continued with the Soviet tradition of teaching a strict history curriculum. Despite some liberalization, teachers still had to follow the officially approved teaching plan, which offered them extremely limited opportunities to alter or add material. The post-Soviet system of history education (which lasted from 1992 to December 2007) consisted of two main components: a federal (world history and the history of Russia) and a national/regional component (NRK).[60] The former took 85 per cent and the latter 15 per cent of the time allotted to teaching history.[61] Moreover, in addition to these components, there was also the

school component to be taken into account, namely the decision, at the level of each school's option, about what to choose from the additional disciplines.

In December 2007 a new law[62] eliminated the NRK and gave the school and federal components room to expand. So far, it is too early to say how this law will operate. Meanwhile, for the last 20 years, the regions have had the right to write their own regional history textbooks and to determine, to some degree, their length. Tatarstan actively used this window of opportunity.[63] Replacing the former brief and optional history of the TASSR, it introduced a compulsory course called 'The History of the Tatar people and Tatarstan', which combines regional and ethnic aspects of Tatar history.[64]

New regional history textbooks in Kazan

A desire on the part of the Tatar intellectual community to revive its people's language and culture and add traditional spiritual and ethical values to its life largely prompted its contemporary approach to history education.[65] In the new Tatar history textbooks, the image of Islam is closely connected to the study of ethnic history. Perceptions of the role of Islam in Tatar history are rather varied. The periods when Tatar statehood and culture blossomed are attributed to the influence of Islam, for instance to the adoption of Islam in Volga Bulgaria (922) and to the blossoming of the Golden Horde during the reign of Uzbek Khan (1312–42), which was also connected to the status of Islam as an official religion.

> Islam started as a state religion and became stronger still during the Golden Horde and the subsequent Tatar Khanates period. Nonetheless, in all these states there was tolerance. This testifies that, for a long time, Tatar society used to be a sufficiently democratic one.[66]
>
> The government of Uzbek Khan (1312–42) [was a] time of prosperity and great strength for the Golden Horde.[67]

Regional history textbooks associate Islam with a high level of development, when civilization, culture and tolerance reigned. They

also connect Islam with national self-consciousness and cultural heritage. The once forbidden names of the Muslim clerics who contributed to the development of Tatar science, culture, education and historiography have found a new place on the pages of these textbooks. Instead of the former negative perception of Islam as a form of obscurantism, these textbooks reveal the transition towards the opinion that Islam provides a civil basis for the formation of the Tatar nation (considered as a 'Muslim Nation').

The latter idea was first expressed in relation to the rehabilitation of Jadidism. Having previously been looked upon as a reactionary pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist ideology, and called 'the most malicious enemy of the working people', Jadidism was now regarded as a 'progressive political movement for the reform of Tatar society'.[68] This was followed by a reconsideration of Qadimism, or Islamic traditionalism, with its positive role in preserving Islamic values in modernized society being given proper recognition.[69]

Even before the beginning of the twentieth century, most Tatars disliked the name 'Tatars' and called themselves 'Muslims'. The words 'Tatar' and 'Muslim' were regarded as equivalent in the Tatar and Russian history textbooks of that period.

> All Tatars, except for a small number of Muhammadans, are well-known for their fervent and strong adherence to Islam. This underlies the world view and morality of the Tatar people, and it distinguishes Tatars from others. Both Russians and Tatars interpret the Tatar nation only in terms of the religious. *Inorodtsy* seduced to Muhammadanism turn into Tatars.[70] To accept Islam means 'to become Tatar'.[71]

Islam was an important part of the Tatar history curriculum because Tatar ethnic identity included a religious identity. In the Tatar textbooks of that period, Tatar people were frequently called 'Muslims', 'northern Muslims', 'Muslims of internal Russia', or 'Kazan Muslims'.

> Kazan Muslims are similar to Volga Bulgars. … According to Arabian and Russian historians, Bulgars adopted Islam only at a

later stage, and they carried out Muslim ceremonies with con-
siderable diligence. For example, one muezzin who was afraid
to lose time during morning prayers when the nights were
short, did not sleep for a whole month. (Modern Muslims
would hardly show such persistence.)[72]

Recently, religion and ethnicity were amalgamated even further. At
present 47 per cent of respondents in the countryside, 80 per cent of
whom are in Kazan, and 58 per cent of Tatar intellectuals think that it
is impossible to maintain a national culture without a religion. Con-
sequently, 77.8 per cent of Tatars in the Kazan area regard themselves
as Muslims. Today, being a Tatar also now means being a Muslim. As a
result, conflicts have recently started to break out between Tatar
Muslims and Tatar Christians (known as Kerasen). Kerasen assert that,
because Tatar ethnicity is identified with Islam, their own culture and
history are insufficiently represented in the textbooks, or only depicted
alongside various other groups against which Muslims harbour preju-
dices, such as the *munafik* (hypocrites) who converted and thus
betrayed their religion. Some recent Tatar textbooks blame the official
policy of aggressive Christianization for having forced Muslims to
adopt Christianity, and depict Kerasen, not as betrayers but as the vic-
tims of an aggressive government policy towards Muslims who secretly
continued to worship Islam. Tatar national activists, however, some of
whom have close connections with textbook authors, try to use the
Islamic factor to consolidate the Tatar nation and at the same time to
subsume the Kerasen into a wider Tatar entity.[73] To counteract this
tendency, some Kerasen identify with neither Tatars nor Russians, but
view themselves as different from both, thus constructing a new
ethnicity.
    Modern regional history textbooks contain no specific mention of
the terms 'Tatars' and 'Muslims' being interchangeable, other than in
the rather loose sense in which terms like 'Ittifaq al-Muslimin',[74]
'musulmanskii komitet'[75] or 'musulmanskii polki'[76] might be included
in textbooks that cover the history of Tatarstan in the twentieth
century. Apart from a mention in a short introduction about the
development of social conceptions at the beginning of the twentieth

century, the use of the term 'Tatars' as an ethnonym is generally not discussed in these textbooks.

Nevertheless, the question of whether Islam still plays a role in the development of a Tatar ethnos continues to stimulate discussion among modern Tatar historians and politicians.[77] Recognizing how important the role of Islam is thought to be in the formation and preservation of the Tatar people, they do not reject the name 'Tatars'. However, another approach to modern Tatar historiography and social movements objects strongly to the term 'Tatars' and insists on using 'Bulgars' instead. This same group also abjures Islam for the benefit of restoring 'Tengrianism' as the authentic 'true faith' of the ancient Turks. There is only one marginal school manual based on Bulgarist ideologies,[78] but it is not officially recognized by Tatarstan's ministry of education. Official academic historians have criticized it sharply and, moreover, it cannot be used in schools as a prescribed textbook.[79]

To sum up, the analysis of the different images of 'others' as represented in modern Tatar textbooks reaffirms that Muslim identity plays an important role in the construction of Tatar national history. Classifying our examples, we found the following categories:

Russians = 'others'
Orthodox = 'others'
Finno-Ugric people = 'others, but close to us'
Modern Turkic people = 'others, but similar to us'
Mongols = 'others, but connected with us'
Russian inhabitants of Tatarstan = 'others, but "our" Russians'
Kerasen = 'others, but part of us'
Ancient Turkic people = 'our ancestors – part of our history'
Islam = 'part of our identity'

The new history textbooks of the Russian Federation

The mixing up of religion and ethnicity in Tatarstan has its counterpart in the Russian Federation. Orthodox Christian authors still refer to Islam as 'the Tatar belief', whereas Orthodoxy is called 'the Russian belief' and Catholicism 'the Polish belief'. People also

frequently use idioms such as 'the Russian god', 'the Tatar god', or 'the German man of Polish belief' (namely a Catholic).

In Russian Federation textbooks, however, ethnic and religious diversity barely exist, for the authors of these books frequently hush up the ethnic histories of any people other than Russians. By creating the impression that Islam and Muslims are practically non-existent in Russia, the federal textbooks were able to promote the ideology of the Soviet period, which sought to mould different people into one uniform 'Soviet nation' (*Sovetskii narod*). They also reproduced imperial historiography, which Russianized ethnic minorities, the so-called *inorodtsy*. Analyses of the most recent federal history textbooks, *The history of Russia* and *The history of the motherland*,[80] make this perfectly clear.

In these books Islam is always associated with negative events like wars, invasions and conquests, and Muslims, as a rule, are portrayed as aggressors. Muslim 'cruelty' to Christians and Muslim 'barbarity' and 'backwardness' are presented as reasons for the colonial expansion of the Russian Empire. Most federal history textbooks portray Islam as alien and a threat to the preservation of the state and national unity of Russia. The militancy of Muslims is assumed as a matter of course, even when the occasion is positively connoted as 'patriotic'. The following observation by a Russian Orthodox priest about spiritual schools[81] also applies to the majority of secular textbooks:

> At our spiritual schools we do not generally study world religions (Islam, Judaism and Buddhism). If they are studied, then it is only from the point of view of how they 'are mistaken', that is, how they differ from Christianity. Let us take the example of Islam. When this religion appeared and began to spread in the sixth century, Christians perceived it as one of the numerous new heresies that periodically appeared in remote areas of the Byzantine Empire. By the end of the twentieth century Islam had turned into a leading world religion, number-ing about a billion followers. … Is it credible, under such conditions, to confine the students in our spiritual schools to such a superficial acquaintance with Islam?[82]

Unfortunately, only a small number of Christians hear this Orthodox priest's plea for mutual understanding and interfaith dialogue. Most church members and clergymen do not see any need to do so. Some more recent editions of textbooks, like the above quoted *History of Russia*, seek to restore the role of Orthodox Christianity as the official state ideology. Church officials actively promote this idea on the official level and in the media:

> Orthodoxy is the living history and the living truth of the Russian people; it is culture and modern conduct – education and upbringing. Therefore, to tear away Russia from Orthodoxy would mean to tear away from our own history, roots and foundation, that is simply to kill it. Thus, returning to Orthodoxy is the main condition for the rescue of the Russian people. … It is necessary to return to Orthodoxy, if not as a state, then as a national and public ideology.
>
> (Bishop Feofan of Stavropol)[83]

> It is necessary to strengthen religious education to frighten off the expansion of radical ideas, extremism and terrorism. I think that Muslims and representatives of other traditional religious communities also should know the culture of the country in which they live.
>
> (Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Alexius II).[84]

> Teaching the 'Bases of orthodox culture' to schoolchildren in Russia should not be optional, but obligatory … to assist the non-orthodox children to grow accustomed to our All-Russian culture.
>
> (Andrey Kuraev, Moscow Ecclesiastical Academy)[85]

Such and other declarations provoke negative reactions from Muslims. To counteract these, Tatarstan started to develop a multicultural approach to history education.

There is no place for religion in a comprehensive school, and I

responsibly declare that in multinational and multi-confessional Tatarstan no religion will be taught unilaterally. The history of religions – that is quite a different proposition. … It is necessary to teach our children the bases of world religions.

(M. Shaymiev, President of Tatarstan)[86]

As a result of this discussion, Tatarstan undertook to write not the *Bases of Islamic culture*, but the *History of religions* (including Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism). This text-book[87] has already been published and is in use.

Russian Federation *World history* textbooks still portray a rather different image of Islam, with the master narrative traditionally containing one or two paragraphs on the occurrence and distribution of Islam around the globe. Later editions of *Medieval history*, however, offer a more balanced view by depicting Islam as one of the world religions that created an original civilization and, as such, it forms part of the world cultural heritage. The *Modern history* textbooks, by contrast, frequently mention Islam only in the context of 'new threats', and link it with migrants, separatism, 'the clash of civilizations' and terrorism.

In addition, the explanations of important principles and concepts (like interpretations of the Koran, *sunnah* and *jihad*), as well as some social aspects of Islam (such as polygamy, equality and human rights) contain numerous mistakes and misconceptions. For example, 'Shiites esteemed more those chapters (*surah*) of the Koran where Ali, cousin of Muhammad, was glorified, the chapters which are unrecognized by Sunnites.'[88] Or, alternatively, 'On the sixth day … Man (Adam) was created. On the seventh day – it fell on Friday – Allah had a rest. Therefore, for the Muslims, Friday is a day of rest.'[89] As the above shows, the author mixed up the story about Sabbath from the Torah with the Muslim concept of *Jumah* (Friday as a day of collective prayer), and the disclaiming of some chapters of the Koran was also erroneously attributed to Sunnis.

My research, as well as that of a colleague,[90] shows that, despite the numerous mistakes, there is an important difference between old and new Russian textbooks: most of the mistakes in the latest editions of

the *World history* textbooks arise from misunderstandings or from the authors' lack of knowledge about Islam and are not intentional misrepresentations. To sum up, an analysis of the different images of 'others' as represented in modern Russian Federation textbooks reaffirms that Orthodox Christian identity plays an important role in the construction of national history in Russia. Analysing the examples, I found the following categories:

- Despite a large autochthon Russian Muslim population, Islam is correlated mostly with unknown and dangerous foreigners;
- numerous misunderstandings and lack of correct information distort the image of Islam as a faith: there are many mistakes in the explanations of the pillars of faith and in the use of religious terms;
- Islam is equated with terrorism and seen as a threat to civilization;
- a deeply held belief in the 'exclusive role of orthodoxy' in Russian culture and history has resulted, among other things, in Russian being equated with Orthodox and 'Rysskii' with 'Rossiiskii';[91] and
- the Russian Orthodox Church is promoted as a powerful political force in Russia that tries to affect history textbook writing.

Conclusions

During the Soviet period, when anti-religious propaganda had interrupted and replaced the tradition of scientific religious studies, any positive appreciation of either Islam or any other religion was prohibited. The new system of history education that followed *perestroika*, therefore, could only be grounded in a denial of everything associated with the former communist ideology. Under these circumstances, references (and not necessarily critical ones) to the pre-revolutionary experience became especially popular. In fact, a fair number of pre-revolutionary history textbooks were reprinted and these reintroduced old concepts and theories, including prejudices against Muslims and Islam. As the Orthodox Church tried to carve out a special role for itself in the new nation-state, pre-revolutionary Russian textbooks that had been written under strong missionary influence gained currency. The old ideology of 'orthodoxy, autocracy

and nationality' has been revived in a new context of 'orthodoxy, patriotism and great power'.

In a similar manner, modern Tatar textbooks also continue the pre-revolutionary tradition of national historiography, using Islam as an important element of nation building. Moreover, the negative and prejudiced image of Islam in federal textbooks brings about counter reactions from Tatar authors who are keen to stress the positive influence of Islam on Tatar history.

The image of Islam in history textbooks emanates directly from the traditions of official Russian and Tatar historiography, which have sparked off a vibrant political debate and public discussions in society. The discussions started when a new school subject, 'Bases of orthodox culture', was brought into the school curriculum with a view to restoring Orthodox Christianity as the official state ideology. Blatant contradictions have provoked attempts to include the teaching of different religious disciplines (Islamic or Orthodox) in secular schools as an alternative to teaching the history of religions ('the traditional religions of Russia'), a school subject that does not emphasize any one religion. There are also many debates within Tatar society and between Tatar intellectuals about the role of Islam in the formation of the Tatar nation, and these too are reflected in the textbooks.

Old prejudices and preconceptions remain in modern history textbooks in Russia and the transformation of history education there seems to be a difficult task. Likewise, multi-perspective approaches to history education are emerging only very slowly. Now available is one of the first textbooks with a multi-perspective approach (*Mosaic of cultures*).[92] It was developed under the aegis of the European Association of History Educators (EUROCLIO) and it portrays Islam as an integral and valuable component of Russian history. However, this book achieves only a first and very small step towards a poly-cultural history of Russia.

Recent discussions have focused on the idea of introducing interfaith dialogue into such a multi-confessional country as Russia, even though these discussions do not yet have the power to change the situation. However, multicultural history education cannot fail to gain legitimacy if Russia embraces the new paradigm of history education,

in other words if the education system is shaped to meet the needs of all members of Russia's polycultural society.

Notes

1. Tatarstan is a federal subject (constituent territory), a region of the Russian Federation with a 'special status' (only Tatarstan has a treaty with the Russian Federation 'On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Powers'). During the Soviet era, Tatarstan (TASSR) was an 'autonomous republic' inside Russia. After *perestroika*, Tatarstan adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty (1990), and declared itself the 'democratic constitutional state associated with the Russian Federation by the Constitution and Treaty'. According to the constitution the sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan consists in 'full possession of the state power beyond the competence of the Russian Federation and powers of the Russian Federation in the sphere of shared competence of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan' (Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, Article 1).
2. Gerhard Friedrich Miller (1705–83) was educated at Leipzig University, and was a member of the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences (1725) and author of the *Sammlung Russischer Geschichte* (1732). August Ludwig von Schlezer (1735–1809) was a historian adjunct at the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences (1762), a professor in Hettinger (1769–1804) and was one of the founders of the 'German School' of Russian historiography.
3. The term 'internal periphery' was introduced by Hans-Heinrich Nolte for territories like Andalusia and Tatarstan. He expressed their meaning as follows: 'Within a society delineated by state boundaries we call a region the "internal periphery", where conditions are organized to the advantage of people living in another region which we call the centre.' See Hans-Heinrich Nolte (ed.) *Internal peripheries in European history*, Göttingen: Muster-Schmidt, 1991, p. 1.
4. Hilmar Curas, *Introduction to general history*, translated by Sergey Volchkov, St Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1747. Produced in German as Hilmar Curas, *Einleitung zur Universal Historie, Worinnen die merkwürdigste Begebenheiten von Anfang der Welt bis auf diese Zeit, in Fragen und Antwort kurz vorgetragen werden, nebst einem Anhang der türkischen Historie*, Berlin: Gottlieb Nicolai, 1723.
5. See also the contribution of Jonker in this volume.
6. Curas, *Introduction to general history*, p. 182.
7. Ibid., p. 184.
8. Ibid., p. 183.
9. Hilmar Curas, *Sokrashchennaia universal'naia istoriia soderzhashchaia vse dostopami-atnye v svete sluchai ot sotvoreniia mira po nyneshnee vremia so mnogim popolneniem vnov' perevedennaia i s priobshcheniem Kratkoi rossiiskoi istorii voprosami i otvetami v pol'zu*

uchashchagosia iunoshestva – 2-m tisneniem napechatannaia, second edition, St Petersburg, 1762, pp. 329. The title page indicates the date of the edition as 1762, but according to the archive records the book was published in 1778. It is printed on paper with a watermark dated 1776.

10. Curas, *Sokrashchennaia universal'naia istoriia*, p. 329.

11. Curas, *Introduction to general history*, p. 189.

12. Ioan Vasilyevich - the Grand Prince Ivan III of Muscovy (1440–1505), the grandfather of Ivan the Terrible.

13. Curas, *Sokrashchennaia universal'naia istoriia*, p. 370.

14. Ekaterina II, Imperatrica, 'Nakaz imperatritsy Ekateriny II, dannyi kommissii o sotchinenii proekta novogo ulozhenia' ['Catherine II's instructions to the commissioners for composing a new code of laws'], *O velichii Rossii*, Moscow: EhKSMO, 2003, p. 139.

15. In fact, Russian schools for Tatars. In these government elementary schools for Muslims of the Volga region (mainly Tatars) children were taught all subjects, except the bases of Islam, in Russian. These schools were created in 1870 to prepare Muslims as loyal citizens, but were unpopular with most Muslims.

16. Anon., *Trudy Osobogo soveshchaniia po voprosam obrazovaniia vostochnykh inorodtsev*, [*Proceedings of the special meeting on the education of Oriental inorodtsy*], Pod red., St Petersburg: A. S. Budilovicha, 1915, pp. 10–78.

17. Ibid., p. 201.

18. Nikolai Ivanovich Ilminski's (1822–91) system of education was given official backing on 26 March 1870 with the 'Regulations on measures for the education of the non-Russian inhabitants of Russia' ('*O merakh k obrazovaniiu naseliaiushchikh Rossiiu inorodtsev*') and was operative until 1917.

19. Jakov Dmitrievich Koblov (born 1876) was a doctor of theology and Orthodox missionary in the Kazan division and inspector of the educational district in the early twentieth century.

20. *Inorodtsy* = 'strange people', 'the other', 'dissimilar others', 'foreigners'. The term was officially used in the Russian Empire to identify ethnic and religious minorities or 'non-Russian peoples'.

21. J. D. Koblov, *Mechty tatar magometan o natsional'noi obshcheobrazovatel'noi shkole* [*Tatar–Mohammedan dreams about national comprehensive schools*], Kazan: Tipo-grafiia Imperial University, 1908, p. 18.

22. I. S. Barkov, 'A short history of Russia', in Hilmar Curas, *Sokrashchennaia universal'naia istoriia*, St Petersburg, 1762, pp. 357–90.

23. Ibid., p. 360.

24. I. D. Ilovaiskii, *Kratkoe rukovodstvo ko vseobshchei i russkoi istorii* [*The short manual on general and Russian history*], Moscow, 1900, p. 115.

25. I. Belliarminov, *Rukovodstvo k srednei istorii* [*The manual to medieval history*], St Petersburg: Kurs 6 klassa klas-sicheskikh gimnazii, 1879, pp. 33–4 (emphasis in original).

26. Belliarminov, *Rukovodstvo k srednei istorii*, p. 33.

27. I. D. Ilovaiskii, *Drevnii mir i srednie veka* [*The ancient world and Middle Ages*], Moscow: 3 izdanie, 1865, p. 172.

28. I. D. Ilovaiskii, *Kratkie ocherki Russkoi istorii* [*Brief essay on Russian history*], Moscow: Kurs starshego vozrasta, 1870, p. 372.

29. N. A. Spasskii, *Ocherki po rodinovedeniiu: Kazanskaia guberniia* [*The essays on motherland: studying the Kazan province*], Kazan, 1913, p. 81.

30. For more detail about Jadid ideology, see Rd. J. Lazzerini, 'Ethnicity and the uses of history: the case of the Volga Tatars and Jadidism', *Central Asian Survey*, vol. 1, nos 2/3, November 1982, pp. 61–9.

31. R. N. Valiullin, *Tatar maktap-madrasalare ochen gumanitar fannar buencha daresleklap (19 ïoz azagy–20 ïoz bashy)* [*Tatar textbooks on humanities for the mektebs and madrasahs at the end of nineteenth–beginning of the twentieth century*], Kazan: FAN, 2004.

32. Ibid., p. 69.

33. Hadi Atlasi, *Seber tarihy* [*A history of Siberia*], Kazan, 1911, p. 3.

34. Rizaeddin Fahreddin, *Bulgar va Kazan Tereklere* [*Bulgar and Kazan Turks*], Kazan, 1993, p. 5.

35. G. Ahmaref, *Kazan tarihy* [*A history of Kazan*], Kazan, 1910, p. 3.

36. Atlasi, *Seber tarihy*, p. 3.

37. Z. Validi, *Kyskacha terek-tatar tarihy* [*The short Turk–Tatar history*], Kazan, 1913.

38. Fahreddin, *Bulgar va Kazan Tereklere*. The manuscript remained unpublished during the author's lifetime and was published only in 1993.

39. Atlasi, *Seber tarihy*, p. 3.

40. The Orenburg Mohammadan Spiritual Assembly (OMSA), in effect the Muftiat or Mufti administration, was the board of Muslim clergymen led by the Mufti and elected for a certain term. It was created in Ufa in 1788, but in 1797 Catherine the Great moved it to Orenburg to gain greater control over the Muslim clergy. It was the highest board of religious management for all Muslims in the Russian empire. Anyone who wished to receive the official status of a Muslim clergyman had to pass an examination in OMSA on the foundations of Islamic religious doctrine.

41. Anon., *Akt chastnago soveshchaniia dukhovnykh lits okruga Orenburgskogo magometanskogo dukhovnogo sobraniia na 14 i 15 dekabria 1913 goda, sozvannyi po voprosam o magometanskikh konfessional'nykh shkolakh (mektebakh i madrasah) v obshchedostupnom tolkovanii tekstov Korana* [*Report of the private meeting of ecclesiastics of the Orenburg Mohammadan Spiritual Assembly's district, convened for popular interpretation of texts of the Koran in Mohammedan confessional schools (mektebs and madrasahs)*], Ufa, 1914.

42. Ibid., p. 36.

43. Ibid., p. 25.

44. Ibid., p. 32.

45. Ibid., p. 36.

46. See M. M. Gibatdinov, *Prepodavanie istorii tatarskogo naroda i Tatarstana v obsheobrazovatel'noi shkole: istoriia i sovremennost* [*Teaching the history of Tatars in comprehensive schools*], Kazan, 2003.

47. Qadimism is Muslim traditionalism or conservatism, from the Arabic word 'Qadim (Kadim)' ('old', 'ancient'). See Stefan A. Diuduan'on, 'Kadimizm: elementy sotsiologii musul'manskogo traditsionalizma v tatarskom mire i v Maverannakhre (konets XVIII–nachalo XX vv)', *Panorama–Forum*, vol. 12, 1997; and Stephane Dudoigno, 'Djadidisme, mirasisme, islamisme', *Cahiers du Monde russe*, vol. 27, no. 2, April–June 1996, pp. 13–40.

48. Hisametdin Moslimi, *Risala i Tavarikhy Bolgariia va zikre maulana khazrate Aksaktimer va kharabe shahre Bolgar* [*The treatise of Bulgar history, mentioning our master Lame Timur and his destruction of the city of Bulgar*], Kazan, 1876.

49. This book, written at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nine-teenth century, was distributed in manuscripts (more than 50 were registered) and repeatedly printed from 1876 to 1902, and used as a textbook in Qadimist madrasahs at the beginning of twentieth century.

50. *Tabiun* (*Tabi'un* and *Taba' at-Tabi'in*) or people who conversed with the associates or companions of Muhammad. The traditions they related have considerable authority and form part of the *Sunnah* or traditional law.

51. The description of history begins with Adam and, via a sequence of prophets, extends to Muhammad. It is followed by the description of various Muslim dynasties. It also describes how Islam penetrates the Volga Bulgar. For more detail, see Saliam Alishev, *Tatar tarihchylary* [*The Tatar historians*], Kazan, 2006.

52. For Shihabetdin Marjani's criticism of Moslimi's books, see Farit Shakurov, *Razvitie istoricheskikh znanii u tatar do fevralia 1917 goda* [*Development of historical knowledge of Tatars before 1917*], Kazan, 2002.

53. See Dzhamal Validi, *Ocherk istorii obrazovannosti i literatury tatar* [*Essay on the history of Tatar scholarship and literature*], Kazan: Iman, 1998, p. 68: 'Actually, the first followers of the new teaching methods were not freethinkers and destroyers of old customs. On the contrary, especially in the initial stage, they made their main problem the direct development of religious education in a more correct way and only very cautiously thought about the secular sciences, accepting them only as an instrument for understanding religion more thoroughly. Jadidists think that the preservation of religious education is an important factor in the moral development of people.'

54. TASSR = Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Autonomous repub-lics are second in rank in the soviet state structure, lower than a 'union republic'.

55. T. G. Pitinova, *Razvitie uchebnogo istoricheskogo kraevedeniia v sovetskoi shkole (1920–90-e gody)* [*Development of studying local history at schools*], Moscow: Avtoreferat, 1995.

56. Resolution (*Postanovlenie*) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party:

'On conditions and measures to improve political and ideological work in the Tatar party organization' (1944). Also, the decisions of a bureau of Tatar regional committees of the Communist Party: 'On mistakes and shortcomings in the work of the Tatar research institute of language, literature and history' (1944), and 'On preparing essays on the history of Tatar ASSR' (1946).

57. The resolutions of a Tatar regional committee of the Communist Party 'On shortcomings and mistakes in the Tatar literature textbook' (1948, 1952), in the central state archive containing historical–political documentation of Tatarstan (TsGA IPD RT, f.15, op.29, d.l55a).

58. TASSR, 'Order of minister of education of TASSR (1952)', National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan (NART), f.P-992, op.1, d.341, 1.50.

59. V. V. Kuz'min, K. R. Sinitsyna and R. G. Fakhrutdinov, *Istoriia Tatarskoi ASSR: Uchebnoe posobie dlia uchashchikhsia srednei shkoly*, Kazan: Tat.kn.izd-vo, 1985, p. 14.

60. The term 'national' is used here to mean 'ethnic'.

61. Anon., 'Obiazatel'nyi minimum soderzhaniia srednego (polnogo) obshchego obrazovaniia. Obrazovatel'naia oblast "Obshchestvoznanie"', *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, vol. 16, 1998, pp. 18–21; Anon., 'Natsional'naia doktrina obrazovaniia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii' ['The national doctrine of education in the Russian Federation'], *Uchitel'skaia gazeta*, vol. 42, 1999, p. 12; Anon., 'Ob utverzhdenii maketov gosudarstvennykh obrazovatel'nykh standartov' ['Approving state educational standards'], *Vestnik obrazovaniia*, vol. 10, 2000, pp. 3–7; Anon., 'Ob utverzhdenii Federal'noi programmy razvitiia obrazovaniia' ['Approving a federal programme of educational development'], *Vestnik obrazovaniia*, vol. 12, 2000, pp. 3–15.

62. In continuing its policy of total centralization, the Russian parliament enacted a law 'about the modification of some federal legislative acts concerning the concept and structure of state educational standards in Russia' (№ 309-FZ), which President V. Putin signed in December 2007. According to this law, the NRK of State Educational Standards has been removed from the 'Education Act'. As a result, the regions have lost their power to create educational programmes. Teaching regional and ethnic history as well as native (non-Russian) languages is once again under the strict control of the federal government.

63. I. M. Fokeeva, *Natsional'no-regional'nyi komponent istoricheskogo obrazovaniia: metodicheskoe posobie dlia uchitelia* [*National-regional component of history education: a method manual for teachers*], Kazan, 2003.

64. F. Sultanov and M. Gibatdinov (eds), *Natsional'no-regional'nyi komponent gosudarstvennogo obrazovatel'nogo standarta osnovnogo obshchego obrazovaniia po istorii. Predmet – 'Istoriia tatarskogo naroda i Tatarstana' (Proekt)* [*Project on the national-regional component of state educational standards on the subject of the history of Tatars and of Tatarstan*], Kazan, 2006.

65.   Flura Ziyatdinova, 'Historical memory of the Tatar ethnic group', *International Affairs*, a monthly journal of world politics, diplomacy and international relations, January 1995.

66.   R. G. Fakhrutdinov, *Istoriia tatarskogo naroda i Tatarstana: Uchebnik dlia srednikh obshcheobrazovatel'nykh shkol, gimnazii i litseev, Chast' 1*, Kazan: Magarif, 1995.

67.   F. Sh. Khuzin and V. I. Piskarev, *Istoriia Tatarstana: Uchebnoe posobie dlia 6 kl.*, Kazan: Tarih, 2004.

68.   V. I. Piskarev, *Istoriia Tatarstana 19 vek* [*The History of Tatarstan in the nineteenth century*], *Ucheb-noe posobie dlia 8 kl. osnovnoi shkoly*, Kazan: Tarih, 2004.

69.   In the struggle between 'progressivist' (Jadidi) and 'traditionalist' (Qadimi) views of Islam, the Jadidists won. The effectiveness of their new teaching methods made their schools extremely popular and the old-fashioned Qadimi *madrasah*s lost their majority of students. The Jadidi *madrasah*s educated a new class of secular Tatar national intellectuals. The small group of stiff Qadimists was marginalized and cooperated with the conservative Russian government in the struggle against all new ideas and changes, condemning them as '*Bid'a*' (innovation). In pre-revolution Tatar society, 'progressivist views of Islam' became more and more influential and famous Jadidists occupied high positions in the Muftiat. One of the main Jadidist ideologists and *madrasah* rector G. Barudi became a *mufti* (1917); the well-known historian and rector of the Jadidi *madrasah*, R. Fahreddin, became a *qadi* (1891) and a *mufti* (1922). But shortly after the revolution both Jadidists and Qadimists fell victim to political repression.

70.   People who converted to Islam under Tatar influence, adopted Tatar culture as an ethnic identity and gradually identified with Tatars.

71.   N. A. Spasskii, *Ocherki po rodinovedeniiu*, p. 70.

72.   G. Ahmaref, *Bolgar tarihy* [*The history of Bulgars*], Kazan, 1909.

73.   See Marlies Bilz, 'Stiefkinder der Nation: Zur Brisanz der Kategorie Christliche Tataren/krjašeny' im Russischen Zensus von 2002', in Andreas Frings (ed.) *Neuordnungen von Lebenswelten? Studien zur Gestaltung muslimischer Lebenswelten in der frühen Sowjetunion und in ihren Nachfolgestaaten*, Hamburg, 2006, pp. 127–62; Paul W. Werth: 'The limits of religious ascription: baptized Tatars and the revision of "Apostasie", 1840s–1905', *The Russian Review*, vol. 59, October 2000, pp. 493–511.

74.   Ittifaq al-Muslimin (The Union of the Muslims) was a liberal-democratic party of Muslims active during the period of the Russian Empire. The main features of its programme were constitutional monarchy, recognition of democratic freedom and religious equality. Founded in 1905, it was dominated by ethnic Tatar intellectuals, but also included representatives of other Turkic peoples.

75.   'The Muslim Committee' – Tatar social and political organization in Kazan (1917–18).

76.   'The Muslim regiments' – military formations of Tatar volunteers and rep-

resentatives of other Muslim people within the Russian army during the First World War and civil war.

77. See Marlies Bilz, 'Islam as a secular discourse', in ICCEES VII World Congress, *'Europe: Our Common Home?'* Berlin, 25–30 July 2005; Abstracts, BWV Berliner Wissenschafts–Verlag GmbH, 2005; D. Ishakov, 'Perekhod tatar ot etnokonfessional'noi k etnicheskoi identichnosti (vtoraia polovina XIX v. – pervye desiatiletiia 20 veka)', in Rafik Moukhamentshin (ed.) *Islam i musulmanskaia kul'tura v Srednem Povolzh'e: istoriia i sovremennost'*, Kazan: Ocherki, 2002; R. S. Khakimov, 'Where is our Mecca? (Manifestation of Euro-Islam)' and 'The Tatars', in R. S. Khakimov, *Russia and Tatarstan at a crossroads of history*, Kazan: Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan, 2006, pp. 104–83; R. M. Moukhamentshin, *Islam v obshchestvennoi i politicheskoi zhizni tatar i Tatarstana v 20 veke* [*Islam in the social and political life of Tatars and Tatarstan in the twentieth century*], Kazan, 2005.

78. Nurutdinov F. Rodinovedenie, *Metodiceskoe posobie po istorii Tatarstana*, *Kazan*, Kazan: Tatarskoe gazetno–zurnal'noe iz-vo, 1995.

79. For more details about different components of Tatar history (Tatar, Mongol or Bulgar), and about different textbooks authors, see M. M. Gibatdinov, 'Razvitie istoricheskogo obrazovaniia v Tatarstane (v poiskakh etnicheskoi i gosudarstvennoi identichnosti)', in *Sbornik materialov itogovykh konferencii Tsentra istorii i teorii natsional'nogo obrazovaniia 2004–2005 gody*, Kazan, 2006, pp. 32–53.

80. Anon., 'Istoriia tatarskogo naroda i Tatarstana v federal'nykh uchebnikakh' ['History of Tatars in federal textbooks'], *Magarif*, vol. 12, 2001, pp. 54–7, and vol. 1, 2002, pp. 63–5; Anon., *Retsenzii na federal'nye uchebniki istorii otechestva* [*The reviews of federal history textbooks*], Kazan: Institut istorii AN RT, 2007.

81. Orthodox Christian schools are theological seminaries for training orthodox priests.

82. Illarion Alfeev (Heiromonachos), 'Problemy i zadachi russkoi pravoslavnoi dukhovnoi shkoly' ['Problems and aims of Russian Orthodox spiritual schools'], *Dukhovno-nravstvennoe vospitanie* (supplement to the magazine *Vospitanie shkol'nikov*), vol. 1, no. 128, 2005.

83. Bishop Feofan, 'Education and orthodox culture: the report of Feofan, Bishop of Stavropol', *Internet magazine of Sretensky monastery*, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/jurnal/060208173422 (8 February 2006).

84. Interview with *Paris Match*, in http://www.pravoslavie.ru/press/061112121106 (12 November 2006).

85. INTERFAX News on 27 August 2007, in http://www.interfax-religion.ru/print.php?act=news&id=19968.

86. NEWSru.com: Religion and Society on 18 January 2007, in http://www.newsru.com/religy/18jan2007/shaymiyev_print.html.

87. A. N. Sakharov (ed.) *Istoriia religii* [*History of religions*], Moscow: Russkoe clovo, 2007.

88.   V. A. Vedyushkin et al., *Novaia istoriia zarubezhnykh stran* [*The Modern history of foreign countries*], Moscow, 2000, p. 269.

89.   V. A. Vedyushkin *Istoria srednikh vekov* [*The medieval history*], Moscow, 2003, p. 93.

90.   Abdesalam Al-Mansy, 'Islam in Russian history textbooks'. See: http:/www.mohe-casm.edu.eg

91.   Both terms ('Rysskii' and 'Rossiiskii') are translated in English as 'Russian'. The first, however, captures ethnic and linguistic characteristics, whereas the second captures a geopolitical context. Equating the two suggests the substitution of a nation-state identity with an ethnic Russian identity. In a society as multicultural as the Russian Federation, this provokes a negative response.

92.   A. P. Shevyrev et al. (eds), *Mozaika kul'tur* [*Mosaic of cultures*], Moscow: Lotus Press, 2005.

Chapter 4

Bringing the Ottoman Empire into the European narrative: historians' debates in the Council of Europe

Luigi Cajani

The history of relations between Europe on the one side and the Ottoman Empire, with its successor Turkey, on the other, is complex, almost paradoxical. For a long time the Ottoman Empire was perceived in Europe as the Islamic enemy *par excellence*, as testified for instance by the famous Italian expression of fear, '*Mamma li Turchi!*' Now, of all the states with an Islamic culture, Turkey is politically the closest to Europe, but even this closeness is controversial and Turkey is still engaged in the long and difficult process of joining the European Union. Turkey's first move in this direction came soon after the Second World War. Not only did Turkey see in the new geopolitical landscape a means of resisting the pressure of the Soviet Union, but its approach also fitted well with the politics of Westernization on which Atatürk had build the new state.

The first step was to join the Council of Europe in 1949, which Turkey's president Mustafa İsmet İnönü took as a sign of being accepted as a 'respected member of the civilized world'.[1] Three years later, thanks to the support of the USA, which wanted to build up a stronghold on the eastern flank of the alliance, Turkey was also admitted to NATO.[2] In both cases Turkey's admission paralleled that of Greece, a country with which there had been many conflicts and

with more, like Cyprus, soon to come. In 1959 Turkey and Greece applied to enter the European Economic Community, but while Greece was admitted in 1981, Turkey's status is still unresolved. Among the various economic and human rights impediments to its admission to Europe, religious culture plays an important part on both sides.

During an election campaign in December 1995, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the pro-Islamist Welfare Party, opposed Turkey's full membership of the EU on the grounds that it is a Christian union, and advocated creating a union of Muslim countries instead. In March 1997, leaders of Western European Christian Democrat parties, including the German chancellor Helmut Kohl and former Belgian premier Wilfred Martens, responded with a joint declaration claiming that 'the European Union is a civilization project and within this civilization project Turkey has no place.'[3] In this clash of religions, the reference to history is both current and obvious: in 2004 the Lega Nord, a right-wing Italian party with strong local roots and hostile to Islam, had evoked the battle of Lepanto and the defeat of the Ottomans under Vienna in 1683 as key to the formation of a European identity, which would be negated if Turkey were to join the European Union (EU).[4]

It is not unusual to use and abuse the past for political purposes. Schools play a special role in this respect, for since the nineteenth century teaching history has had a patriotic and identity forming function and to this end has been used to create images of the enemy. To counter this war-mongering approach, even before the First World War but especially after it, various organizations with pacifist agendas tried hard to get history textbooks revised, but with little success because of the unfavourable political situation.[5] After the Second World War these initiatives gained a new momentum, with those of UNESCO, the Internationales Institut für Schulbuchverbesserung (later Georg-Eckert-Institut für internationale Schulbuchforschung) in Braunschweig and the Council of Europe being among the most relevant. One of the latter's first goals in reforming history teaching in member states was to replace the traditional nationalistic approach with a new European vision of history. This action was seen as an important step towards creating a culture of peace among member

states and supporting the unification process. An intensive programme was thus set up to revise history textbooks, to formulate recommendations to remove prejudices and negative attitudes towards other states, and to draft a common European historical discourse. In this general context, a deep and unprecedented dialogue became possible between Turkish and European historians, on which I shall focus in the following pages.

The first symposium to define a general framework of European history was held in Calw in the Black Forest in 1953. Five more were to follow, each focusing on a particular period – in Oslo in 1954 on the Middle Ages, in Rome in 1955 on the sixteenth century, in Royaumont in 1956 on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in Scheveningen in 1957 on the 1789–1871 period, and finally in Istanbul and Ankara in 1958 on the 1870–1950 period.

Historians from Sweden, Norway, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the German Federal Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Saar, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey were invited to the first symposium. Among them, Mario Bendiscioli and Franco Valsecchi represented Italy, Haakon Vigander Norway, L. J. M. van de Laar the Netherlands, Georg Eckert, Paul Egon Hübinger and Karl-Dietrich Erdmann the German Federal Republic, Jacques Droz, Marc Bonnet and Edouard Bruley France, Edward Dance and J. Thompson the United Kingdom, André Puttemans Belgium, Denys Zakythinos Greece and Ekrem Üçyiğit Turkey.[6] The symposia were based on lectures with themes relevant to European history, the presentation of previously made textbook analyses, and the definition of a set of recommendations to improve textbooks and curricula.

The recommendations of the Calw symposium were particularly interesting because they defined the ideology of the project, which was to promote Europeanism and pacifism:

> Our purpose is not to use history as propaganda for European unity, but to try to eliminate the traditional mistakes and prejudices and to establish the facts. … It is especially necessary to avoid any interpretation of historical development which might be used in the particular interest of one state, or which

might disturb the friendly relations between peoples. … It would be desirable not to introduce into the past contemporary national antagonisms. On the contrary, one should emphasize that conflicts between states or between sovereigns did not necessarily involve the peoples themselves.[7]

Methodological issues were also addressed, with an interesting suggestion to focus on local and regional history more than on national history, precisely with a view to achieving a European vision:

> In order to bring pupils by degrees to a European conception of history, teachers should be recommended to start from local and especially regional history, not only because it is more easily understood by young minds, but still more because it constitutes the only appropriate framework for the study of certain phenomena, the limits of which do not coincide with the frontiers of states.[8]

It is also worth noticing just how much emphasis was being placed on the need to study contemporary history, which at that time was quite problematic. In France, for instance, the Lycée's 1947 programmes ended in 1939,[9] whereas in Italy the entire period after the end of the First World War had been excluded from the programmes for political reasons and was only reintroduced in 1960.[10]

Recommendations from subsequent symposia focused on the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the French Revolution, nationalism, colonialism, women's history, and economic and social history. By the time the symposia ended all the main events in European history from the Middle Ages to the Second World War had been discussed and redefined. This included themes that were then considered outside the canons of school history in Western Europe – the Byzantine Empire on the one hand and the Ottoman Empire and Turkey on the other, including the corollary of Islam.

The first symposium was organized around three lectures in which Hübinger spoke on the Middle Ages, Bonnet on modern history and Thompson on contemporary history.

Hübinger raised the question of whether the Byzantine Empire had once formed a unit with Western Europe and came up with a clear negative answer. In his opinion, the process of differentiation between east and west started under the Roman Empire during the second century and eventually led to the existence of two different civilizations, the Latin and Orthodox, each with its own religious features. The schism of 1054, 'an incident of the greatest importance in European history', had sealed the differentiation.[11] The long lasting effects of this division inside Europe – he added – could still be observed in modern Yugoslavia, which suffered from the fact that it was divided by the frontier between the two halves of Europe.

During the course of the debate Zakythinos seriously contested Hübinger's thesis, asserting that the Byzantine Empire had been part of the whole European community, despite the religious differences, which in any case were not decisive because 'mysticism, scholasticism and [research on] Plato and Aristotle … had pursued a parallel course'.[12] This religious parallelism was found even in the development of heresies, with the Albigenses facing the Bogomils. In his view, therefore, the schism of 1054 had not destroyed this unity, as witnessed by the many attempts made for a reunification. Also, on the political level, Western and Eastern Europe were not 'two completely separate worlds but rather … two entities closely bound up to each other *because they were inspired by a common political outlook*'[13] based on their shared orientation to the Roman Empire. All in all, both in Western and Eastern Europe there had been 'a unity of sentiment, an awareness of the vast European community which was a very genuine reality to its peoples'.[14] The enemy was outside, it had been fought during the Crusades, which were 'an achievement of the whole Western community'[15] and played an important role in unifying Europe.

In his reply, Hübinger disputed Zakythinos's interpretation of the Crusades, which he claimed came from romanticists like Novalis who had written that 'out of the Crusades emerges Europe'. Hübinger reasserted the significance of the 1054 schism and dismissed the attempts at reconciliation as obvious behaviour under the circumstances. In fact, to demonstrate the depth of the rift between West and East he quoted 'one Pope', not specified, who had said that 'Byzan-

tium in the hands of the Greeks is no better than Byzantium in the hands of the Turks'[16] and another Pope, Pius II, who attributed to the Byzantine emperor Eraclius the guilt of creating and encouraging Islam. Hübinger had not dealt with another reality outside Europe, Islam, and during this part of the debate van de Laar, the Dutch delegate, suggested adding the Arabian culture to the three cultures normally regarded as the 'main forces' of the Middle Ages, namely the classic, Christian and German culture,[17] but Hübinger totally disagreed, saying that 'the Arabians had not been so important to the development of Europe as the Orthodox and the Slav world'.[18]

Thus, a contest had arisen between Islamic and Orthodox cultures and this was to be at the core of the next symposium, in Oslo, at which two competing lectures – one on Byzance and one on Islam – would be given. Zakythinos, who spoke on Byzance, picked up and developed the main points of his intervention during the debate at Calw, stressing among other things that Byzantine feudalism 'sprang from the same institutions and customs as are at the origin of Western feudalism',[19] and insisting that the schism of 1054 'did not raise any insurmountable barriers between two worlds henceforth alien and hostile'.[20] He concluded with force that Byzantium belonged to the European community of the Middle Ages because:

> (a) the Byzantine Empire was built on the foundation of a Roman empire in contact with the hellenistic East, (b) economy was developed within the European economy, (c) society was subject to Greco-Roman law deeply influenced as it was by feudalism, (d) it was a tributary, in a spiritual sense, to Greek science and letters, (e) its intellectual and artistic repercussion on Western Europe was considerable, and (f) finally, Byzantium was part of the European community, having for more than a millennium defended Europe and resisted pressure from abroad.[21]

This last point obviously alluded to resistance against the Islamic enemy. The debate was very lively and not without criticisms. Van de Laar rejected the idea that during the Middle Ages Byzance had been

part of Europe: 'Undoubtedly there was a great influence. But nevertheless these were two different worlds.'[22] Üçyiğit also disputed the similarity between Europe and the Byzantine Empire. He denied that the latter had been either feudal or the sole heir of Greek civilization, asserting on the contrary that 'Islam had perhaps a greater importance than Byzantium as a bridge'[23] and stressing the influence of Islamic civilization on the intellectual and artistic life of Europe. Here Bonnet stepped into the debate to assert that even if Western Europe and Byzantium had been two different worlds, they were not as different as the Christian and Islamic worlds.

The atmosphere was already heated by the time Üçyiğit stood up to give his lecture on the influence of Islamic civilization in the Middle Ages on European civilization. The lecture had been included in the programme at the special request of many delegates who saw a need for much more information on the history of Islam and of the Turks.[24] Üçyiğit started by asserting that 'Islamic civilization is essentially a part of Mediterranean civilization and shows, in many respects, a unity of origin with the civilization of Christian Europe.'[25] This was because Islam went back to old Palestine and the Old Testament for its religion, to ancient Greece for its science, and combined some Byzantine influence with a major influence of the Sassanid Empire for its political organization. He then came to his second and basic argument, the deep difference between medieval and modern Europe. As he put it: 'After the Renaissance a new Europe with new concepts of religion, state, economic activity, very different from those of the Middle Ages, emerged and it was in that period that the peoples of Europe became aware of a European conscience.'[26]

The discontinuity between medieval and modern Europe lay in the decreased role of Christianity. Here Üçyiğit developed an interesting and provocative vision of European identity:

> Those who have tried to analyse European culture have always found three main elements: Christianity, antiquity and modern technique. In my opinion the most important of these factors is modern technique. But as modern technique is a result of the application of sciences based on ancient Greek traditions, I will

count antiquity as the fundamental and creative element of European civilization. Christianity takes its place lower in the hierarchy even though it has considerably influenced European morals, arts, and legal and social systems and also has played a great role in uniting the peoples of Europe. In modern times, however, sciences, arts, law, morals etc., and even religion itself is under the influence of antiquity and Renaissance.[27]

Thus Christianity, instead of shaping modern Europe, had rather been reshaped by Europe in the framework of the new culture of the Renaissance, which was above all an expression of the classical heritage:

Europeanism is, above all, the knowledge of antiquity and the ability to assimilate it. The discovery of antiquity at the end of the Middle Ages is at the source of the European development. The Renaissance contributed to European science an environment of determinism, criticism and belief in the positive sciences. The new principles, when applied to religion, led to the Reformation and religious tolerance. Their application to political institutions resulted, eventually, in democracy. Europeanism is not being Christian; it is having religious tolerance and freedom of faith. European science is freedom of research and *esprit critique*. As far as politics are concerned political tolerance and liberty constitute the main element of Europeanism. Europe is not the product of Christianity, but Christianity is the product of Europe.[28]

After this rather original definition of the identity of modern Europe, in which he based his recognition of the Ottoman Empire as part of the European world on religious pluralism and tolerance rather than on religious identity, Üçyiğit went back to Islam in the Middle Ages to observe that Muslim civilization had the great advantages of controlling world trade and having the widest network of cultural intercourse with other peoples. Its contribution to European culture was twofold. First, through its access to classical culture and network of contemporary civilizations, it was able not only to transmit eastern,

especially Indian and Chinese, knowledge to Europe, but also, thanks to its tolerance of Christians, permitted the travel of Christian missionaries to East Asia. And, second, it had its own direct cultural influence, which had entered Europe particularly through Spain and Sicily. As examples he cited the school of medicine at Salerno, which Muslim medicine had influenced, and Dante Alighieri, in whose work the influence of the Arab poet Abu'l-'Ala al-Ma'arri can be recognized.

Üçyiğit's lecture caused a certain amount of discomfort in the audience. Gould admitted beforehand that it was difficult for him to be 'purely objective' about the 'extreme points of view' Üçyiğit expressed. He then went on to contest Üçyiğit's vision of Christianity with the rather odd argument that 'Christianity was much more a personal matter',[29] and added that he had exaggerated the importance of Islam in the transmission of knowledge to Europe: although this transmission had been very important, 'it was thanks to the Western European scholars of the eleventh and twelfth century that this knowledge could be assimilated'.[30] Bonnet disagreed that antiquity had been discovered at the end of the Middle Ages: on the contrary, he argued, 'antiquity had been known throughout the Middle Ages and had [not] witnessed any break with ancient culture',[31] adding that he found it difficult to consider Islam as part of medieval Europe: 'The influence was real, but the Islamic world was a stranger to the European world, even opposed to it.'[32] Puttemans went further, asserting that the Islamic world's only role was that of enemy and, as such, it had stimulated the unification of European peoples during the Crusades and Reconquista – 'One may therefore say that Islam could be considered, in a negative way, as having promoted European unity.'[33] Furthermore, he denied that Islamic culture had any creativity, considering it merely as a cultural intermediary. Similarly, Zakythinos asserted that only Christianity had created Europe and acknowledged to Islam only the twofold role of broker and opponent. He claimed that Üçyiğit had exaggerated the extent of Islamic tolerance, and had, in his opinion, concealed the fact that it was only the result of a political necessity.

Üçyiğit answered firmly on every point. On the question of tolerance, he recognized that political considerations had also played a role, but still held that it was a fact that 'the whole [of] Islam showed greater

tolerance in the Middle Ages than the Christians'.[34] The tolerance that characterized modern Europe did not come, he continued, 'from the religious structure of Christianity, but had its roots in ancient Greece, and was transferred to Europe by the Renaissance'.[35] Therefore, with respect to tolerance, 'Islam was in medieval times nearer to modern Europeanism than Europe itself'.[36] Üçyiğit then clarified his statement that Christianity was a product of Europeans and not vice versa: 'Christianity was not only the work of the writers of the Bible but also that of European scholars, such as Luther, Calvin, etc.'[37]

In his words there was therefore a contraposition between medieval Catholicism and Protestant reform and, implicitly, Renaissance, a cultural movement that, he added, had not been directly caused by Islam, but nevertheless Islam had indirectly contributed to its birth because it 'awakened a great admiration for and interest in antiquity among the peoples of Europe'.[38]

The recommendations of this symposium very clearly showed who, between Byzance and Islam, had won the race for entering European history. Zakythinos's thesis was in fact widely accepted:

> It is recommended that the textbooks should not lose sight of the fact that the Eastern Church continued to be an integral part of Christendom after the Schism of 1054.
>
> The history of the Middle Ages should not be treated from an exclusively Western point of view. Byzantium should, therefore, be given its due importance in the general history of the Middle Ages by drawing particular attention to its role in uniting Western Europe in the fight against Islam, and to the widespread nature of its civilization.[39]

Thus, Islam was recognized as the enemy that had stimulated the unification of Europe through the action of Byzance and also through the Crusades, whose 'unifying role'[40] was stated in these recommendations. Islam appeared only in a short paragraph, much more modest and generic: 'It would appear desirable to show greater appreciation of the contribution of Islam to the formation of the intellectual and artistic life in Europe.'[41]

This first encounter between Europe and Islam had been difficult, but things were to improve with the following symposia, when the attention was focused on the Ottoman Empire.

In fact, one of the questions put to the historians for the textbook analysis to be presented at the symposium in Rome in 1954 was: 'In the presentation of the history of Eastern Europe, is due justice done to the cultural influence of the Turkish advance?'[42] The answer had been negative:

> In the great majority of textbooks the Ottoman Empire is treated solely as the arch-enemy of Christendom and its cultural influence is, at least by implication, represented as evil. The sole exceptions appear to be Greek textbooks, which recognize the legal achievements of Suliman the Magnificent, and some Scandinavian ones, which mention Turkish toleration in religion. This presentation contrasts sharply with the Turkish view, according to which 'the advance and settlement of the Turks in Europe did not produce any unfavourable effects for European nations.'[43]

This remark and the attention being given to the Turkish point of view led to the following recommendation, which echoed the one of the previous symposium: 'It is desirable that the cultural influence of Turkey … should be more fully explored by the authors of textbooks.'[44]

At the next symposium in Royaumont, a second lecture by Üçyiğit on the position of the Turks and the Ottoman Empire in general again turned the participants' attention to Turkish history. He started with a short overview of the history of the Turks before their Islamization, asserting that at that time they had already achieved a high level of development and, in a clear statement of pride and autonomy, noted that: 'The Turks possessed an urban civilization and a literary tradition before the advent of Islam.'[45] He then passed on to the Ottoman Empire, of which he extolled not its religious but its political virtues. Its strength, he held, which allowed it a life of six centuries, was due above all to its special ability to bring together so many different

peoples with different languages, religions and cultures. In this sense, the Ottoman Empire could be compared with the Roman Empire, with which it also shared the military power. The role of Islam for the Turks was ambivalent. On one hand Islam was positive because it introduced peoples from the steppes of Central Asia to the Mediterranean world and exposed them to Greek philosophy, science and the Roman legal system, but on the other hand Islam segregated them from Europe: 'As they were Moslems, Greek and Latin literature remained to them a closed book. The Renaissance passed Turkey by.'[46] Üçyiğit also emphasized that Islamization had caused the Turks to break with their original religious practices, an outcome that the use of the term 'fanaticism' clearly deplored:

> The fanaticism engendered by the new religion had such a marked influence upon the upper class of the society, who were most easily permeated by it, that everything connected with the pagan cult was soon eradicated and new values quickly replaced the old. Only the common people retained an element of their former paganism, of which traces may still be found beneath the external forms of Islam.[47]

Again, it was clearly the intention to distinguish the Turks from the Islamic world as a whole by stressing their originality beyond religion. Anyway, Üçyiğit continued, the Turks contributed significantly to the development of Islamic culture: while the Arabs excelled in eloquence and the Persians in spirituality, the Turks excelled in literature, characterized by simplicity and sincerity, and in music. Moreover, Üçyiğit accredited the Turkish scholar Abu Nasr al-Farabi with having familiarized Avicenna with the thoughts of Plato and Aristotle and underlined Sinan's original contribution to the development of architecture.

Another specific feature of the Ottoman Empire had been its political tolerance and the way it overlooked the racial and religious differences of the many groups of people it ruled; this had been one of the most important contributors to its stability and longevity. All non-Muslim communities were guaranteed full cultural and religious

freedom: in drawing a comparison with the Roman Empire, Üçyiğit considered that the politics of the Ottoman Empire should serve as a model for all Europe. In this context, he painted a positive picture of its relations with Christians. He dwelt for a while on the *devşirme*, the abduction of young Christian boys for the service of the sultan, which was controversial and attracted sharp criticism of Ottoman rule, especially in the Balkans. Üçyiğit pointed out that no force or cruelty was used in the procedure and that families often pushed their children forward for selection because they knew that the youngsters would get a good position within the military service and in the administration.

Üçyiğit then came to the crucial theme of the decadence of the Ottoman Empire; the crisis, he argued, was due not to an internal autonomous decay and weakening but to a dramatic change in the balance of power:

> In my opinion it was not so much internal disruptions but changes in external circumstances that began the decline of the Ottoman Empire. There was a vast difference between Europe of the seventeenth and the eighteenth and Europe of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Furthermore, in the eighteenth century Russia made her appearance in Europe and became a powerful and dangerous state to the north of the empire.[48]

The crisis had opened people's eyes to the need to learn from Europe: Üçyiğit described the long and difficult process of Westernization, which eventually came about under Atatürk.

At the end of his lecture, and with great passion, Üçyiğit lamented the negative image of the Turks that prevailed in Europe: indeed, he said, conflicts always produced negative feelings among participants, but these had never been as strong and as enduring because 'in no case has propaganda been so long continued and virulent as against the Turks. … No other people in Europe, and perhaps in the world, has had to suffer from so much misunderstanding.'[49] Prejudice against the Turks had become part of European culture, and that created a deep sense of frustration and resentment among Turks who felt on their side a great openness towards Europe.

History textbooks, he concluded, played a large part in diffusing and strengthening these negative prejudices and it was necessary to revise them in order to erase these prejudices:

> In most history textbooks which European students come across, the name Turk is associated only with the following events: the Crusades, the conquest of Istanbul or Hungary, the risings in the Balkans and lastly the battle of the Dardanelles. In all these contexts the Turk is seen only as a warrior. It is true that we are good soldiers, and we are obliged to be so even today. But we want your history books to show the Turk as something more than an ogre with a mind for nothing but fighting: we would like to see them find space for our culture and our contribution to civilization.[50]

The debate was friendlier this time. Dance expressed his gratitude to the speaker for giving an unusual vision of history seen 'from the Bosporus and not from the Channel'.[51] Ludovic Ravet, the UNESCO delegate, expressed his hope that Turkey would place documentation and teaching materials at the disposal of those who wrote textbooks and planned syllabuses, so that they could improve the presentation of Turkey's history; he also suggested that it would be a good idea to set up bilateral meetings with Turkish historians for the revision of Western European textbooks. The Belgian delegate Emile Lousse said that the main reasons for the incomplete presentation of Turkish history in Western European textbooks were a lack of documentary sources and linguistic difficulties. He also recognized that Europe had been incontrovertibly intolerant, as evidenced in the fate of the Jewish communities. Zakythinos was the only really critical member of the audience. First, he pointed out that the Ottoman Empire had been less original than the speaker had implied: for instance, the feudal structure of the Ottoman Empire was a continuation of the Byzantine structure. Then he complained that the speaker had underplayed the contribution of Christians, especially of Greeks like Sinan, to Ottoman culture, and warned against painting a 'too idyllic picture' of tolerance and of the Ottoman Empire's relations with subjected peoples:

One could not belittle the persecutions, the abduction of
children, [and] the brutality of the policy of assimilation
practised by Turkey in regard to people who remained
Christian. If tolerance had existed, it was because no system can
endure for long by force alone, and because imperialism
inevitably comes to terms with subjugated populations. This
tolerance … had nothing to do with what was meant by respect
for the opinions of others.[52]

At the end of his rather damning remarks Zakythinos felt the need
to cool tensions by declaring that 'he did not wish to resuscitate an
old quarrel and fully supported everyone's effort to correct the
narrow nationalistic point of view given in some history textbooks.'[53]
Üçyiğit answered briefly, thanking him for presenting the Greek
position, which paralleled his own. He affirmed that he had focused
in particular on the social, political and administrative aspects of the
Ottoman Empire because there laid its originality. On the issue of
tolerance, he admitted that he had perhaps been carried away by his
concern to correct the conventional picture, but that in any case the
very fact, which Zakythinos had raised, that despite his Greek origins
Sinan could still become the greatest Ottoman architect was evidence
that the government was able to give everyone the place they
deserved.

There was no evidence of this debate in the recommendation,
which dealt only with general issues like the importance of economic
and social history and the obvious invitation to 'respect historical
objectivity and avoid the use of derogatory or exaggerated
expression'.[54]

Attention to the Ottoman Empire did not, however, disappear: the
textbook analysis of the 1789–1871 period presented at Scheveningen
in 1957 made it clear, among other things, that the Ottoman Empire
was generally accused of being the instigator of conflicts with Euro-
pean powers and that in relation to the Greek war of independence it
was treated as a power outside Europe. To correct this bias, at the end
of the symposium the following recommendation was issued: 'When
treating the Eastern Question, it is desirable that the Ottoman Empire

be studied in its own right and not merely as a factor in the policy of the powers; care should be taken to avoid implying that Turkey is a non-European country.'[55]

The Ottoman Empire and Turkey had thus fully entered European history. During the course of the previous conference, held in Turkey in 1958 and devoted to contemporary history, the prominent Turkish historian Halil İnalcık completed the portrayal of Ottoman–Turkish history with a long lecture on Turkish Westernization.

He traced the history of the rift back to the ninth century. Before then Islam and Christianity had been reconcilable because both derived from a common Middle East cultural and religious background and because Greek philosophy and Roman law influenced Islam. Later, however, the Islamic authorities forbade any independent reasoning in legal matters: 'It was the sacred character of the Moslem law, under supervision of the Ulemâ, that was chiefly responsible for the conservative character of the Moslem State long before the Ottomans.'[56] The pre-eminence of religion was therefore the main problem for Islamic culture. The Turks changed this situation by introducing a dual legal system in which the state and religion were separated: 'Turkish Sultans, concerned primarily with their supreme authority over the politico-religious community of Islam, assumed an absolutely independent position in the face of the Ulemâ and the Caliphs and instituted new State laws based exclusively on this supreme political power.'[57] Nevertheless, because of *ulema* resistance to Westernization the relationship between the state and religion remained problematic. Ever since the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, violently conservative *ulema* had supported the Muslim masses against the sultans and elites because they associated Westernization with Christianity. The janissaries with their military power also supported the conservative side. This tension continued throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire:

> The partisans of modernism on one side, reactionaries and conservatives on the other, formed two hostile camps. Derogatory names such as frenk, snob and infidel for Westernisers, backward, reactionary or ignorant bigots for conservatives were

often applied reciprocally. This fundamental division [has] dominated Turkish political life in the last two centuries.[58]

Accurately and comprehensively İnalcık set out to reconstruct the history of Ottoman Westernization. From the initial stages sparked by military defeats in the eighteenth century (which was why the military played the role it did in the process of modernization), he took his audience through Selim III's failed reforms, Murad II's new initiative with the suppression of the janissaries, the period of reform (Tanzimat) in the nineteenth century, the adoption of Western laws and a parliamentary system, and finishing of course with Atatürk. İnalcık stressed that Atatürk was not against religion: his aim was to create a secular state inside the Muslim world because only a secular state could realize Westernization. Also, because all the other Western nations were secular, to be part of their family Turkey 'had to eliminate the barriers that estranged her from the West'.[59] By implementing this reform, he continued, the Turks had made an important contribution to the entire Muslim world by showing that it is possible to be good believers in a secular state:

> Turks are as good Muslims as any other Muslim people in the World. But they have at the same time a secular state which according to the Muslim tradition is something impossible. … The Turks brought a new historical solution for the difficult position in which Islamic societies find themselves in the modern world.

This new way of seeing the Islamic faith as a private matter, İnalcık emphasized, was still strange to the rest of the Muslim world: 'It must be added that while Islam is purely a religion for modern Turks, Arab nationalists tend to regard it rather as a National heritage and see no harm in using it for political purposes.'[60]

Audience reactions to this long lecture were mostly very positive. Haakon Vigander thanked İnalcık for his 'admirable lecture'. Lousse, Erdmann and Puttemans followed by asking for more detailed information on a number of points, to which İnalcık answered with precision,

showing evidence of great scholarship and also pointing out the back-wardness of Western studies on the Ottoman Empire. Since Nicolae Jorga's *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, published between 1908 and 1913, he stated, there had been no further comprehensive works that made use of recent research undertaken in the Turkish archives.[61] Only van de Laar adopted a critical position, asking İnalcık if he actually believed that real Westernization of Turkey was possible given that, as he put it, 'Western civilization was profoundly religious – a fact not to be forgotten'.[62] İnalcık replied sharply by advocating a non-essentialist vision of culture: 'If one took the view that a culture was an organic whole which could not be imitated or borrowed from, genuine westernization was not possible. That was not, however, the view he took himself.'[63]

This symposium in Turkey closed the first phase of the Council of Europe's engagement in the reform of history teaching. In the following years a few scattered conferences were held to deepen and systematize the work that had been done and to disseminate a broader vision of history to the rest of the world, but the specific subjects of Islam and the Ottoman Empire were no longer discussed. The recom-mendations of the conference on the general theme of history teaching in secondary education held at Elsinore in 1965 contain only one short reference to Islam, recorded as one among many civilizations that had any influence on Europe. There is also a reference to the mutual influence of Europe and the 'steppe civilizations', without further specifications: it is impossible therefore to know whether Mongolians or Turks or both were included. Byzance, by contrast, received more consideration: 'Attention should be drawn to the place of Byzantine history in medieval civilization. Byzantine culture should be examined, and common elements of, as well as differences between, Western and Eastern medieval history should be observed.'[64]

The next conference, on the theme of history teaching in lower secondary education, was held at Braunschweig in 1969. While stress-ing the importance of studying world civilizations 'understood in the widest and not merely in the political sense – that is to say, embracing spiritual, religious, social, cultural, technical, economic, scientific and other matters',[65] no particular one of them was mentioned or spe-

cifically analysed. At another conference, held at Louvain in 1972 and devoted to the place of religions in history textbooks, only general recommendations were issued on the need to give an unbiased presentation of religions and to remember the influence of Judaism and Islam on European culture:

> The history teacher should not present one faith as being superior to all others, all the more superior in that the other faiths are distant in space and more different in dogma and practice. If the textbooks used in Western Europe accordingly devote a pre-eminent place to European forms of Christianity (Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy), they should not lose sight of the role of other religions (Judaism, Islam) and their contribution to the development of European culture.[66]

The meeting of experts on history teaching in upper secondary education, held at Strasbourg in 1971, was confined to the need to focus on contemporary history in the last phase of secondary education. More than ten years later, in 1983, a symposium was held in Lisbon on teaching secondary school pupils in Western Europe about Portuguese discoveries. The theme was particularly relevant to relations between Europe and the rest of the world, and the recommendations touched important points like the need 'to do justice to the considerable achievements of the contemporary civilizations in other parts of the world, e.g. Africa, India, China and Japan',[67] an attention that should also serve to improve intercultural understanding.

The influence of all this Council of Europe activity on teaching history was clearly relevant to many member states. A European vision of history has been achieved and, in many countries, as the conferences of the 1950s intended, it has replaced the nationalistic approach. Research conducted in the early 1990s on the image of Europe in British, French, German, Italian and Spanish schools shows a general shift from a national to a European approach, as summarized by Falk Pingel, the coordinator of the research: 'By all means, one can no longer say that the textbooks we have examined explicitly endeavour to develop a sense of national consciousness: they rather point towards

more global values, or try to engender an awareness of the European and Western tradition.'[68]

This is certainly a relevant change. However, this evolution towards a wider vision of history stops at the borders of Europe, despite the Council of Europe's later attempts – albeit limited and timid ones – to include Europe in the general framework of world history. European ethnocentrism and nationalism have replaced previous nationalisms. The rest of the world has continued to remain on the edge of the narrative presented in history textbooks: history textbooks only deal with it according to when and how Europe becomes involved.

In this context it is interesting to look at what influence the debates of the 1950s had on the place of Islam and of the Ottoman Empire in history textbooks. Islam during the European Middle Ages, with its cultural achievements and relations with Europe, had certainly entered the textbooks, but not much progress had been made on the treatment of the Ottoman Empire. In a recent analysis of British history textbooks, Stefan Ihrig stated that:

> In many books the Ottoman Empire is literally the big void on the European map. It is either not present at all or is assigned a nearly peripheral place in the history of Europe. Especially when the narrative deals with the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman Empire is often portrayed as a passive 'non-power'.[69]

The same is generally true of Spain,[70] France,[71] and Germany.[72] In Italy, apart from traditional textbooks that only mention the Ottoman Empire in connection with wars against Europe, there are others that examine its social and political structure and the reasons for its decadence. The authors of these textbooks focus on the failure of cultural, technological and scientific modernization, the conservative involution of Islam since the sixteenth century, the mediocrity of most sultans and the lack of a mercantile bourgeoisie.[73] In Greece, where a system of a single textbook for each subject operates under the control of the ministry of education, a derogatory and superficial portrait of the Ottoman Empire (*Tourkokratía*, as it is called) still prevails:

> The perception of this period as a black page in the history of
> the Greeks has not gone through considerable changes in the
> second half of the twentieth century. The lack of any period-
> ization of … Ottoman history is characteristic of all Greek
> history textbooks printed in this period, since the time between
> 1453 [and] 1821 is perceived as a single period. … The
> Ottoman institutions or the administrative structure of this state
> are discussed to a very limited degree in some textbooks of
> secondary school published from the mid-1980s onwards. …
> The *Tourkokratía* is depicted as a series of sufferings that lasted
> almost four hundred years.[74]

On the Turkish side, where textbooks are also under ministry of
education control (even if there is more than one for each school), the
image of the Greeks in connection with the war of independence is
negative:

> The Greek War of Independence is perceived in all Turkish
> history textbooks as a rebellion or revolt. … The Turkish text-
> books argue that the Greeks enjoyed freedom to a large extent in
> many aspects of their life within the boundaries of the Ottoman
> state, implying in essence that there would have been no
> rebellion if Russia had not supported the Greeks and if the latter
> had not been influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution.
> The events themselves are described in one or two paragraphs
> in which are cited massacres of Turks by the Greeks.[75]

Turkish history textbooks pay more attention to Western Europe
than vice versa. Western Europe's image is ambivalent – positive on
the modernization it pursued, but negative on its intrusion in Ottoman
affairs, which eventually led to the empire's collapse.[76]

After 50 years, there is still much to be done to obtain a less ethno-
centric, less ideologically biased and more scholarly vision of the
history to be taught at school. Political interference is certainly an
obstacle, for it tends to use history teaching as a tool for legitimating
the current political agenda. The method the Council of Europe inau-

gurated, which gives the task of revision to historians, is clearly the best way forward, but to be effective it needs to be coupled with historians and history educators having sole charge of school curricula, possibly at an international as well as national level. In recent years the Council of Europe has neglected the history of Muslim societies and of the Ottoman Empire because, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has geared its history teaching conferences towards new member states that were previously behind the 'iron curtain'.

Nevertheless, Turkey has been included in the regional initiatives that other organizations, such as the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, have set up. This centre has published a set of four workbooks on Balkan history that are intended for use as alternative teaching materials. The outcome is interesting and useful: the workbook devoted to the Ottoman Empire and addressed to students in higher secondary education[77] gives an insight into social and economic life, and tries to develop a multi-perspective approach (for instance concerning the *devşirme*) by presenting pupils with contradictory sources. This engagement in direct debate and confrontation among the protagonists of contentious historical events is necessary if one is to achieve mutual recognition on both the cognitive and emotional levels. If this process leads to addressing negative prejudices, it is not sufficient to overcome ethnocentrism, which acts as a basic bias in understanding history. Regional horizons like the Balkans or even Europe are inappropriate: what we need is a world vision of history to provide a conceptual framework into which partial histories are inserted and can take their meaning.

Notes

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3. Ibid., pp. 238–9.
4. Luigi Cajani, 'Von Lepanto bis zum Zusammenbruch Jugoslawiens: eine Reise durch die italienischen Geschichtsschulbücher für die Oberstufe', in Andreas Helmedach (ed.) *Pulverfass, Powder keg, Baril de Poudre? Südosteuropa im europäischen Geschichtsschulbuch* [*Southeastern Europe in European history textbooks*], Hanover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2007, p. 197.

5. Carl August Schröder, *Die Schulbuchverbesserung durch internationale geistige Zusammenarbeit*, Braunschweig: Georg Westermann Verlag, 1961.

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7. Ibid., p. 71.

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9. Evelyne Hery, *Un siècle de leçons d'histoire. L'histoire enseignée au lycée 1870–1970*, Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 1999, p. 316.

10. Luigi Cajani, 'Italien und der Zweite Weltkrieg in den Schulgeschichts-büchern', in Christoph Cornelißen, Lutz Klinkhammer and Wolfgang Schwenkter (eds) *Erinnerungskulturen: Deutschland, Italien und Japan seit 1945*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, p. 271.

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13. Ibid., p. 17.

14. Ibid., p. 17.

15. Ibid., p. 16.

16. Ibid., p. 21.

17. Ibid., p. 18.

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19. Archives of the Council of Europe, EXP/Cult (54) 44 Revised: Committee of Cultural Experts, *Report of the symposium on the revision of history textbooks held in Oslo from 7 to 14 August 1954*, p. 25.

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22. Ibid., p. 27.

23. Ibid., p. 28.

24. Bruley and Dance, *A history of Europe?* p. 63.

25. EXP/Cult 54, p. 31.

26. Ibid., p. 32.

27. Ibid., p. 32.

28. Ibid., p. 32.

29. Ibid., p. 36.

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33. Ibid., p. 38.

34. Ibid., p. 37.

35. Ibid., p. 37.

36. Ibid., p. 37.

37. Ibid., p. 36.
38. Ibid., p. 36.
39. Bruley and Dance, *A history of Europe?* p. 73.
40. Ibid., p. 72.
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45. Archives of the Council of Europe, EXP/Cult (56) 43: Committee of Cultural Experts, *Official report of the fourth conference on the revision of history textbooks held at Royaumont from 2 to 9 September 1956*, p. 91.
46. Ibid., p. 90.
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49. Ibid., p. 95.
50. Ibid., p. 95.
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54. Bruley and Dance, *A history of Europ?* p. 73.
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71. Marie-Christine Baquès and Nicole Tutiaux-Guillon, 'Los árabes, el islam y los turcos en la enseñanza de la historia en el sistema educativo francés contemporáneo: entre la tradición educativa y el contexto sensible', in Luigi Cajani (ed.) *Conociendo al otro: el islam y Europa en sus manuales de historia*, Madrid: Santillana, 2008, pp. 123–72.

72. Andreas Helmedach, 'Südosteuropa im deutschen Geschichts-und Gemeinschaftskundeschulbuch der Gegenwart', in Andreas Helmedach (ed.) *Pulverfass, powder keg, baril de poudre? Südosteuropa im europäischen Geschichtsschulbuch* (Southeastern Europe in European history textbooks) Hanover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2007, pp. 73–119; and Gerdien Jonker, 'El islam en los libros de texto alemanes: la historia de una narración educacional', in Luigi Cajani (ed.) *Conociendo al otro: el islam y Europa en sus manuales de historia*, Madrid: Santillana, 2008, pp. 37–72.

73. Cajani, 'Von Lepanto bis zum Zusammenbruch Jugoslawiens', pp. 173–8.

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Intertwined identities: a gender-based reading of the visual representations of contemporary Islam in European textbooks

Benoît Challand

Textbooks and crossed identities

Visitors to the Swiss pavilion at the 1992 Universal Exhibition in Seville were greeted with the phrase '*La Suisse n'existe pas*' ('Switzerland does not exist'). I would like to apply this provocative motto to the question of European identity. European identity does not exist unless it is pitted against another identity and then interpreted with the help of xeno-stereotypes. Bo Stråth treated self-descriptions and descriptions of others as two faces of the same coin, each caught up in a dynamic relationship in which xeno-stereotypes are sometimes integrated into auto-stereotypes.[1] In this chapter[2] I shall attempt to test that hypothesis by examining how discourses about Islam are increasingly being linked to discourses about European identity.

I have chosen to confine the study to German, French and Italian history textbooks, to cover only contemporary Islam and Muslims (the period after 1945), to concentrate mostly on visual sources (pictures, caricatures and drawings), as well as the text surrounding them, and to employ a gender-based reading of these visual sources. My reason for confining the investigation to contemporary Islam is because European construction is now at a crossroads and Turkey, as the new frontier of Europe, can offer us a fresh glimpse at long-held clichés born of encounters between Europe and Islam since the Middle Ages.[3]

I concentrate on visual sources because, although textbooks provide a summary of what a society knows, visual sources tend to create a more vivid impression on people's minds. Because gender quickly reveals deep-seated assumptions and expectations about identities – whether individual or collective – through the prism of gender I aim to polarize expectations about collective identities and shed new light on Europe and this external other that represents Islam (and Turkey) in our contemporary epoch.

I chose the countries with a view to offering a reasonable basis for comparison: they are all founding members of the first European Community and they all have more or less centrally-planned curricula,[4] but they have had different colonial or post-colonial experiences. The corpus of material consists of 94 textbooks published between 1950 and 2007 and they are selected to give an overview of the shifts in the presentation of contemporary Islam and Muslims over time and space.[5] I shall thus look at national differences and underline some current themes of the interplay between Islam and European constructions. Is Islam, as the 'other' of Europe, represented homogenously across time and space? What are the differences (either in diachronic terms or in geographical space) and what might these differences suggest about the difficulty of speaking about *a* European identity?

Confronting the ways in which European history textbooks deal with contemporary Islams (and one can never understate the plurality of Muslim worlds) over time and place gives us some clues about the extent to which 'Islam' can embody a significant other for European identity.[6] By contrast, such readings give us the chance to reflect on the underpinnings of a common European identity. Can the latter be subsumed (or not) under the heading of common 'values',[7] 'symbols' or myths,[8] or historical experience (*Erfahrung*)?[9] Do we witness, in European history textbooks, a *common* framework for the interplay between Islam and Europe, do we still discern national differences? How does diversity within contemporary Muslim worlds fare in the narrative of history textbooks and relate to an expanding political Europe?

Finally, I think there are three justifications for a visual and gendered analysis. First, while there is a burgeoning literature on the

representation of Islam and Muslims in Europe,[10] and on the gender dimension of contemporary Islam,[11] very little has been done through visual material.[12] Second, we cannot limit our analysis of history textbooks to their written content. The textbooks used in classrooms are always richer in terms of pictures, maps and caricatures; this changes the nature of teaching by providing quick icons and visual (sometimes emotional) short cuts to a more complex knowledge contained in the written texts.[13] Therefore, one has to study pictures, particularly within the written context.[14] Third, a visual analysis also involves a dynamic dimension between the subject (the textbook as a metonymy or link between the active author and the readers invited to react to the text and pictures) and the object of study, in this case the representation of Islam. Since textbooks have the capacity to define not only the text but also the nature of the pictures representing Islam and Muslims, the analysis of visual sources should also tell us about the ways in which the interaction between two worlds (in this case the national textbook and Europe on the one hand and the Muslim worlds on the other) is evolving and how it is also normatively constructed. The idea is that the visual analysis reveals certain expectations about the nature of the European project (a European identity) pitted against the nature or essence of another, in this case Islam. If Islam is indeed a significant 'other' for Europe, then its representations should be intimately interlocked with those of Europe.

I have divided this chapter into two main sections, one dealing with text analyses and the other offering a visual reading of the contemporary representations of Islam, leading to a conclusion on what become increasingly intertwined identities.

Text analysis: Islam's increasing presence at the heart of Europe
I base this section on a textual analysis of contemporary Islam over time. Let us look in detail at what the textbooks of the three countries have to say about contemporary Islam.

The transformation of Islam as a 'civilization' into a French domestic problem
Textbooks in France, unlike those in Germany and Italy, have always found space for contemporary Islam, probably because Muslim popu-

lations featured quite prominently in its colonial past. Also, the French are in the habit of comparing civilizations,[15] a tendency that Braudel's influence on the French curriculum and ways of conceiving history made fashionable in the 1960s and 1970s. The theme of Islamism was introduced earlier in France than in other European countries. In fact, large sections were dedicated to the Iranian revolution (partly because of Khomeini's presence in France just before the revolution) as early as the mid-1980s. While Islam maintains it status as a world religion, from the late 1980s and early 1990s it started to be represented as a specific challenge to the French republican model of *laïcité* (secularism). Then, from 1994 onwards, the study of contemporary Islam and Muslims moved away from being just a part of Middle Eastern history and into the very heart of French socio-historical developments. A number of incidents over schoolgirls in France wanting to wear the veil (*affaires du foulard*) in 1989, the mid-1990s and 2003/4, the loss of French blood during terrorist attacks in Paris in 1996 and 1997 as a consequence of the civil war in Algeria, and an increasing number of Muslim migrants living in France precipitated this change. Figure 5.1 is a perfect illustration of the next stage in the treatment of Islam, namely a consciousness of the presence of Muslim believers in the heart of French cities (for a detailed visual analysis, see later section entitled *A typology of* homo islamicus *and* femina islamica).

From Arabs to Muslims and the absence of an inner 'other' in Germany
Until the early 1990s German textbooks contained few accounts of contemporary Islam and Muslims: in textbooks written between 1950 and 1985, political problems in the Middle East were subsumed under the heading 'Arab politics', not 'Muslim politics'.[16] Then, in the mid-1980s, the Iranian revolution sparked a change and introduced the formal theme of 'Muslim self-consciousness'; the political turmoil in the region in the 1990s ushered in the themes of the 'expansion of Islam' (*Verbreitung des Islams*) and 'fundamentalism', often unproblematically lumping together Islam and Islamism and opening the door to many neo-Orientalist clichés in German textbooks.[17]

German textbooks contain a further two distinctive features that warrant discussion at this stage.

Figure 5.1: Muslims praying in Levallois. Source: J. Marseille, *Histoires: terminales*,
Paris: Nathan, 1991, p. 275.

First, the increased amount of space dedicated to Islamic fun-
damentalism in recent years has created an (at times silent) antagonism
between Europe and the Muslim worlds. Consequently, Islam (or
Islamism) is presented in the text as either openly opposed to Western
democracies[18] or the contraposition of images and texts reinforces
such an opposition. For example, in Figure 5.2, which shows a
weeping Algerian woman, one is invited to imagine the reasons for her
suffering (and maybe also to feel empathy for her). However, in the
textbook from which it was taken, this picture did not appear in a
section dealing with the Algerian civil war, or with Islamism, but came
at the end a 14-page section on Europe as a political project, which
started by highlighting the Christian legacy for Europe, went on to
present the historical phases of the economic integration of the EEC/
EU and finished with Europe's current challenges, such as Turkey's
request for EU membership, Islamism and asylum seekers.[19] The
woman's suffering was thus projected onto the heart and future of
Europe – as the title of the page on which it appeared implied, *Europa:
Land der Hoffnung für viele? Europe: land of hope for the many?*

M2 *Frau in Algier*. Foto 1997.

4. Versucht das Schicksal der abgebildeten Frau zu erahnen. Was könnte der Grund für ihren Schmerz sein (vgl. S. 153)?

Figure 5.2: Woman in Algiers (*Frau in Algier*). Source: P. Brokemper, K.-H. Müller, D. Potente and H.-O. Regenhardt, *Arbeitsbuch für Geschichte-Politik an Hauptschulen in Nordrhein-Westfalen. 3*, Berlin: Cornelsen Verlag, 1999, p. 205.

The second striking feature is the conspicuous absence of Turkish guestworkers from the maps, texts and pictures that describe the German economic miracle. Only a few textbooks and one picture cover the role of Turkish workers in the postwar period.[20] German textbooks increasingly portray Islam and Muslims as the 'other' of Germany and Europe. For France this external other is also an inner other, but not for Germany, which overlooks its Muslim (Turkish) minorities.

Stark dichotomies in Italian textbooks

The treatment of Islam in Italian textbooks is rather striking. While, as in Germany, all textbooks published between 1950 and 1985 speak of

'Arabs' when dealing with political developments in the Middle East, all textbooks published after that time speak at once of the 'Islamic' or even 'Islamist' population. It is as if a cultural identity based on a language had suddenly shifted (in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution) to a *common* homogenous identity based on religion. In general, the treatment of contemporary Islam and Muslims is strictly limited to Middle Eastern politics and there is hardly[21] any interlinking of contemporary Islam with internal Italian or European matters (as was the case for France and Germany).

Italian textbooks are easily inclined to make simplistic contrasts and portrayals, and this started well before the rise of Islamism. For example, in a 1985 textbook, the contrast between a modernizing Israel and a backward Arab world was embodied in the collation of two pictures, one of a modern concrete infrastructure near Haifa in Israel, followed by one of a camel-riding Bedouin from the Jordanian desert. The antagonism between the two was further emphasized by the caption that mixed political comment with spurious essentialisms (the caption along the two contrasted pictures hinted at a relationship between economic 'backwardness' and violent attacks by Arab groups against Israel).[22] More recent texts concentrate on stark oppositions between the West and Islam, making the latter the main reason for economic backwardness, fundamentalism and the oppression of women.[23] By doing so, they overlook other political and geostrategic factors and, as in many European textbooks,[24] use the particular situation of Muslim women to depict contemporary tensions between the West and Islam.[25] I now turn to the formal analysis of visual sources.

Visual analysis and gendered differentiations

Overview of the visual sources
Out of the 94 textbooks I analysed, which were mostly published between 1962 and 2006, I chose 179 pictures depicting contemporary Islam and Muslims. The database included all visual representations that associated Europe with some aspect or other of contemporary Islam, as well as a random selection of pictures from sections dealing with the Middle East. To ensure statistically significant results, I

constructed the sample to achieve a balanced number per country and per period of analysis.[26]

Some 18 pictures (10 per cent of the sample) portray direct inter-action with Europe, and they are found in French and German textbooks.[27] A quick analysis of these 18 pictures shows that some serve to contrast Europe, defined mostly in terms of its Christian heritage, against Muslims who are always praying, or pictures of mosques in France and Germany. One of these pictures is an obvious manipulation, placing Muslims in fundamentally different times and places than 'actual' Europeans: although the picture is meant to depict European Muslims, it is actually taken from the Middle East in the 1960s, thus reinforcing the sense that (European) Muslims are really alien to Europe.[28] Only one picture shows Muslim migrants outside a religious framework – this, incidentally, is the only picture showing a Turkish guestworker in Germany.[29] Religion seems to be a common way of portraying contemporary Muslims visually, whereas there would probably be more than one way to represent what a 'Christian' does.

I shall now analyse the 179 pictures in terms of their themes.[30] In Table 5.1 I illustrate a first change, namely the strong emergence of religious themes in the most recent period, which leads to diminished instances of pictures dealing overtly with political themes.

Table 5.1: Main theme of the pictures

	By decade			
Theme	*1962–1990*	*1991–2000*	*2001–2006*	*Total*
Politics	35	48	38	121
Religion	9	8	15	32
Daily life	4	7	7	18
Countryside	4	4	0	8
Total	52	67	60	179

In Table 5.2 I sum up various sub-themes or potentially overlapping connotations.[31] Again, with the emergence of sheer violence, terrorism and fanaticism, all of which were viewed as being wrapped up in religious motives, one can perceive the shift away from formal politics

and military problems. When looking at details of the connotations attached to the different Abrahamic faiths (Table 5.3), one sees that Islam is the only 'trouble maker' (except for one negative depiction of an Israeli soldier quarrelling with Palestinians in the occupied territories), while Christianity, Judaism, secularist principles and ecumenical representations are always attached to positive messages of peace, dialogue and tolerance.

Table 5.2: Selected themes tackled in the pictures

Theme	By decade 1962–1990	1991–2000	2001–2006	Total
Formal leaders	21	20	13	54
Military themes	12	11	9	32
Violent themes	14	20	22	56
Terrorism	0	1	4	5
Religious themes	18	29	34	81
Fanaticism	6	14	17	37

Table 5.3: Positive vs negative connotations per 'faith'

Violent connotation in the name of …	Islam	Judaism	Christianity	By faith Secularism	Ecumenical	n.a.	Total
Yes	30	1	0	0	0	25	56
No	64	5	2	4	3	41	119
n.a.	3	0	0	0	0	1	4
Total	97	6	2	4	3	67	179

Gender analysis
Let us now turn to a formal gender analysis of this visual material. First, in simple male–female terms, Table 5.4 highlights that if male are predominantly present (58 per cent of all pictures have only male, 13 per cent only female) in the overall database, women become much more present from 1991 onwards, hinting thus at a new role that women have to play in the representation of contemporary Islam and Muslims from the 1990s onwards.

If we correlate this simple gender analysis with the presence or not of religious themes (Table 5.5), one sees that women's representation

in the 1990s is mostly expressed in religious terms,[32] thus confirming Cooke's thesis that Muslim women are increasingly *muslimwomen*, a term she coined to show that 'so intertwined are gender and religion that they have become one' and that all diversity has been reduced to a single image,[33] that of the veiled woman (see also Table 5.7).

Table 5.4: Analysis of the 168 pictures in terms of gender

Male or female?	1962–1990	By decade 1991–2000	2001–2006	Total
Male	36	36	31	103
Female	2	15	6	23
Other (both, child, n.a.)	14	16	23	52
Total	52	67	60	197

Table 5.5: Crosstabulation: religious theme * Gender * Decade

By decade		Religious theme Yes	No	n.a.	Total
1962–1990	Male	12	23	1	36
	Female	2	0	0	2
	Other (both, child, n.a.)	4	10	0	14
1991–2000	Male	13	22	1	36
	Female	9	6	0	15
	Other (both, child, n.a.)	7	8	1	16
2001–2006	Male	20	11	0	31
	Female	0	6	0	6
	Other (both, child, n.a.)	14	7	2	23
Total		81	93	5	179

Although the *muslimwoman* was strong in the 1990s, the figure was later eclipsed (with a total disappearance of 'religious women' in our sample for the period 2001–06). This figure (in the latter period) was substituted in part by the non-religious female character (six occurrences) and mostly by that of the *homo islamicus*, a violent if not fanatical figure who gives a new face to contemporary Islam from the early 2000s onwards (20 occurrences in Table 5.5. See also Table 5.6

and the section on 'A typology of *homo islamicus* and *femina islamica*' for visual examples).

Table 5.6 shows that two-thirds of all pictures with a violent connotation are linked to male figures, while only 8 per cent (4 of 56) include women. We have here again a further embodiment of the *homo islamicus* engaged in violent scenes, most probably with a more or less direct reference to religion, and in the period after 2000, with direct links to questions of fanaticism and terrorism.

Table 5.6: Occurrence of pictures with explicit violent connotation correlated with gender

		Male	*Female*	*Other (both, child, n.a.)*	*Total*
Violent connotation	Yes	35	4	17	56
	No	66	18	35	119
	n.a.	2	1	1	4
	Total	103	23	53	179

Some pictures might not be violent *per se*, or directly related to religious activities, but their captions can blur the lines between spheres of activities. For example, a picture of a demonstration in Iran (about which nothing is known) shows a vast number of women wearing the *chuddar* and with a large picture of Khomeini hanging on the wall of the square behind them; its caption is 'Fundamentalist Iranian women chanting for Ayatollah Khomeini'.[34] The fact that they are wearing the *chuddar* and that there is a picture of Khomeini nearby does not necessarily make them 'fundamentalists' (after all, they could be demonstrating for more bread, or over some other social or political problem in Iran). However, as I explained in the section entitled 'Stark dichotomies in Italian textbooks', a caption can decide at once who is a fundamentalist (or a 'modernist'). Or maybe the 'veil' functions as the definitive signifier of cultural differences.[35]

Indeed, the veil, or rather headscarf,[36] is widely represented in pictures from 1991 onwards (only 4 in the first period, but 17 and 14 in the second and third periods respectively), confirming an increasingly gendered polarization of the ways in which contemporary Islam and Muslims are represented in European textbooks (Table 5.7).

In all three countries under focus, the veil uniformly featured in the pictures (there were 11 or 12 occurrences), with Germany the only country to give more visual space to non-veiled Muslim women. If we look at the breakdown of veiled women per country and per decade, we can see that there were only three cases in the 1990s, but as many as nine in the 2000s, while in Italy it was mostly a 1990s' phenomenon (with no cases before that decade, 11 in the 1990s and only one after 2001), and in France the veil was present throughout (four, three and four cases respectively).

Table 5.7: Presence of the 'veil' by periods and by country

Veil present…		*1962–1990*	*By decade* *1991–2000*	*2001–2006*	*Total*
	Yes	4	17	14	35
	No	3	8	4	15
	n.a.	45	42	42	129
Total		52	67	60	179

Veil present…		*GER*	*By country* *FR*	*ITA*	*Total*
	Yes	12	11	12	35
	No	9	2	4	15
	n.a.	41	45	43	129
Total		62	58	58	179

The 'veil' was thus a must: 70 per cent of all the pictures in which women appeared (whether as the main figure or not) included one form or another of the headscarf. Subsequent analysis (Table 5.8) of the caption or content of the picture showed that 80 per cent of the pictures in which veiled women were present denoted the theme of 'oppression', 'submission' or 'violence'. In short, the 'veil' (and the captions around it) evoked the impression of women being watched over (*surveillées* in French). Only 6 per cent of the veiled women projected a more dynamic meaning suggestive of personal freedom or autonomy.

Figure 5.3: Casbah of Algiers, January 1992. Source: J.-M. Lambin, *Histoire: terminales*, Paris: Hachette, 1995, p. 338.

Figures 5.3 and 5.4 exemplify two possible dimensions of the 'veil': on the one hand (Figure 5.3) the veiled woman walking past graffiti calling for the implementation of an Islamic state is only one of many forms and symbols of female submission to a male political authority, while on the other hand (Figure 5.4) an ambiguous image of a veiled woman being able to perform her job (she is a Yemenite doctor who needs to wear the full *chuddar* if she is to gain access to her patients in the countryside) seems to indicate that the veil can also play a positive role towards achieving female autonomy (although the picture's 'positive' message is ambiguous given that the 'veil' negates the 'modernity' of the motorcycle and of her professional role). In our database, the latter case is rare, while the former has many ways of transmitting its message.

Table 5.8: Connotation of the veil

	Number	%
Surveillance/submission/violence/oppression	28	80
Freedom, autonomy	6	17
n.a.	1	3
Total	35	100

A typology of homo islamicus *and* femina islamica

Both through discourse and visual analyses I have tried to show that over the last 15 or so years there has been a tendency to project a

Figure 5.4: Modernity and tradition in Yemen. A female doctor reaching out
to her patients. Source: S. Paolucci and G. Signorini, *Il corso della storia:
il novecento*, 1997, p. 312.

Muslim threat onto the European space and that the articulations
between Islam and Europe contain many gendered dimensions. I shall
now conclude by detailing what I have called *homo islamicus* and *femina
islamica* as a short cut to refer to a gendered alterity in the represen-
tation of contemporary Islam. I shall start with the female version of
this trend.

The *femina islamica* described here is close to Cooke's idea of a
muslimwoman: it is as if Muslim women have to be religious and have to
be passive followers of political systems. An unveiled politically active
woman proposing alternative political programmes is a rare phenom-
enon.[37] All other cases of politically involved women are veiled women
(ranging from teenagers to old women) who passively support the ruling
systems by showing allegiance to male political figures (they either hold
a picture of a leader, or pass near political posters or Islamist messages,
as in Figure 5.3). In other words, the veil denies 'positive' agency[38] and
is reduced to a power symbol conveying the fact that Muslim women
are only obeying existing rules and practices. (We are far from the rise
of feminism quoted in the section above on 'The transformation of
Islam as a "civilization" into a French domestic problem').[39]

Die türkische Boxerin und Muslima Fikriye Selen wirbt für ein Haarpflege-mittel.

Figure 5.5: Looking for a place in modernity. Source: H.-J. Lendzian, *Zeiten und Menschen 2* (1st edn, vol. 2) Braunschweig: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2005.

The idea of the passive Muslim woman is also expressed through another visual artefact, namely that of contrasting two pictures or two layers of pictures. For example, one finds a two-page sequence of contrasting pictures aimed at portraying how 'Islam is looking for a place in modernity'.[40] One such representation of *femina islamica* is reproduced in Figure 5.5 in which a 'veiled' woman passes in front of a large advertisement promoting a Turkish female boxer. The title of the page on which the picture was originally placed left one in no doubt about which woman was the modern one and which one was stuck in the 'traditional' realm. In other words, captions or titles decide at once who is emancipated, who is traditional and who is endowed with agency. The timing of the emergence of *femina islamica* (from the early 1990s until now, although *homo islamicus* comes to the fore in the early 2000s) is also significant because at that time Europe and the Western world in general were looking for new points of orientation after the

collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the disappearance of the communist threat. Moreover, the *active* projection of *femina islamica* onto the European public (as in Figure 5.5, as well as in Figure 5.2 in which the reader is asked to *feel* for the weeping Algerian woman) implies some entwinement between European and Muslim collective fates.

Let us now conclude with a few remarks on what is constitutive of the *homo islamicus* which is as essential as the feminine counterpart (who generally receives more coverage in the literature) to the creation of the idea of there being a profound and unbridgeable rift between 'Islam' and 'Europe'. Figure 5.6 shows *homo islamicus* as a violent man, one who resorts to political

Figure 5.6: Male fighters and violence. Source: S. Paolucci and G. Signorini, *Il corso della storia*, 1997, p. 320.

violence for religious reasons (explicitly rendered here as the emblematic mix of the banner that bears the *shahadah*, or declaration of Muslim faith, and the politico-religious leader that Khomeini represented). A variant of this depiction is the picture of a bearded man carrying a copy of the Koran during a public demonstration, or the image of a group of armed militant Islamists.

There are other ways of representing *homo islamicus*, especially male Muslims living in Europe, for example the Muslim praying on the ground, usually as part of a large crowd. Figure 5.1 captures this idea but the analysis of this picture should go further. If we take a close look at it, we can see a poster in the background depicting elderly people from Levallois (a Parisian suburb) in which two senior citizens are smiling and dancing.[41] One cannot escape the message of a clear

and intended distinction between the dynamic French couple and the Muslims praying on the pavement, thus following religious rites instead of 'enjoying themselves'. The picture also shows that a police car is passing by, implying either that the French state is in control or that the praying Muslims are a threat to the French public (the two men are supposedly praying on the street because the mosque is full) and that a possible response to the spilling over onto French streets is based on a security reading.

The interesting thing about the analysis of this picture is that it takes an old Orientalist topos that can also be found in a textbook printed in 1962, when there were hardly any pictures in textbooks. The following quotation encapsulates both dimensions of *homo islamicus* – a violent unruly mob, and men (no women can be included in this scheme) who passively follow the will of God:

> Some see in holy war, *jihad*, the sixth pillar of Islam (the general mobilization of men by the religious authorities). Thus, Islam shapes a characteristic type of human, the Muslim. He is a man who submits to the will of God (Islam implies submission), patient, resigned to fate. He is often fatalistic, for his belief in predestination inclines him to inertia.
>
> For thousands of years Islam has been producing the illiterate humanist followers of wise and authoritarian patriarchs. … A Muslim crowd is very different from an individual. Gullible, easily led by the verbal propaganda of the speaker, it is a docile instrument in the hands of certain agitators.[42]

Two pictures were used to illustrate and add weight to the argument made in the core of the text. One showed large groups of devout Muslims performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the other depicted a huge crowd blindly demonstrating its support for the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser: *homo islamicus*[43] is, *par excellence*, either praying or unthinkingly supporting political causes.

Conclusion

We have seen in this chapter how representations of contemporary

Islam and Muslims evolve and develop along three lines of arguments.

First, many Orientalist or neo-Orientalist clichés about Islam sustain or help create an exaggerated sense of alterity between Europe and Islam. Since the late 1970s, when we first saw the shift from an ethnic (Arab) to a religious (Islam) marker to characterize the population of the region, diversity within Middle Eastern societies was erased in the name of religion, to be replaced by a hypostatized vision of Islam that serves as a new reservoir for the xeno-stereotypes of Europe.

Second, this limiting representation of Islam is very often expressed through themes of threat and violence that contain clearly articulated gender differences. I have used the categories of *homo islamicus* and *femina islamica* and their related typologies to explain how some of the links between Europe and Muslims are framed in gendered terms. While the first projection threatens Western political orders on purely religious grounds, the second conveys a rather passive religious woman who needs to be pitied and possibly rescued.

Third, despite the Europeanization of the public sphere and of historical narratives, national contexts still play a central part in defining what types of contemporary Islam and Muslims are represented in textbooks. In France, the presence of Islam has always been important, while in Germany and Italy it is a more recent topic introduced since 1990, though the German representation invokes more pathos than the Italian.[44] In other words, each nation-state's particular experiences largely shape how Islam and Muslims are represented in its national textbooks (for example, German textbooks give more attention to Turkey's accession to the EU because of the Turkish minority living there, while France focuses more on the 'integration' of its Muslims). Changing times (particularly the eruption of the 'war on terror') also contribute greatly to a renewed and polarized representation of Muslims.

However, these representations of contemporary Islam and Muslims seem to contain a new feature, in which Europe's values (liberal democracy, a secular order and gender equality) are increasingly being projected (with the missionary-like zeal of a reactualized white man's burden) onto what is perceived as a politically violent and religiously fanatical Muslim world. The obverse of this is the

projection of a (male) Islamic threat onto the European public, which brings us back to the question raised in the introduction, namely how do auto-stereotypes and xeno-stereotypes link up and intertwine with one another? A secular order and gender equality are dominant themes in European self-understanding, and they counteract perfectly the negative representation of Islam as a source of 'traditional' political oppression, particularly for Muslim women (unless, as in Figure 5.5, they become 'Europeanized').

The contrasts I describe in this chapter draw from different rhetorics and techniques (dichotomies, projection of the Islam–Europe interplay, hypostatization, sequences of pictures, and counterpoint between pictures and text). The gendered dimension of opposition, both in the male and female realms, is a powerful way of conveying the message and reinforcing assumptions about a secularized and gender-equal Europe as opposed to a religious fundamentalist Muslim world that oppresses women. To sum up, the message these images give (especially since the early 1990s when the communist threat faded) is of:

- opposition between a secular European order where women are fully emancipated and a purely religious Middle East where the oppression of women is total;
- passive Muslim women supporting patriarchal power, where only emancipated women do not wear a headscarf;
- a male Muslim sphere dominated by violence, religious themes and military power;
- Europe as a place of tolerance and acceptance of diversity (albeit a diversity subsumed under religious identities); and
- a modern Europe opposed to a traditional Middle East, with an overlap of a male threat coming from the Muslim majority world where women are weak and feeble and in need of European help.

Beyond the usual dichotomy of 'modern–traditional', which actually loses its content to become a relative positionality marker, it is as if the depiction of contemporary Islam and Muslims is increasingly being linked to a representation of Europe and a certain vision of a 'European identity'. This can be seen in the fact that the treatment of

contemporary Islam is no longer confined to the study of the Middle East, but has become an increasingly more integral part of the narrative of a political Europe (see text analysis above). Such views can be found in texts and pictures. For the former, we can take the example of a German textbook[45] in which the authors draw a line between Europe and non-Europe in terms of access to full gender equality, with Europe the place where equality exists (albeit after lengthy battles). When they cite lagging non-European cases, the authors draw on the example of Islam, which, in their words, '*forbids* equal treatment for Muslim women'[46] – a very strongly-worded statement that misreads a good part of the Muslim world.

Figure 5.7 (which was drawn by a teenager) gives a visual pendant to the same message. In 1991 German students were asked to draw the 'house of Europe' (the phrase was taken from a 1987 speech by Gorbachev calling to reunite the 'house of Europe' after the divisions provoked by the cold war). One can see that in a cosy apartment on the third and top floor a relaxing person represents the richer west European countries. The lower we go and the closer to the basement, we see on the second floor countries where 'people are normally working', while on the ground floor, eastern European countries all call for 'democracy'. In the basement rooms one finds Yugoslavia and Turkey, symbolized by a man being served food by a woman wearing a *burqa*-style veil covering her whole body. Again the 'other' of Europe that has to be hidden is the Muslim country, a place where women need to be pitied if not saved by Europe. This is obviously a problematic representation that reduces the complexity of the relationship between Europe and contemporary Islam to stark opposition. It is problematic because such a contrast is drawn on simplification, essentialization and at times manipulation (as noted in the case of a picture taken from Egypt to represent European Muslims).[47]

Casanova notes that, despite Turkey being Westernized and totally committed to a secular system, many Europeans are still afraid of allowing it into the EU. As he puts it, 'indeed, the closer Turkey gets to meeting the political conditions, the more the unstated cultural conditions of already belonging to a European civilization tend to gain prominence in the debate.'[48]

Europa – ein „gemeinsames Haus"?

6 *Nachdem in einer Berufsschulklasse im Schuljahr 1990/91 das Thema „Europa" behandelt worden war, faßten zwei Schüler ihre Vorstellungen vom „Europäischen Haus" in folgenden Zeichnungen zusammen:*

1. *Vergleiche die beiden Zeichnungen. Welches sind nach den Vorstellungen der Jugendlichen die wichtigsten Merkmale des „Europäischen Hauses"?*

2. *Fertige selbst eine Zeichnung des „Europäischen Hauses" an. Lies dazu vorher noch einmal die Darstellung S. 173–175.*

Figure 5.7: 'The House of Europe'. Source: B. Mütter et al., *Die Menschen und ihre Geschichte in Darstellungen und Dokumenten*, Berlin: Cornelsen Verlag, 1996, p. 178.

It seems that irrational, latent and simplistic arguments about the existence of fundamental and essential differences between civilizations take the upper hand in the arena[49] and that rational arguments about Turkey having fulfilled most of the criteria to enter the EU are washed away by simplistic views of an alleged Islamic threat. Casanova observes that the religious argument against Turkey overlaps with different dimensions of Turkish 'otherness' and that the objection to Turkey's Muslim identity is really about the presence of Muslim migrants in the heart of Europe.[50] Göle, in the same vein, draws attention to the fact that 'the two countries that voted against the European Constitution were those where Islam was most debated publicly', namely the Netherlands and France.[51] The question of Turkey (or, to put it differently, the fact that its otherness is expressed in religious terms) is deeply interrelated to the quest of Europe for its own identity.

Even more at stake than problematic Europe–Islam relations are challenges by Muslim minorities to models of nation-state 'integration': indeed, it is mostly in France and Germany that Islam is projected as a European (and thus also a local) problem. To quote Amselle's study of the universality of cultures, when social groups appeal to universalizing forces and principles, it is most often to highlight a particular problem or situation.[52] In our case, Europe, with its secular liberal order, is invoked as a universal principle of democracy to express disarray in relation to the presence of Muslim minorities, which are portrayed as placing nation-states at risk of erosion (if not violent challenge). The result is that because nation-state viewpoints constrain the study of contemporary Islam, it is not considered on a neutral basis. In this process, certain discourses about 'European identity' function as a ceiling for a standardization of xeno-stereotypes around Islam and Muslims, which increasingly function as the 'other' of Europe, albeit in an intertwined manner.

Appendix: list of textbooks

German textbooks

Askani, B., and E. Wagener, *Das 20. Jahrhundert*, Braunschweig: Westermann Schulbuchverlag (1997, 1st edn, vol. 4).

Berger-von der Heide, T. and H.-G. Oomen, *Von 1917 bis zur Gegenwart*, Berlin: Cornelsen Verlag (2002, 1st edn).

Brack, H. and D. Brückner, *Zeitgeschichte* (10. Jahrgangstufe der Realschule), Bamberg: C. C. Buchners Verlag (1996, 1st edn, vol. 4).

Brokemper, P., K.-H. Müller, D. Potente and H.-O. Regenhardt, *Arbeitsbuch für Geschichte-Politik an Hauptschulen in Nordrhein-Westfalen. 3*, Berlin: Cornelsen Verlag (1999, 1st edn).

Brückner, D., *Das waren Zeiten 4*, Bamberg: C. C. Buchners Verlag (2004, 2nd edn, vol. 4).

Brückner, D. and H. Lachner, *Zeitgeschichte*, Bamberg: C. C. Buchners Verlag (2005, 1st edn, vol. 5).

Busch, E., *Vom Beginn der Französischen Revolution 1789 bis zur Gegenwart*, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Moritz Diesterweg (1951, 1st edn, vol. 7; 1952, 2nd edn, vol. 7; 1954, 4th edn, vol. 7; 1958, 7th edn, vol. 7; 1960, 9th edn, vol. 7).

Deissler, H., *Von Wiener Kongress bis zum Ausbruch des zweiten Weltkrieges* Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Moritz Diesterweg (1950, 1st edn, vol. 4, 1952, 4th edn, vol. 4; 1955, 6th edn, vol. 4).

Deissler, H. and H.-G. Fernis, *Von Wiener Kongress bis zur Gegenwart*, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Moritz Diesterweg (1961, 13th edn, vol. 4; 1965, 16th edn, vol. 4).

Dittrich-Gallmeister, E., J. Dittrich and H. Herzfeld, *Von 1850 bis zur Gegenwart (Ausgabe B)* Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag (1962, 3rd edn, vol. 3; 1965, 3 edn, vol. 3; 1975, 6 edn, vol. 3; 1978, 7 edn, vol. 3).

Fernis, H.-G., A. Hillgruber, E. Busch and J. Hoffmann, *Von Zeitalter der Aufklärung bis zur Gegenwart* (Textband), Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Moritz Diesterweg (1971, 5 edn, vol. 2; 1984, 7 edn, vol. 2).

Flues, H., A. Höfer, K. Kehrig, K. Leinen and H. Steidle, *Zeitreise 10. Rheinland-Pfalz*, Leipzig: Ernst Klett Schhulbuchverlag (1999, 1st edn, vol. 10).

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Notes

1. Bo Stråth (ed.) (2000) *Europe and the other and Europe as the other*, Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang.
2. This study is part of part of a larger Marie Curie research project dealing with the impact of two different significant 'others' on European construction, namely Eastern European communism in the 1950s and 1960s and Islam in the last two decades. I wish to thank the European Commission for the generous funding linked to this project. For some findings from the larger study, see Benoît Challand, 'From hammer and sickle to star and crescent: the question of religion for European identity and a political Europe', *Religion, State and Society*, vol. 36, no. 4, 2008; and Benoît Challand, 'The sequences of Europe: creating the European self in history textbooks (1950–2005)', *Contexts. The Journal of Educational Media, Memory, and Society*, vol. 2, no. 1, forthcoming 2009.

3. For a recent discussion on the borders of Europe and Turkey, see Jürgen Kocka, 'The mapping of Europe's borders: past, present, and future', in H.-A. Persson and B. Stråth (eds) *Reflections on Europe: defining a political order in time and space*, Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang, 2007, pp. 37–48. For a representation of Islam in Europe from a *longue durée* perspective, see Almut Höfert, 'The order of things and the discourse of the Turkish threat: the conceptualization of Islam in the rise of occidental anthropology in the fifteen and sixteenth centuries', in A. Höfert and A. Salvatore (eds) *Between Europe and Islam: shaping modernity in a transcultural space*, Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang, 2000, pp. 39–69; and Gerdien Jonker, 'Imagining Islam: European encounters with the Muslim world through the lens of German textbooks', in H. Yilmaz (ed.) *Rethinking Europe through rethinking Islam*, London: I.B.Tauris, 2007.

4. Germany is the notable exception because of its federal system; the curriculum differs slightly from one Bundesland to the other, but overall, the period studied is the same for the same type of school and year of education (contemporary history at the end of the curriculum).

5. See Appendix 5.1. This list was drawn up during a visit to the Georg-Eckert-Institute (Braunschweig). The selection criteria were: (a) these history textbooks must deal, as their main focus, with post-Second World War history; (b) they are used at an advanced secondary level (Liceo in Italy, Oberstufe in Germany, and Classes Terminales in France); (c) some textbooks were chosen because they contain various reprints and/or elaboration of an original text, thus allowing a study of the evolution of European construction over time; and (d) the selection was operated so as to include as many significant publishing houses as possible to convey the varieties of (political) sensibilities towards history and politics.

6. For a discussion of the thorny issue of 'identity' and 'European identity', see Klaus Eder, 'Europe as a narrative network: taking serious[ly] the social embeddedness of identity constructions', in F. Cerutti and S. Lucarelli (eds) *The search for a European identity: values, policies and legitimacy of the European Union*, London: Routledge, 2008; Amartya Sen, *Identity and violence: the illusion of destiny*, New York: Norton & Company, 2006; and Peter Wagner, 'Hat Europa eine kulturelle Identität?' in H. Joas and K Wiegandt (eds) *Die kulturelle Werte Europas*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 2005, pp. 494–511. In a more substantiated manner I have also addressed the interplay between Europe and identity elsewhere (Challand, 'The sequences of Europe') and by drawing on sources other than school textbooks (Challand, 'From hammer and sickle to star and crescent').

7. H. Joas and K. Wiegandt (eds) *Die kulturelle Werte Europas*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 2005.

8. Luisa Passerini (ed.) *Identità culturale europea: idee, sentimenti, relazioni*, Florence: Nuova Italia, 1998; and Luisa Passerini (ed.) *Figures d'Europe: images and myths of Europe*, Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang, 2003.

9.   Wagner, 'Hat Europa eine kulturelle Identität?' pp. 503, 511.

10. Hastings Donnan (ed.) *Interpreting Islam*, London: Sage Publications, 2002;
     Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson (eds) *Muslims and the news media*,
     London: I.B.Tauris, 2006; and Amir Saeed, 'Media, racism and Islamophobia:
     the representation of Islam and Muslims in the media', *Social Compass*, vol. 1,
     no. 2, 2007, pp. 443–62.

11. Lila Abu-Lughod, 'The Muslim woman: the power of images and the danger
     of pity', *Eurozine*, 2006, available HTTP: <http://www.eurozine.com/
     articles/2006-09-01-abulughod-en.html> (accessed 25 May 2008); and Mohja
     Kahf, *Western representations of the Muslim woman: from Termagant to Odalisque*,
     Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999.

12. Diane Watt, 'Challenging Islamophobia through visual media studies:
     inquiring into a photograph of Muslim women on the cover of Canada's
     national news magazine', *Studies in Media and Information Literacy Education*, vol.
     8, no. 2, 2008, pp. 1–14. The article is a rare occurrence of such analysis.
     However, it focuses only on one picture reproduced in a Canadian news
     magazine.

13. On the so-called 'primacy effect' of visual shortcuts and 'icons', see Chiara
     Bottici, *A philosophy of political myth*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
     2007, Chapter 9.

14. For an illustration of the importance of 'text in context', see Ruth Wodak
     and Gilbert Weiss, *Critical discourse analysis: theory and interdisciplinarity*, New
     York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

15. For example, in J. Bouillon, P. Sorlin and J. Rudel, *Le monde contemporain:
     classes terminales*, Paris: Bordas, p. 256 there are five civilizations under
     scrutiny, namely 'les civilisations occidentale, socialiste, asiatique, musulmane
     et de l'Afrique noire'. Such analysis is blind to the consequences of colonial-
     isms in North Africa and, for example, early nineteenth century colonization
     in Algeria is characterized as a mere 'beginning of occupation of Algeria'
     (ibid., p. 464). If the civilizational model disappears in the 1980s, it is
     stunning to see it reappearing with an explicit reference to Huntington's
     'clash of civilizations' in a 2001 textbook (C. Peltier, *Histoires du XXe siècle:
     1erset terminales agricoles*, Paris: Educagri éditions, 2001).

16. With one exception (E. Busch, *Vom Beginn der Französischen Revolution 1789 bis
     zur Gegenwart*, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Moritz Diesterweg, 1960, pp.
     201ff.), which already spoke of a 'Selbstbewusstsein des Islams' ('self-
     consciousness of Islam') back in the post-First World War period.

17. For example, one can read bold statements such as 'im Islam sind Religion und
     Staat untrennbar' ('in Islam, religion and State are inseparable') (W. Funken and
     B. Koltrowitz, *Geschichte Plus: Ausgabe Sachsen Gymnasien*, Berlin: Cornelsen/Volk
     und Wissen Verlag, 2003, p. 180). Few textbooks are much more nuanced in
     their reading of political Islam and of the 9/11 events. See, for example, D.
     Brückner, *Das waren Zeiten 4*, Bamberg: C. C. Buchners Verlag, 2004; or D.

Brückner and H. Lachner, *Zeitgeschichte*, Bamberg: C. C. Buchners Verlag, 2005. For a discussion of neo-Orientalism, see Donnan, *Interpreting Islam*, p. 9; or Yahya Sadowski, 'The new Orientalism and the democracy debate', *Middle East Report* (MERIP), July–August 1993, pp. 14–21.

18.   For example, B. Askani and E. Wagener, *Das 20. Jahrhundert*, (1st edn, vol. 4) Braunschweig: Westermann Schulbuchverlag, 1997, pp. 298ff. holds that 'Staatliche Ordnung und Religion werden zu einer politischen Waffe verschmolzen, die zugleich zum Generalangriff gegen die westliche Tradition und ausdrücklich gegen die westliche Demokratie ansetzt.'

19.   P. Brokemper, K.-H. Müller, D. Potente and H.-O. Regenhardt, *Arbeitsbuch für Geschichte-Politik an Hauptschulen in Nordrhein-Westfalen. 3* (1st edn) Berlin: Cornelsen Verlag, 1999, pp. 192–205.

20.   And it does so in a very unfaithful manner: the picture shows how the millionth Turkish guestworker arriving in Germany in 1969 was offered a television set as a present. The caption seems to indicate that all migrant workers from Turkey received the same generous treatment, which was obviously not the case (see M. Treml, *Oldenburg Geschichte für Gymnasien*, Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994, p. 166).

21.   Only a few pictures of the Middle East are placed in the section dealing with 'Difficult moments of Italian democracy'. See S. Paolucci, *Storia: Ottocento e Novecento con schede di antropologia* (4th edn, vol. 3) Bologna: Zanichelli Paolucci, 1984, pp. 335–8.

22.   See R. Pizzagalli, *La Storia, come e perché* (1st edn, vol. 3) Turin: Marietti Editori, 1985, p. 320. The caption (a model of essentialism and hypostasis) reads 'Two different worlds. The rough and desolate aspect of the Jordanian landscape reflects the poverty of the Arab world. To this, the prosperity and spirit of entrepreneurship of Israel is in stark contrast. Such spirit is best captured with the picture of this very modern silo in the countryside of Haifa. The contrast between these two worlds translates in a constant state of hostility feeding further the action of the "feddayn", the Arab guerrillas of the Liberation Movement, which claim Arab lands now in the hands of Israel.'

23.   See S. Paolucci and G. Signorini, *Storia: Ottocento e Novecento con schede di antropologia* (4th edn, vol. 3) Bologna: Zanichelli, 1997, pp. 301ff).

24.   See also Funken and Koltrowitz, *Geschichte Plus*, p. 180, for a similar contrast in Germany.

25.   This particular reading of Muslim women would need serious discussion, in the line of Abu-Lughod, 'The Muslim woman'; Leila Ahmed, *Women and gender in Islam: historical roots of a modern debate*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992; or Deniz Kandiyoti, *Gendering the Middle East: emerging prospectives*, London: I.B.Tauris, 1996, for the position of women in Muslim-majority societies. A simple look at the editorial team of the textbooks indicates a huge imbalance in terms of equality in the number of female and male authors: only 13 per cent of the authors of the textbooks analysed are female.

While difficult to assess the impact of female (or lack thereof) in the editorial teams, two shortcomings must be addressed here. First, in both the 1992 and 1997 editions of F. Delouche's, *Histoire de l'Europe* (Paris: Hachette), no women at all were included in the team and this probably contributed to the perpetration of the cliché of a masculine power ruling a feminine Europe (see Darby Lewes, 'The site/sight of Europe: representations of women in European cartography', in L. Passerini (ed.) *Figures d'Europe: images and myths of Europe*, Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang, 2003, pp. 107–23). The second case deals with the French analysis of Islamic civilization. While in both the 1962 and 1978 editions of L. Genet et al., *Le monde contemporain: classes terminales* (Paris: Hatier, pp. 555ff. and 541ff. respectively) there is a careful and accurate sociological analysis of the situation of women in the Muslim/Arab worlds, two other textbooks (the 1962 and 1970 editions of J. Sentou and C.-O. Carbonell, *Le monde contemporain: classes terminals,* Paris: Librairie Delagrave) adhere to a very Orientalist and simplistic account of Islam. In the first two cases, the chapter is written by a woman (Alice Marcet) revealing refined sensibility for the question of women in the Middle East, while the other sections of the Sentou textbooks are written by male authors. Here is an excerpt of the more nuanced text (Sentou's texts are discussed in the section headed *A typology of Homo Islamicus and Femina Islamica*): 'Bien plus significatif est le fait que soit apparu dans l'Islam un nouveau personnage: la femme seule, célibataire, instruite, travaillant, subvenant elle-même à ses besoins. … Le féminisme en pays Arabe est un des phénomènes sociologiques les plus remarquables et les plus importants' (Genet et al. *Le monde contemporain*, 1962, p. 555).

26. There are thus 62 items from German textbooks, 58 from France, and 59 from Italy. The periods of analysis (justified by the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989 and the 9/11 events) were 1962–1990 (52 items included in the database), 1991–2000 (67 items) and 2001–2006 (60 items).

27. This corroborates the discourse analysis made in the section headed 'Text analysis: an increasing presence of Islam at the heart of Europe'. Also, in line with these findings, the interlink between Europe and Islam can already be found in French textbooks of the first period (five items, and five other items for the last 2000 to 2006 period), while in Germany, this is a recent phenomenon, with six items for the period from 1991 to 2000 and two for the last period.

28. See P. Brokemper, K.-H. Müller, D. Potente and H.-O. Regenhardt, *Arbeitsbuch für Geschichte-Politik an Hauptschulen in Nordrhein-Westfalen. 3* (1st edn) Berlin: Cornelsen Verlag, 1999, p. 193. This photomontage depicting European diversity contains folkloristic pictures of a Scot playing the bagpipes, French boule players and other traditional costumed happy people, while the picture of Muslims in which men are seen praying in the middle of a street, is taken in Egypt in the early 1960s. Three elements hint at such time

and geographical location: the blue and white taxi (a 1950s or 1960s model) with orange plates are typical of Egypt, the shop sign (in Arabic) includes the letters 'sh. m. m.' which stands for Sharika Mosahema Masreyya ('Egyptian Registered Company'), and one can see a poster of Gamal Abdel-Nasser. For a study of picture manipulation, see Watt ('Challenging Islamophobia through visual media studies'), and for another example of the 'othering process' through images in the case of Turkey, see Challand ('From hammer and sickle to star and crescent'). I am thankful to Geraldine Chatelard and Nabil Boutros for their help in locating the exact place and time of this picture.

29. Treml, *Oldenburg Geschichte für Gymnasien*, p. 166.
30. I chose the four sub-themes, but to decide whether a picture belonged to 'religion', 'politics', or 'violence', I looked at the caption (if any) or at the context in which the picture was placed. The same applies for Table 5.2.
31. The same picture can be counted twice, say, when a military leader is depicted in a violent way. Note that the categories 'terrorism' and 'fanaticism' are taken from the captions of pictures (fanaticism, which is my choice, sums up incidences of 'fundamentalism', 'extremism' or 'radicalism').
32. There are, as we shall see in Table 5.7, many more pictures of veiled women in the 2000s, but they might not appear as religious figures in Table 5.5, unless the caption or the context of the picture was clearly linked to a religious situation.
33. Miriam Cooke, 'The Muslimwoman', *Contemporary Islam*, vol. 1, 2007, p. 140.
34. A. Polcri and M. Giappichelli, *Il XX secolo* (2 edn, vol. 3) Brescia: Editrice La Scuola, 2000, p. 562.
35. Watt, 'Challenging Islamophobia through visual media studies'.
36. For a critique of what the 'veil' hides and what is really at stake in the European scene, see, Abu-Lughod, 'The Muslim woman'; and Armando Salvatore, 'Authority in question: secularity, republicanism and "communitarianism" in the emerging Euro-Islamic public sphere', *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 24, no. 2, 2007, pp. 135–60. On the 'politics of the veil' in France, see Joan Wallach Scott, *The politics of the veil*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
37. 'Den islamischen Fundamentalisten ein Dorn im Auge: emanzipierte unverschleierte Frauen wie hier die einer Demonstration gegen den Terrorismus in Algier', see B. Askani and E. Wagener, *Das 20. Jahrhundert* (1st edn, vol. 4) Braunschweig: Westermann Schulbuchverlag, 1997, p. 298.
38. This is a topos of veiled women in general, not just of its representation in textbooks. For a discussion, see for example Abu-Lughod's 'The Muslim woman', and Watt's 'Challenging Islamophobia through visual media studies', p. 5. By 'positive', I refer to the normative point of view implied by Western liberal modernity.
39. See note 25 above.
40. 'Die Islamische Welt auf der Suche nach einem Platz in der Moderne', in H.-

J. Lendzian, *Zeiten und Menschen 2* (1st edn, vol. 2) Braunschweig: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2005.

41.   The poster reads: 'A Levallois, nous avons l'expérience du dynamisme. Personnes âgées.'

42.   Sentou and Carbonell, *Le monde contemporain*, 1962, p. 458. The original French text is as follows. 'Certains voient dans la guerre sainte, djihad, le sixième pilier de l'Islam (mobilization générale des hommes par les autorités religieuses). Ainsi l'Islam façonne un type humain original, le musulman. C'est un homme soumis à la volonté de Dieu (Islam signifie soumission), patient, résigné aux épreuves. Il est souvent fataliste car la croyance à la prédestination l'incline à l'inertie. L'Islam produit ainsi depuis mille ans des illettrés humanistes de patriarches autoritaires et sages … La foule musulmane a un comportement très différent de celui de l'individu. Crédule, facilement sensibilisé par la propagande orale du bonimenteur ou du speaker, elle est un instrument docile aux mains de quelques agitateurs.'

43.   For a discussion of *homo islamicus* from a different perspective, see Vincent Geisser, *La nouvelle islamophobie*, Paris: La Découverte, 2003; and Jonker, 'Imagining Islam'.

44.   In the light of the violent xenophobic attacks against foreigners in Italy, there are, unfortunately, good grounds to believe that it will be the same in the coming years in Italy.

45.   Funken and Koltrowitz, *Geschichte Plus*, p. 304.

46.   The original reads: 'in vielen aussereuropäischen Staaten ist die rechtliche Gleichstellung der Frau noch in weiter Ferne, weil, z.B. der Islam ihre völlige rechtliche und soziale Emanzipation mit gleichen Bildungschancen verbietet. Es ist völlig offen, wann hier ein Wandel eintritt.'

47.   See note 28 above.

48.   José Casanova, 'The long, difficult and tortuous journey of Turkey into Europe and the dilemmas of European civilization', *Constellations*, vol. 13, no. 2, 2006, p. 236.

49.   For a discussion of the clash of civilizations and its success as a political myth, see C. Bottici and B. Challand, 'Rethinking political myth: the clash of civilizations as a self-fulfilling prophecy', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 2006.

50.   Ibid., p. 242.

51.   Nilüfer Göle, 'Europe's encounter with Islam: what future?' *Constellations*, vol. 13, no. 2, 2006, p. 251.

52.   Jean-Loup Amselle, *Branchements: anthropologie de l'universalité des cultures*, Paris: Flammarion, 2001, p. 49 thus sustains: 'En d'autre termes, il s'agirait d'inverser le raisonnement habituel qui consiste à opposer universalisme et relativisme afin de montrer que l'universalisme, loin de contrarier la manifestation des différences, est le moyen privilégié de leur expression.'

Chapter 6

Who were the 'others' at Poitiers? Medieval Islam as both cultured and daily stereotype

Antonio Brusa

Research on anti-Muslim prejudice – the 'others' to Western culture – started in Italy in the 1950s.[1] When, nearly half a century later, in *La paura preferita* (*Our favourite fear*), Luca Scarlini published his findings on relations between Muslims and Italy, the 'others' had become the 'enemy'.[2] Moreover, the fear was widespread throughout society and, following a steep growth in Muslim immigrants, had reached boiling point. After a number of bestsellers written by Oriana Fallaci, xenophobia spawned an aggressive style of literature, above all from the political right. In response, a different form of literary output developed, aimed to give Italians more accurate information on a religion and population that had for centuries been only the stuff of imagination.[3] The Muslim world also reacted to this state of affairs and carefully compiled publications can be found on Western anti-Muslim stereotypes from Aeschylus to Claude Levi Strauss.[4] A final point to bear in mind is the enormous growth of foreign pupils in Italy, many of whom are Muslims.[5] In 2007, the National Observation Group on multiculturalism pointed out that one of the current aims of Italian schools was to combat Islamophobia and anti-Muslim stereotypes.[6] In little more than half a century, therefore, the question of Muslim stereotypes has been transformed. At the beginning of the twentieth century it was a subject for scholars. By the start of the new century, it had become a complex problem of social culture.

In the early 1970s, when Umberto Eco drew the Italians' attention to the widespread use of stereotypes in school textbooks,[7] a particular political viewpoint began to characterize the research and debate of that decade. It was suggested that books were subject to error because they reflected a dominant ideology and represented history 'written from above'. Eurocentrism and capitalism were treated as synonymous and held responsible for the perpetuation of obsolete and false historical views. Accurate human and historiographical description was seen as essential in democratic teaching, in fact a political and moral requirement of professional deontology.[8] The group of primary school teachers who carried out the research from which Eco drew his conclusions analysed as many as 263 primary school textbooks. These are known as 'subsidiary textbooks': a consequent neologism that became popular was 'subnormal textbooks'. On one hand this term expresses moral indignation, yet it is also an insight into how a problem that could be traced back to ignorance and lack of intelligence was so undervalued.[9]

In those years, nobody could have imagined quite how much the wave of immigrants, starting in the 1980s, would transform Italy from a country of emigration to a destination for immigrants. In the second half of that decade, the physical presence of the 'others' who had started to arrive in Italy immediately turned 'diversity' into a problem and questions about prejudice and stereotypes escaped the confines of theory and historiography and became dramatically real. This change had an impact on the research and didactic proposals that followed. In this phase the protagonists, as well as the teachers and cultural experts, were scholars of pedagogy, sociologists, anthropologists, numerous religious researchers and, obviously, linguists, and it was they who produced the main body of the research on the subject. These scholars painstakingly examined numerous textbooks as well as current trends of thought and, more recently, the world of the internet and media.[10] However, because historians were absent from the debate, we now face a huge output of material that is difficult to place in the research categories of historiography and historical teaching.[11]

We could say that we have an almost definitive list of Islamic and Muslim stereotypes in both textbooks and in our daily culture.

However, we should realize that current didactic solutions are disappointing. A prevailing strategy is to use euphemism or even to hide previous conflicts, a form of 'xenophobic sweetening'.[12] It is also possible to arrive at the opposite extreme, with attitudes best defined as xenophylia or exaltation of the 'other'.[13] One official proposal, which formed part of the 2003 history programme, suggested asking foreign children in the class to speak about the history of their country.[14] A great deal of energy and reflection is dedicated to reception problems and relationships between Italian and foreign children and within families. In conclusion, it seems that interculture stops at the door of the classroom and does not form part of the concrete teaching of any subject (history, mathematics or geography).

Common sense and fine sentiments are, however, not enough. We need to study stereotypes analytically if we are to deal with them convincingly. Indeed, research enables one to abandon the cliché that stereotypes are 'unchangeable' and thus difficult to eradicate – in fact, they show signs of mutation. For instance, at the beginning of the 1970s Umberto Eco revealed, with some irony, that heroes of Italian history were depicted as if they were in fairytales and that the 'others' among them were often Arabs presented as the violent predators of desert lands.[15] Falteri's research 20 years later showed that this vision had changed and that the crudest stereotypes had been softened. With respect to Islam, it was observed that the focus in textbooks had shifted from ethnic and religious differences to an emphasis on economic inequality: the differences between rich and poor were what mattered, not between Christians and Muslims.[16] Based on research that Marco Cecalupo carried out on a small number of exemplary textbooks, but with an extremely accurate analytical methodology, I have drawn up the synthetic table shown on the next page.[17]

Here are some examples. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Arabian Peninsula was presented as a desert, 'one of the poorest countries in the world'. In this squalid scenario 'miserable and ignorant tribes' of caravanners and pillagers roamed around. These were the 'Arabs', generally described as belonging to the Semitic branch of the 'white race'. Probably the most widely used book in Italian schools (published in the mid-1960s but still in circulation) states that: 'the Arabs were still

a primitive population, forced by local economic hardship to live in a state of continual anarchy beyond any political liaison.'[18]

	Textbooks 1950s/1960s	Textbooks 1970s/1980s
Arabia	Desert	Oases, trade routes, deserts
Mohammed	Violent hero	Social and religious innovator, great political skills
Allah	God of the Arabs	God of humanity
Holy War	Arab fanatics, predators	Jihad and Crusades
Culture	Stolen from other people	Original and sumptuous

Textbooks published in the 1970s and 1980s, on the other hand, hardly ever speak of the desert, but instead describe trade routes, cities and oases. The Arabs are viewed with greater analytical method: on the one hand there are the Bedouins (still 'poor' and 'predatory'), while on the other the textbooks speak of 'small Arab states'. These no longer belong to a 'race'. The textbooks speak instead (with evident embarrassment) of a 'lineage', or of the psychological characteristics of a people: 'intelligent, simple, courageous, undisciplined and sometimes violent'. A book from the late 1960s offers us a sweetened stereotype that Edward Said would have happily considered a perfect example of Orientalism: 'They were sober, intelligent, imaginative and passionate, enthusiastic and loyal to their chiefs but, like many Oriental populations, they were prone to laziness and fatalism.'[19]

Further examples reveal similar attempts to attenuate, or soften, the descriptions, and to eliminate the harsher aspects. In the 1950s Muhammad is a hero who, through the use of violence, transforms a 'poor and primitive' people. 'At last the man was born who would give religious and thus political unity to the Arabs: Mohammed.'[20] At the end of the twentieth century he has a more complex personality: he is devout, an astute politician and a social and cultural innovator. In textbooks published after the Second World War, Allah is the God of the Arabs, while in more recent textbooks he is a God who 'speaks to all men'. While the Holy War was the main characteristic of a 'fanatical and rapacious' people, at the end of the century it was recognized that the Holy War was conducted by Christians too.

The most spectacular change, however, concerns the evaluation of Arab culture. In textbooks written in the 1950s it was defined as 'not very original', borrowed from other civilizations, and the Arabs were considered as mere 'transmitters' to the West of Oriental and ancient cultures. For example, this is how one textbook defined matters in the 1970s and 1980s (and it should be borne in mind that this was a progressive textbook): 'The great achievement of the Arabs was not so much that of accomplishing great inventions as that of encouraging the spread of inventions and discoveries whose historical importance was decisive for the subsequent progress of civilization.'[21] Today, no one doubts the originality and magnificence of Arab culture, which, rather, is often praised beyond normal limits.

However, to provide a clear idea of these changes, let us analytically compare the pictures taken from two textbooks, both written by professional historians. The first was written in the 1950s by Raffaello Morghen, one of the most famous medievalists of the time. The other was written by Maurizio Bettini, one of today's most recognized experts in ancient history.[22]

Morghen speaks about the great Arabic peninsula (quoting from the text) 'cut out of the living circle of civilization', 'populated by Bedouin', 'nomads of Semitic race', 'primitive, sensual, born above all to carry out war and robbery'. Arabs were 'materialistic and lacking in the profound spirituality of the great Judaic–Christian tradition, attracted by the prospect of Mohammed's Paradise' and 'they become invincible and fanatical soldiers'. They 'destroyed the unity of the Mediterranean World and pushed the centre of Western Civilization northwards'. 'They founded another splendid and fertile civilization which spread to Africa, Spain and Sicily' (in the latter comment, Morghen distinguished himself from other textbooks of the time).

In the second text, Bettini (also quoting from his textbook) claims that 'Arabia is the kingdom of perfumes' inhabited by 'sedentary and nomadic populations'. Conquest is rapid yet complex 'but we should not therefore consider Arabs as a gang of fanatics'. It gives way to a process of 'massive conversion to Islam, which, however, does not encourage violence'. The new empire has 'a complex and diverse economy', sumptuously rich but 'also based on the extremely hard

work of slaves'. 'A key to understanding the success of the Arabs was the intelligent choice of tolerance', natural in a 'population of poets, philosophers and scientists'.

Let us try to focus on these changes. Most of the cruder, more obvious stereotypes seem to have been eliminated. There are still many others, however, though we can note an obvious attempt to mitigate the differences and the violence. The present state of Italian school textbooks may therefore be defined as a kind of 'watered-down ethnocentrism'.

However, this image of paradigmatic change should be corrected by some considerations of historical didactics. The first is the historical text (I shall call it the base text), which constituted almost the whole volume of a 1950s' textbook while today it constitutes only a small part. Most of the volume is made up of images (generally miniatures and photographs of monuments), the para-text (titles, summaries and glossaries) and teaching apparatus (chronologies and exercises). These parts are (often) not the author's work but the editor's. They are chosen in accordance with marketing strategies and so do not result from a particular interpretation of history.

The base text is generally sparse and cold, without adjectives. It is presented as a 'neutral' account. On the other hand, all the emotional charge is transferred to the para-text (titles and so forth), documents and illustrations.[23]

As a result, if we return to a comparison between the two text-books, we can see that in the case of Morghen, the text written by the author is practically the only message transmitted (there are few pictures, the titles are only denotative and there are no boxes); in the case of Bettini's book, the base text is accompanied by 37 pictures, four maps, a large number of boxes and explanations on various concepts. Moreover, one chapter ends with pages dedicated to a reflection on the rapport between 'past and present', as well as questions about the veil, fundamentalism and terrorism.

It seems that the two parts of base text and editorial para-text (especially the 'past/present' box) have different values for teachers. Indeed, it seems that teachers use these two parts in different ways. There are cases in which we know that teachers make a choice and

concentrate on just a few topics. This type of teacher is especially interested in workshops and discussions and it is not hard to imagine that she or he represents a minority. It seems that the majority only use some general elements of the base text due to lack of time and they concentrate on the section of 'past and present' as a way of motivating their pupils to study on their own. It is in this very section that the new stereotypes (especially on terrorism) are concentrated.

To summarize the typical features of the Italian school textbook market, we could say that every book resembles an original 'cocktail' of true and false knowledge. There are over 400 of these cocktails and many of these are textbooks currently circulating in elementary, middle and high schools. To complete the picture, it should be noted that over the last 15 years publishing houses have produced new editions of the same books every three years. These editions generally keep the base text without making any changes but modify the para-text, the very part that, as we have seen, is most sensitive to the influence of current stereotypes. Therefore, we have textbooks in which the base text has been crystallized for almost half a century, and so continues to describe the fears, problems and visions typical of the 1960s. The pictures, exercises and editorial comments, on the other hand, allude to more recent preoccupations with terrorism and fundamentalism.[24]

As we can see, the Italian situation (which is perhaps unique in the world) is complex and fluid. It is difficult to apply methodologies to textbooks that have been consolidated and proven in other research contexts. On the other hand, the variety and quantity of cases that are present force scholars to formulate general hypotheses that, for this reason, can also be useful outside the Italian situation.

Recently, I proposed organizing the inaccurate knowledge found in textbooks into two broad categories, 'daily stereotypes' and 'cultured stereotypes'.[25] This division not only addresses the need to catalogue and order but it also has a theoretical and didactic aim. Indeed, daily stereotypes that reflect problems of everyday life (attitudes to women, old people, different people and other people) are widely studied in the social sciences. It is from such studies and from pedagogy that one attempts to find adequate antidotes. Cultured stereotypes, however, derive more or less directly from academic work; therefore, from my

point of view, their analysis and didactic solutions fundamentally
require, among other things, historiographical tools.

If we return to an examination of the stereotypes in Muslim history,
as seen above, we can see that some of these are based on spontaneous
constructions of the other, attributing violent characteristics to Arabs
or Muhammad, for example, or the undervaluation of Muslim culture.
Stereotypes of 'others' could not exist without determined historical
knowledge – for example, that Muslim cultures were (or were not)
built on the heritage of previous cultures. All stereotypes change, as we
have seen. Yet, if we ask ourselves about the reasons for these
changes, we have to give different answers. Some changes are a result
of cultural climate. It is easy to see that these daily stereotypes change
long before intercultural themes and sensibility spread throughout
Italy. Cultural stereotypes, however, change as a result of determined
knowledge, depending on the progress made in studies and, more
precisely, the spread of new knowledge.

A key area of good teaching is that stereotypes can (and must) be
destroyed. We do this with daily stereotypes almost spontaneously;
understanding others, not confusing diversity with inferiority, listening
to other points of view. Pedagogy, in this case, begins with the
assumption that these conceptualizations are the fruit of a precise
ethnic point of view. They reflect the Western way of thinking. There-
fore, the best way to combat them is to decentralize, one of the strong
points of twentieth-century pedagogical research, and to see the point
of view of the other. This approach seems more natural today because,
unlike in the 1960s, Muslims are now present in Italy. Therefore, it is
possible to discuss history with them and to negotiate an acceptable
image of the past. Moreover, there is also the work of Italian Muslim
scholars and the strategies they propose as a solution. The table on the
next page demonstrates how an online Italian Muslim magazine
suggested we correct the prejudices of Islamophobia.[26]

The logic of the study is clear and is based on opposing couples. In
an intelligent study of stereotypes posted on the internet, Maxim
Rodinson is correctly quoted as saying that the fundamental
characteristic of these stereotypes is that the enemy is imagined as
'monolithic, invincible, totalitarian' (exactly the same characteristics

that were attributed to the communist enemy several decades ago).[27] The view of the other is painted with dark colours. As a result, to provide the truth, it is considered sufficient to give a description using light colours. Complete reversal is the obvious strategy.

Categories	*Closed view*	*Open view*
Structure	Static, unmoveable block	Adaptable and with discussion
Identity	Separate	Interdependent with other cultures
Difference	Inferior	Different but deserving of respect
Rapport with others	Aggressive, violent, terrorist	Reliable partner in solving common problems
Trustworthiness	Wants political and military advantages	Genuine religious faith practised without other aims
Criticism of West	Refused	Taken into consideration

My opinion is that with cultured stereotypes, this approach (for all its merit) is insufficient if not ineffective. Let us examine, for example, these concepts:

- pre-Islamic Arabia inhabited by savage nomadic tribes;
- the spread of Islam and the rapid rate of conversion;
- the creation of an Islamic world totally different from the Roman one and with a consequent breakdown in the unity of the Mediterranean world; and
- the specific nature of Islamic culture as a crossing point between ancient and modern times.

Research over the last 13 years has shown the inconsistency of these affirmations. Pre-Islamic Arab culture bloomed and was highly diverse; conversion to Islam does not coincide with conquest and in many cases was very slow; Arabs did not, in fact, break Mediterranean unity (as we find in the classical Pirenne's *Mohammed and Charlemagne*); Islamic culture, just like all the others, re-elaborates external sources.[28] Nevertheless, these stereotypes are widely accepted today in Italian

textbooks. We will now take a look at a version of the same 'facts' according to Italian-Islamic sources. Here is a brief summary:

- 'one of the reasons for the rapid and peaceful spread of Islam lies in the simplicity of its doctrine';[29]
- 'Arab scholars expanded and developed ancient heritage before its move to the West';[30]
- 'entire populations were immediately seduced by the spiritual message of the conquerors with mass conversion to Islam';[31]
- 'the affirmation of Arab civilization definitively broke the unity of Mediterranean populations';[32]
- 'the fiery rectangle that is today's Saudi Arabia was inhabited by nomadic people who lived by raising livestock and theft. Bedouins or sons of the wind … lived as outlaws';[33]
- 'there was no real nation but a tribal system … pastoral nomadism … there was little space for the arts';[34] and
- 'the biggest miracle of Islam was its appearance in an area full of ignorance and to transform this nation, excluded up to then from human civilization, into one that built its foundations on a new style … so creating the biggest movement in history'.[35]

However, it is not unusual to find the same misinformation in books written specifically 'to inform' Italian readers correctly. Some writers are so enamoured of the Bedouin image that even today they describe Arabs as 'nomadic in spirit even without camels'.[36] Others obstinately defend the theories of Pirenne on the breakdown of Mediterranean unity.[37] Still others contend that, despite all the results of historical research (as we shall shortly see), Charles Martel stopped the Muslims at Poitiers.[38]

Thus, ideas in 'ethnocentric Western' textbooks are replicated, sometimes with the same words, sometimes with borrowed declarations (as in the part on the breakdown of the Muslim world in the secondary school textbook by Camera and Fabietti).[39] It is easy to understand that in this case the methodology of *regards croisés* has the perverse effect of reinforcing false knowledge. We discover there is a tendency for cultural stereotypes to be fairly transnational. Their

impermeability at borders and flexibility show a vitality and resistance that should put us on guard. Furthermore, they raise another problem in that they are perceived (with tragic irony) as an authentic version of Arab history, as opposed to the falsity of the Western world.

In cultured stereotypes we find reflections, research and didactic solutions elaborated over the course of decades. This background renders them particularly rich in meaning. They have great didactic power because they give a sense of 'deeper understanding' of history and, above all, they make the rapport between past and present both easy and immediate.

To understand this richness, let us take as an example the case of the battle of Poitiers in one of the clearest texts I have been able to find.

> The greatest achievement of Charles Martel was the defeat he inflicted on the Arabs in 732 at the battle of Poitiers. This was a highly important victory in the history of wars against Islam because for the first time the Islamic advance into Europe was blocked. … If the Arabs had beaten the Francs, they would not have met other resistance and all Europe would have become Islamic. Charles therefore saved Western civilization.

The textbook from which I took this extract, written by a modern historian R. De Mattei and his colleagues, is unique in the panorama of Italian publishing.[40] Indeed, unlike the 'cocktail' textbooks mentioned above, it was written deliberately to adopt the reforms of 2003, with a view to 'returning to the traditional role of creating for history a national and European identity … derived from the coming together of classical civilization, the Christian message and the energy of Germanic populations'. As a result, the book contains no intercultural concessions.[41] On the contrary, it tells us that Islam 'aimed from the start to destroy the Christian religion' and transformed Christians from 'masters of Jerusalem to barely tolerated inhabitants'. It also tells us that Muslims 'massacred the men and seized women and children who were sold as slaves' and that their culture had 'a simple function of intermediation'.[42] Today it is difficult to find such crude expressions in

other school books and, fortunately, De Mattei's textbook is rarely used.

However, notwithstanding this feature, the elements that De Mattei used in his description of Poitiers are found practically unaltered in all current textbooks. Strategies of 'interculturalization' are found in the use of euphemisms (it was not such a great battle, especially when considered from the Arab point of view) or in the declaration that the importance of this battle lies in ideological emphasis rather than military dynamics.

Eva Cantarella, a highly respected Ancient historian, adopted this narrative strategy in her textbook, the most commonly found in high schools. The base text informed us that:

> The historical achievement of Charles Martel is in having blocked the Arab invasion, which was spreading north from Spain. In 732 Charles Martel, commanding his heavily armed cavalry of Franc Knights, faced the Arab[s] at Poitiers and defeated them. This huge success put an end to the Arab robberies and at the same time, re-established Franc authority in south Gaul. The victory at Poitiers is therefore one of the fundamental military battles in medieval European history. Indeed, the Franc kingdom was the only military power that could oppose Arab expansion into Europe and its defeat would probably have resulted in Arab settlement in Western regions.

Subsequently, in a box dedicated to *European identity and the Arabs*, she added (for further discussion by the teacher):

> It was a 'pointed victory' against an Arab incursion, rather than an invasion. It was emphasized by a Spanish chronicle. Significantly, it spoke of Franks and not Europeans. Actually, as well as fighting, there was exchange, compromise and what we would regard as a betrayal. Cases of mixed marriages were not infrequent, neither were Christians who preferred Muslim rule to that of the Franks. However it is not necessary to exaggerate this demythification.[43]

The two textbooks have opposing political, ideological and didactic viewpoints. However, the sense of the two base texts is wholly comparable. This is even more evident if we compare them with the results acquired from medieval history research.[44]

- the Franks fought at Poitiers against an army of Arabs, Berbers, Visigoths, Iberians (Muslims and Christians);
- Muslim incursions continued well after the battle;
- in a Visigoth chronicle describing the battle the term 'European' rather than 'Frank' was used for the first time in the historical literature of the time. The Visigoths could not admit that the Franks, their sworn enemies, were able to defeat the Muslims;
- Carolingian historical accounts blew the battle of Poitiers out of all proportion;
- subsequent historians used the term 'European' to prove that European identity was found in the eternal fight against its enemy, Islam; and
- the fear that, had the Arabs won at Poitiers, they would have gone as far as Constantinople, obviously lacks military consideration.

One apparently marginal feature, from an intercultural point of view, becomes decisive in helping us understand how this Poitiers *Vulgata* is really a powerful explanatory tool. The two writers referred to the heavily armed Frank cavalry (De Mattei went further with a box describing stirrups). We find ourselves with another suggestion, this time by the famous writer Lynn White Jnr, that Charles Martel won because stirrups were used for the first time, which increased his cavalry's destructive force. We know, however, that stirrups were only slowly adopted for military use over the medieval period. At Hastings, almost three centuries after Poitiers, knights still dismounted their horses and fought on foot.[45]

So we have a dual 'invention'. On one hand, Charles Martel saved Europe from the infidels. On the other, he carried out a technological revolution that was able to shake up stagnant medieval history. Other reasons can be found in the historical didactic of Poitiers. In both

texts, the reader is invited to participate; 'we' were saved; 'we' can consider mixed marriage and commerce between Muslims and Christians as a betrayal. This 'we' shows that the authors see us as being in continuity with these events. Today, as then, Christians and Muslims face up to each other. And we can conclude that a bloody history entrusts modern intercultural didactics with the task of making peace.

In its apparent 'neutrality', the base text expresses a powerful ideological construction from many different dimensions – progress, European identity, the enemy and the link that holds us to these facts. From an intercultural point of view it becomes a seminal text in the literal sense of the term. It creates a problem that history at the time of Charles Martel did not have and produces the didactic paradox that can be summarized in this opposition:

- teach this vulgate, and then try by discussion and intercultural best practices to formulate a remedy *versus*
- change the vulgate and teach history in a way in which we are able to reconstruct it.

The first solution seems to be the one that has been adopted, even in the most advanced textbooks. I believe that the real intercultural battle that historians address today is to convince colleagues, textbook authors and teachers to keep their distance from this authentic 'invention of tradition'.

It needs to be understood that we – the Christians, Muslims, Laics, Europeans and non-Europeans – are the real 'others' when we decide to free ourselves from our own inventions when we study the past.

Notes

1. A. Malvezzi, *L'islamismo e la cultura europea*, Florence: Sansoni, 1956.
2. L. Scarlini, *La paura preferita. Islam: fascino e minaccia nella cultura italiana*, Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 2005.
3. Perhaps the firmest response to Fallaci's books was a reading organized by the well-known medievalist Franco Cardini, *La paura e l'arroganza* [*Fear and Arrogance*], Bari: Laterza, 2003; it should be noted that this collection takes in writings from both right and left-wing historians. Among recent works are R. Bettini, *L'Occidente dentro l'Islam*, Milan: Franco Angeli, 2006; E. Buzzi (ed.)

Islam: una realtà da conoscere, Genoa: Marietti, 2001; R. Di Meglio, *Islam, uno sconosciuto in Occidente*, Naples: Tullio Pironi, 2003; and A. Negri, *Islam: capire e conoscere la religione musulmana*, Turin: Utet, 2007.

4. L'immagine degli arabi nella storia, in www.arab.it/islam/conoscere_islam. htm; S. Marhaba and K. Salome, *L'antiislamismo spiegato agli italiani: come smontare i principali pregiudizi sull'Islam*, Trento: Erikson, 2003.

5. These data can be found on the website of the Ministry of Education and Research: http://www.pubblica.istruzione.it/dg_studieprogrammazione/ notiziario_stranieri_0708.pdf. They show how in the last decade, pupils of foreign extraction have grown from 60,000 to 600,000 with a constant growth rate of around 100,000 pupils per year.

6. La via italiana per la scuola interculturale e l'integrazione degli alunni stranieri: http://www.pubblica.istruzione.it/news/2007/allegati/pubblicazi- one_intercultura.pdf

7. U. Eco and M. Bonazzi, *I Pampini bugiardi. Indagine sui testi al di sopra di ogni sospetto: i testi delle scuole elementari*, Florence: Guaraldi, 1972.

8. This debate appears almost simultaneously in E. Becchi and F. Ghilardi (eds) *Libro d'obbligo. Il libro di testo nella scuola elementare degli anni '80*, Florence: Nuova Guaraldi, 1981, especially in the contribution by F. Rotondo, 'Pro, contro, oltre il libro di testo', pp. 7–38.

9. Alberto Alberti, Bini Giorgio, Del Cornò Lucio and Rotondo Fernando, *I libri di testo*, Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1972, p. 42.

10. It is impossible to calculate, even briefly, the immense range of literature produced over just the last 15 years. To limit ourselves to Islam and history teaching, the following can be highlighted: S. Allievi (ed.) *L'Occidente di fronte all'Islam*, Milan: Franco Angeli, 1996; P. Falteri (ed.) 'Interculturalismo e immagine del mondo occidentale nei libri di testo nella scuola dell'obbligo', *Quaderni di Euridice*, vol. 8, 1993; G. Garotta (ed.) *L'immagine dell'altro nei manuali di storia tunisini e italiani: Conflitti, scambi e contaminazioni culturali nel mondo antico*, Genoa: Irre Liguria, 2004; G. La Torre, 'Stereotipi e pregiudizi anti-arabi nei libri di testo', in L. Cambria Ajmar and M. Calloni (eds) *L'altra metà della luna*, Genoa: Marietti, 1993; R. Marini, 'Una ricerca sugli stereotipi: l'immagine degli altri popoli nei sussidiari', *Scuola e Città*, vol. 10, 1992, pp. 431–440; A. Nanni, 'Pregiudizi e stereotipi nei libri di testo', *Cem. Mondialità*, 3 October 1993; L. Operti, *Cultura araba e società multietnica: per un'educazione interculturale*, Turin: Boringhieri, 1998; I. Sigillino, *Così vicini, così lontani: i musulmani in Italia*, Milan: Cens, 1996; I. Sigillino (ed.) *L'Islam nella scuola*, Milan: Franco Angeli, 1999.

11. A. A. Brusa and M. Cecalupo, *La terra abitata dagli uomini*, Bari: Progedit, 2000.

12. M. Della Nave, 'Parlando d'altro: stereotipi, pregiudizi, razzismo e rappresentazione della diversità culturale', in E. De Nigris (ed.) *Fare scuola per tutti*, Milan: Franco Angeli, 2003, pp. 62–118.

13. A. Portera, *L'educazione interculturale nella teoria e nella pratica: stereotipi, pregiudizi e pedagogia nei libri di testo nella scuola elementare*, Padua: Cedam, 2000.

14. Law 53 passd in 2003 (Minister Moratti). Fortunately this law was modified in 2007 with a new programme: http://www.pubblica.istruzione.it/ normative/2007/allegati/dir_310707.pdf. As a new government has recently taken office, it is likely that these rules will change once again.

15. Alberti et al., *I libri di testo*; Eco and Bonazzi, *I Pampini bugiardi*. Where no other reference is made, citations from textbooks are taken from these two works.

16. Falteri, 'Interculturalismo e immagine del mondo non occidentale'.

17. A. Brusa, 'Afrique, Méditerranée et monde arabe dans l'enseignement de l'histoire antique et médiévale italienne: cartes, images et récit', in M. Hassani Idrissi (ed.) 'Rencontre de l'histoire et rencontre de l'autre: l'enseignement de l'histoire comme dialogue interculturel', *Horizons Universitaires*, vol. 4, no. 3, 2007, pp. 99–113.

18. A. Brancati, *Fra Oriente e Occidente*, vol. 2, Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1980 (first edition 1963), p. 118.

19. F. Bonacina and E. Natta, *Storia dell'uomo*, vol. 1, Florence: Vallardi, 1967, p. 346.

20. R. Fimiani and A. Manti, *Storia della civiltà europea*, vol. 1, Milan: La Prora, 1953.

21. F. Di Tondo and G. Guadagni, *La storia e i suoi problemi: dalla preistoria al IX secolo*, vol. I, Turin: Loescher, 1980, p. 344.

22. M. Bettini, M. Lentano and D. Puliga, *Sulle spalle dei gigantic: storia e culture del Medioevo*, Milan: Edizioni Scolastiche Bruno Mondadori, 2006, pp. 116–43; R. Morghen, *Popoli e civiltà del mediterraneo*, Palermo: Palumbo, 1954, pp. 99–107.

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24. There are two examples. S. Zavoli, *La storia e il suo racconto*, Milan: Bompiani, 2003, p. 327, comments on the chapter of the Crusades with a picture of a masked guerrilla holding a machine gun. A more meaningful example is that of G. Gentile and L. Ronga, *Speciale storia*, Brescia: La Scuola, 2004, p. 209, who use an image of the Twin Towers in flames as an endpiece to a comparison between Muslim and Christian sources.

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26. www.lega-musulmana.it/Rivista_Islamica

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40. R. De Mattei, E. Nistri and M. Viglione, *Alle radici del domani*, vol. 1, Milan: Agedi, 2004, p. 108.
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42. Ibid., pp. 93–4.
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Chapter 7

Islamization reconsidered: Islam and Muslim Albanians in Albanian history texts (1973–2006)

Adrian Brisku

There has been growing interest in religious studies among academics in post-communist Albania. Indeed, research in this area has focused on a wide variety of historical and contemporary subjects and themes in which Albania's multi-religious diversity,[1] the coexistence of these faiths and the attitude of the Albanian state towards religion offer wide scope for historical and sociological enquiry and analysis. Scholars have, for example, examined the relation between religions and present-day Albanian society,[2] the Islamization[3] of the population in the seventeenth century,[4] and the conversion of Catholics.[5] They have also investigated the interrelationship between the three religious communities (Muslim, Christian Orthodox and Roman Catholic) since the Ottoman occupation,[6] the transitory phenomenon of crypto-Christianity (hidden Christianity),[7] and the emergence and spread of the Bektashi Muslim sect,[8] the fourth main religious community in Albania along with the above three.

Despite such a wide range of themes, little interest has been shown so far in how Albanian historiography[9] introduces the topic of religion into educational practice. This lack of interest is evident from the way in which the main faiths (Sunni Islam, Bektashism, Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism) are presented within the context of Albanian

nationalism. In this chapter I shall look at historiographical representations of Muslim Albanians and of Islam (both Sunni and Bektashi) in Albanian history textbooks, an enquiry I consider important in the light of both the contemporary negative perception of Islam globally and of Albania's attempt to construct a European identity.[10] By scrutinizing four Albanian secondary school history textbooks and juxtaposing them with a recent (2002) edition of *History of the Albanian People* (*Historia e Popullit Shqiptar*), published by the Albanian Institute of History, I propose to analyse in depth the nature of the representation of Islam and Albanian Muslims in educational practice at the secondary level. In the analysis I shall look for 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' evaluations and ask whether they create an equilibrium or disequilibrium[11] in the perceived national make-up of the Albanian nation and Albanian history. Given the impact of contemporary global perceptions of Islam, and the affinity that Albania seeks with the European Union, I shall ask whether new factors might affect images of Islam and Albanian Muslims, which in turn may affect the established equilibrium in Albanian historiography and educational practice.

The textbooks analysed here contain images constructed in both the communist and post-communist periods. The first, *The history of Albania for secondary school level* (*Historia e Shqipërisë për shkollat e mesme*),[12] was written during the communist period by Kristo Frashëri and Stefanaq Pollo and published for the first time in 1973, then reprinted in 1983, 1985 and 1987. The other textbooks were written in the post-communist period. These are *The history of the Albanian people for secondary school level* (*Historia e popullit Shqiptar për shkollat e mesme*) by Hysni Myzyri (1994);[13] *History 4* (*Historia 4*) for secondary-level social-science students by Myzafer Korkuti et al. (2002, reprinted 2003),[14] and *History 4* (*Historia 4*) for natural-science students, again by Myzafer Korkuti et al. (2006).[15] The last, the already mentioned *History of the Albanian people*, vol. 1, was prepared by the Institute of History at the Academy of Science in Albania and published in 2002. Interestingly, most of the contributors to the textbooks produced during both periods are distinguished historians and members of the Institute of History. *The history of the Albanian people* (2002) can thus be taken as a point of reference in preparing new history textbooks and as a means of

comparing what information is included and excluded in both periods. It also shows that while there has been a socio-political change in Albania – from an extreme communist to a liberal democratic system – the contributors to Albanian historiography, whose role it is to reflect these larger socio-political transformations in history writing, and here with reference to religion and specifically Islam and Muslims in Albania, have remained the same.

The Albanian state, nationalism and religion

Since the inception of the modern Albanian nation-state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (the period of the so-called Albanian National Renaissance) the existence of four main religious communities – Sunni Muslims, Bektashis, Orthodox Christians and Roman Catholics – meant that nationalist ideologues could not and did not use religion to bind a national identity. They were forced to down-play religion and keep it out of politics, focusing instead on ethnic identity. This was very different from the situation in neighbouring Balkan states like Greece and Serbia, where ethnic and religious iden-tities were able to overlap,[16] and from the Ottoman Empire's *millet* system, which was extended over Albania and in which religious divisions assumed primary political importance. Given that the society of the time was divided along strong religious lines, the Albanian nationalists sought, by contrast, to instil a large measure of neutrality (secularization) in the new Albanian state.[17]

Thus, nationalist ideologues agreed that religion could not play an important role in the promotion of Albanian nationalism; instead, ethnicity was to be embraced as the primary identity, as reflected in the slogan 'the real faith of Albanians is Albanianism'.[18] The prominent contemporary Albanian historian Kristo A. Frashëri claimed that with the declaration of independence on 28 November 1912 the character of the Albanian nation-state was created as united, independent, demo-cratic, secular and enlightened.[19] He saw the embrace of secularity during this period as a solution to the religious divisions in Albanian society, but also regarded it as an expression of the 'aspiration not only to push aside from a political viewpoint the centuries-long Ottoman yoke but also the will to distance completely Albania from the Orient

and to direct its face toward the Occident'.[20] In other words, secularity was a step closer to cherished European culture and civilization, and it implied a distancing from the Ottoman legacy. Frashëri further maintained that the first historical step was formalized legally with the decision to divide the state from the religious institutions, which, accordingly, had two revolutionary outcomes. First, it gave the newly born Albanian state a European secular appearance. Second, it deprived the Christian Churches of the privileged position they had enjoyed since the medieval period, a restriction that was also applied to the Islamic institutions, which had benefited during Ottoman rule. Hence, it asserted that all these traditional confessional communities would have equal rights in relation to each other and with other religious institutions.[21] The upholding of the principle of secularity by Albanian nationalism and its implementation by the state set into motion a dynamic in which the latter began to gain the upper hand *vis-à-vis* religious communities.

Until the end of the Second World War, religious communities flourished in Albania, with some also taking on a kind of national 'mantle'. The Albanian Orthodox Church, which had been under the authority of the Orthodox patriarchate in Constantinople, was established as autocephalous and the latter agreed to recognize it in 1937.[22] The Sunni Muslim Zog I, proclaimed king in 1928, was keen to reinforce the secularity of the Albanian state because he was conscious of religious diversity in the country. The 1928 constitution, which declared Albania a democratic constitutional and hereditary monarchy, laid down that there was to be no state religion and that all creeds were equal before the law. Caught in the processes of Europeanization and modernization, and being the monarch of the only predominantly Muslim nation in Europe, Zog I maintained a policy on religion in which the state could intervene in religious affairs but not the other way around. An illustrative example was when in his 1937 efforts to Europeanize and modernize Albanian society, among other proposals, the king suggested unveiling Muslim women.[23] In addition, during the 1930s, he severed all formal ties between Albanian Sunni Muslims and Muslims outside the country.[24] Furthermore, the Bektashi Albanians declared themselves independent of the Turkish Bektashi in 1922.[25]

Kemal Atatürk abolished Bektashism in Turkey in 1925 and by 1929 Albania had become a world Bektashi centre with an estimated 200,000 followers.[26] Meanwhile, Catholic Albanians, unlike their Orthodox, Sunni and Bektashi counterparts, did not declare their independence from the Vatican. In 1940 the Albanian Catholics were directly subordinate to the Holy See in Rome.[27] Their dependence on the Vatican would prove detrimental during the communist period, for the communists in general were antagonistic to religions and more so to those that were beyond their political control and affiliated with foreign religious institutions.

The communist regime that ruled the country from 1945 to 1990 pushed to extremes the established policy in which the state could intervene in religious affairs but not vice versa. Shortly after the Second World War, Enver Hoxha's communist rule, which was still insecure and experiencing difficulties, followed a relatively moderate policy in dealing with Muslim, Orthodox and Roman Catholic communities.[28] By the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, the communist state's policy had become harsher. Muslim communities were the first to undergo direct state intervention and control in the form of discouragement and later through severe restrictions being placed on religious instruction and mosque attendance. This was followed by the gradual closure of mosques.[29] State intervention was also imposed on the Orthodox community by replacing bishops who were disloyal to the regime and unwilling to establish closer ties with the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow.[30] The Roman Catholic Albanian community, however, experienced the harshest treatment of all from the communist regime, for the latter saw the former's links to the Vatican as dependent on an outside body over which it had no control and whose doctrine was deeply antagonistic to its interests. Also, the regime faced the toughest opposition to its rule in the Catholic areas of the country. The communist state began its campaign against the Catholic community by imprisoning and executing the most prominent members of its clergy. Then, by declaring null and void the links between the Albanian Catholic Church and the Vatican in its July 1951 decree, rendered it a national Church in the service of the state.[31]

Communist intervention against religious institutions reached its peak in 1967. The state campaign against religion, which was part of the Chinese-inspired Albanian cultural revolution,[32] involved nation-wide attempts to persuade, cajole and ultimately force people to abandon their religious beliefs and practices altogether. Unlike other communist states at the time, which had reached a *modus vivendi* with their religious communities, the Albanian communist state was unwilling to compromise[33] and, with the introduction of a special decree to revoke the charters allowing the three religious communities to function, declared Albania 'the first atheist state in the world'.[34] Soon afterwards the government announced the closure of the majority of the country's 2169 religious buildings and their conversion to cultural centres, sports halls, theatres and storage depots. The clergy were widely persecuted, with some imprisoned or sentenced to death on charges of espionage.[35] In 1972 the Museum of Atheism was opened in the town of Shkodra to chronicle the closing down of religious institutions. Meanwhile, Article 37 of the new 1976 constitution asserted that the state recognized no religion, while Article 55 of the Penal Code set out penalties, including death sentences, for anybody engaging in religious activities.[36]

In its latter years, the communist regime slowly began to relax its stance on religion. In 1988 Hoxha's successor, Ramiz Alia, allowed a prominent Albanian Orthodox cleric from an American diocese both to visit the country wearing his clerical garb in public and to perform discreet religious services. Also, the number of treasonable offences punishable by death was reduced from thirty to two.[37] By 1990 the communist state had lifted its ban on religion and religious practices; it now guaranteed freedom of worship, and allowed churches and mosques to reopen throughout the country. In 1991 a state secretariat of religions was established to register different religious communities officially. Between 1991 and 1996 more than 120 new religious groups and sects, mostly evangelical churches, were registered.[38]

The post-communist Albanian constitution ratified in 1998 reasserted in Article 10 that there was no state religion in the Albanian Republic and that the state was 'neutral' on the question of belief and conscience. It guaranteed religious expression in public life and recog-

nized the principle of equality among religious communities. Also, it sanctioned mutual respect for the independence of state and religion, and regulated this relation on the basis of agreement between representatives from each community and the Albanian Council of Ministers, subject to being ratified by the parliament. Finally, the state (through the 1998 Albanian constitution) recognized religious communities as legal entities that were free to administer their properties. Since then, the post-communist state's hands-off policy on religion has forced religious communities to depend more on foreign assistance for building and repairing their institutions or training their clergy than on support from the Albanian state.

Themes in the representation of Islam and Albanian Muslims in history textbooks

It can be suggested, then, that the Albanian state's interactions with and attitudes towards the country's religious institutions have played a large part in influencing Albanian historiography's take on religion. However, the aim here is not to concentrate on the general position adopted by historiography on the main religions in Albania, but rather to examine how the discipline represents Islam and Muslim Albanians in secondary-school history textbooks and what themes it employs. The choice of this particular educational level is significant because only a small proportion of Albanians go on to attain qualifications beyond the secondary-school level. As such, one can assume that what they learn from these textbooks is likely to represent the sum total of their formal exposure to Albanian history.

As stated earlier, I shall look at the 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' impacts of depictions of Islam and Muslim Albanians in four history textbooks, and at their stabilizing or destabilizing effects. I organize the discussions in these textbooks around four themes – the expansion of Islam, the process of conversion, the many faces of Islam, and the impact of Islam on the Albanian nation.

The expansion of Islam

The authors of all the textbooks, including *The history of the Albanian people* (2002), trace the introduction of the Muslim faith to the Albanian

population to the establishment of Ottoman rule in Albanian inhabited territories. In addition, though Bektashism is mentioned in *History 4* (2003) and in slightly more detail in *The history of the Albanian people* (2002), Islam is generally associated with Sunni Islam. All the textbooks explicitly state that the expansion of Islam distorted the existing balance between Orthodox and Catholic faiths.

Indeed, the discussion on the establishment of Islam in Albania in the 1987 *History of Albania* is presented in Chapter 5 under the heading 'Albania under the Ottoman feudal-military yoke of the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries', with the subtitle, which deals specifically with Islam, entitled 'The spread of Islamization in Albania'.[39] This section is quite short, barely covering one page.[40] Here, the expansion of Islam in Albania is described as causing disequilibrium and having a negative impact on Albanian society at that particular moment in history. There is an account of how the Ottoman Empire conspired against Albanian people by seeking to convert them to Islam as a means of disrupting their struggle for liberation and 'ideologically' bringing them round to its side. The text reads:

> The Ottoman rulers thought that if they converted Albanians to Islam, they would give up their struggles for liberation and that they would ideologically side with the fate of the Turkish Empire. This was the rationale that they upheld in their campaign to Islamize Albanians during the last quarter of the seventeenth century.[41]

Hence, the implication is that from the outset the Ottoman occupiers used Islam as a political instrument that they hoped would have a positive impact on Albanians and would orient them towards the 'Turkish Empire' – a term used rhetorically in communist historiography to refer to the Ottoman Empire. This image of *politically imposed Islam* was placed in the wider Albanian and European contexts of the time when, from the beginning of the sixteenth century, Albania came under Turkish rule and Albanian peasants were being exploited under the *timar* system.[42] The first uprisings of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were mentioned, especially that of 1612–13 in

which northern Albanians fought against and beat the Ottoman armies, but attempts at a pan-Balkan struggle against the Ottomans fell apart. When Albanian resistance subsided temporarily because of the Thirty Years' War, which had started in Europe in 1618 at the height of Ottoman power,[43] it became easier for the Ottomans to impose Islam directly (by force) on the Albanians. In addition, according to the textbooks, indirect (social and economic) measures were used to force Albanians to embrace Islam:

> Turks pursued the politics of severe religious discrimination in social life and the sphere of taxes. The Christian inhabitants had many of their rights taken away. They could not stand trial either to lay their claims or to defend themselves. In addition, they increased *xhizja* (*jizia,* tax for protection under Ottoman rule) so much that it became impossible for them to pay it.[44]

Like the 1987 *History of Albania* textbook, in which the expansion of Islam is discussed in political, military and historical contexts, the 1994 *History of the Albanian people* contains a description in Chapter 5 of 'The consolidation of Ottoman rule in Albanian lands', in which the effects on Albania of Ottoman political, administrative and economic organization, liberation struggles against Ottoman rule and sixteenth- and seventeenth-century developments in Albanian culture were considered. At the end, it deals with the theme of religion under the subtitle 'Changes in the religious structure of the Albanian people'.[45] The length of this section is also rather short, less than two pages; again, presumably, it is related to how this theme is balanced with other themes in the textbook.

Departing from the previous textbook, which focuses solely on the Muslim community, the 1994 *History of the Albanian people* mentions the Albanian Catholic and Orthodox communities.[46] We can attribute this to the change of political discourse in the post-communist period in which religious freedom became an established norm. In the previous period, when religion was banned, discussing religious diversity was impermissible, yet to have ignored the spread of Islam completely would have been a great historical anachronism. Further, unlike the

previous textbook, the 1994 *History of the Albanian people* does not offer an image of an Islam imposed directly, but rather indirectly. It states that 'after the Ottoman occupation, a new religion began to spread in Albania: Islam.'[47] A number of factors are listed in the textbook that indirectly caused Islam to spread in the Albanian population, namely:

> The system of *devshirme*, according to which boys from Albanian Christian families were taken and sent to Istanbul and were Islamized and educated in the Muslim ethos, the tax of *jizia*, which was a growing economic pressure, the lack of a single national church, and the disagreements between the Catholic and Orthodox churches on extending their own sphere of influence.[48]

Meanwhile, both the 2003 and 2006 editions of *History 4* contain discussions on the theme of Islam under the subtitle 'Religions in Albania' and, as in the 1994 *History of the Albanian people*, the roles of Catholicism and of Orthodoxy are mentioned. Both textbooks have a rather similar narrative – which is hardly surprisingly given that Korkuti and his colleagues prepared them both – in expressing that the spread of Islam occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a result of the establishment of Ottoman rule in the country. They reiterate the idea that 'Islam was supported by the Ottoman state'.[49] Significantly, in explaining the spread of Islam, both textbooks introduce the notion of voluntarism alongside that of (direct and indirect) imposition. With this concept, they make the historical argument that a small number of Albanians converted to Islam not because they were directly or indirectly forced to do so but because they were enticed by gifts offered by the Ottoman state.[50] Nevertheless, they write that the imposition of direct state violence and indirect economic pressures played the major role in the spread of Islam.[51] Moreover, they point to the disequilibrium caused by its expansion in which 'the Christian anthroponomy and topology was replaced with the Islamic one. The cities took on an Islamic religious mantle. And the religious divisions deepened.'[52]

Meanwhile, in a chapter on 'Changes in the religious structure of the

Albanian people: the expansion of Islam' the 2002 edition of *The history of the Albanian people* contains a discussion of this theme.[53] Unlike the four other textbooks, the period of the spread of Islam spans the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. In addition, it is stated that even before the Ottoman occupation, the Albanian population had contacts with Islam, 'since in pre-Ottoman times these lands (Albanian) come into contact with merchants, military forces and other representatives of the Oriental-Islamic world'.[54] Despite this, the position adopted in the previous textbooks is reaffirmed by the statement that 'the beginning of the Islamization of the Albanian population in terms of a historical process is synchronically connected to the beginning of the establishment of Ottoman rule in Albania'.[55]

Similarly assessed is the disequilibrium caused by the expansion of Islam into Albania, which upset the uneasy balance between Orthodox and Catholic Churches. However, 'both the Orthodox and Catholic Churches lost Albanian Christian followers to the spread of Islam, the official religion of the Ottoman state.'[56] The image of *politically imposed Islam* is reconfirmed as is the fact that its imposition created disequilibrium within the Albanian religious structure. In the 2002 *History of the Albanian people*, the factors that brought about the expansion of Islam, such as *devshirme* and the *timar* system with its heavy taxes, are listed in a much more detailed and informative way[57] and the political, economic, cultural and religious factors in the establishment of Islam are also considered. However, the argument in the 1987 *History of Albania* that the Ottoman state imposed Islam through direct rather than indirect use of organized violence is reversed: 'in Albania, the Ottoman occupation was not accompanied by the organized and direct use of force by the state to uproot the existing faith (Christianity) [*sic*] and the imposition of Islam in its place.'[58]

Thus, all the textbooks, including the 2002 *History of the Albanian people*, are in agreement that Islam spread in Albania because the Ottoman state imposed it politically and that this caused fundamental disequilibrium in the country's religious makeup. However, the accounts vary over how Islam was imposed. The 1987 *History of Albania* asserts that it was both directly and indirectly imposed; the 1994 and 2002 editions of the *History of the Albanian people* agree that it was

spread indirectly, while both the 2003 and 2006 editions of *History 4* claim that the spread of Islam was direct, indirect and voluntary. Such contradictions can be attributed not only to changes in ideological positions between the dates of publication, but also to current tensions in which historical information is increasingly torn between attempts at historical objectivity and current political and ideological factors.

The process of conversion
The process of conversion, or what is described in Albanian historiography as Islamization or *apostaza* (apostasy), is another important theme discussed in these textbooks. Seeing the expansion of Islam as a political tool of the Ottoman state, conversion is described as a negative and difficult process, which lasted a full century at its height. This theme is marked by inconsistency between textbooks in the two periods with regards to which section of the population got converted first, peasants or ruling elite. The 1987 *History of Albania* textbook states that the process of Islamization continued throughout the seventeenth century and encountered strong resistance among Albanian peasants, but it was they and the highland population that converted first and in higher percentages:

> After the [second decade] of the seventeenth century, began the Islamization *en masse* of the *raya* peasants[59] and partly of the highlanders who were included in the *timar* regime. By the end of the seventeenth century, when three-quarters of the Albanian population was converted to the Muslim faith, the Turks relaxed the policy of Islamization and reduced the *jizia* to its initial level.[60]

In the 1994 *History of the Albanian people*, on the other hand, it is stated that the process of conversion initially started with a part of the Albanian aristocracy rather than with the peasants, as suggested in the previous text:

> In the beginning Islamization was embraced by part of the Albanian aristocracy. The sons of local feudal families were

taken and educated like the 'iç-ogllanë' in the Sultan's palace or the 'gulamë' close to the Bey of Rumelia … who after having converted to Islam took on different administrative or military functions in their country. By initially Islamizing members of [the] Albanian aristocracy, it was easier for Islam later to spread in the rest of population.[61]

The 2002 *History of the Albanian people* takes the same line as the 1994 edition in elaborating that due to the *timar* system, which privileged Muslim rather than Christian Albanian landowners, 'by the beginning of the sixteenth century the complete Islamization of the Albanian feudal class was achieved'.[62] However, the 2002 version goes even further than the 1994 one in stating that the Albanian feudal class was completely Islamized. Nevertheless, unlike the 1987 *History of Albania*, both textbooks claim that it was the urban population that was initially Islamized.

Also, both the 2003 and 2006 editions of *History 4* argue, in line with the previous post-communist text and textbook, that:

During the sixteenth century the process of Islamization moved slowly. In the cities 30–40 per cent of the population remained Christian, whereas in rural areas it was 85 per cent. The biggest turning point occurred in the seventeenth century. At the end of this century Islam was embraced by more than half of the inhabitants of the Albanian lands.[63]

In addition, it is stated in the 1994 and 2002 versions of the *History of the Albanian people* that conversion occurred at a faster rate in the towns because, after the establishment of Ottoman rule, these towns functioned as administrative, economic and cultural centres of the new political system.[64] They take this theme further in discussing the rate of expansion of Islam in the urban areas, in specific towns in Albania, as well as in relating how those percentages came to increase over time.

While the 1987 *History of Albania* textbook covers the process of converting Albanian peasants in the seventeenth century, it does not in fact mention, as the 1994 and 2002 editions of *The history of the Albanian*

people do, that the initial conversion actually occurred among Albanian aristocrats in urban centres during the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, all four post-communist texts are in agreement with the 1987 *History of Albania* that only at the beginning of the seventeenth century did the conversion process start in earnest in rural areas and by the end of it the majority of Albanians had converted to Islam. In the 1994 edition of the *History of the Albanian people* it is stated that:

> Only in the seventeenth century did Islam begin to penetrate visibly into this segment of the population. The fast rate of Islamization among the Albanian population during the seventeenth century could be noticed not only in the numerical decrease of the Christian population and in the increase of the Muslim one, but also in the decrease of Christian worship sites and in the increase of Islamic ones.[65]

The 2002 edition of *The history of the Albanian people* implies that the prior Islamization of the ruling elite and urban population had a strong influence on the rural population's mass conversion to Islam in the seventeenth century, which was higher in the male than female population because it was usually the men who sought work in urban areas.[66] Furthermore, the conversions created a new equilibrium in the religious composition of the population that would be maintained to the present day: 'The dynamics of the process of Islamization indicate that in the mid-eighteenth century the religious structure of the Albanian people, that is the proportions between the Christian and Islamized populations, had reached more or less stable levels, which with some slight changes would be maintained up to our times.'[67]

While all the texts mention that Islam spread quickly among the rural class in the seventeenth century, destabilizing the population's overall religious composition, unlike all the post-communist texts, the 1987 edition of *The history of Albania* fails to mention that by the onset of the sixteenth century most aristocrats and members of the urban classes had already converted. It is difficult to establish why this information was left out of the 1987 edition. Was there an ideological reason to focus first on the resistance and then on the final conversion

of the poor suppressed class of peasants as a way of promoting the communist state's role as their champion of rights and freedom? Or was it simply a matter of concentrating only on the most dramatic period and on peasants as the largest sector of the population? Whatever the answer, all the texts recognize that a new situation pertained after the massive seventeenth-century conversion, which altered the balance of the population's religious composition.

The many faces of Islam
As the 2002 *History of the Albanian people* shows, alongside the expansion of Sunni Islam in the population, other processes such as the appearances of different forms of Islam and of crypto-Christianity began to take place, suggesting that Islam was not a monolithic religion in Albania. The forms of Islam other than the main Sunni variant were mystic Islamic sects or orders like Bektashism, Halvetism[68] and Rufaism.[69] Crypto-Christianity, on the other hand, refers to the phenomenon in which individuals or groups, while publicly professing Islam, privately practise Christianity – whether Orthodox or Catholic.[70]

Again, the difference in positions between the two periods is clearly apparent, though there is also a certain amount of inconsistency among the post-communist textbooks. For example, the 1987 *History of Albania* provides a monolithic image of Islam, but mentions neither the orders nor crypto-Christianity. It simply registers the religious division of Albanians into three main faiths – Muslim, Orthodox and Catholic.[71] The 1994 *History of the Albanian people*, on the other hand, discusses crypto-Christianity by both defining it and indicating its geographical spread in Albania. It describes the presence in some regions of Albania of 'the phenomenon of double-faith, that is while in public many inhabitants appeared as Muslims, privately they followed the Christian faith'.[72] But, like the 1987 *History of Albania*, there is no mention of Bektashism or the other two sects, which is inexplicable given the post-communist commitment to protecting religious freedom and recognizing religious diversity.

Unlike these two textbooks in which little or no information is given on the above phenomena, the 2002 *History of the Albanian people* offers a more detailed description not only of crypto-Christianity but

also of other Islamic orders in Albania. It depicts crypto-Christianity as a reaction to Islamization, mentions its occurrence in both Catholic and Orthodox rites, and claims that the Catholic clergy were less tolerant towards it than their Orthodox counterparts. Catholic clergy apparently tried to stop the practice by asking double faith believers to declare publicly before the Church and Ottoman authorities that they were returning to their previous faith before being allowed to participate in church services, whereas the Orthodox Church did not exclude them from attending its services.[73] However, crypto-Christianity, as the text states, was considered to be a:

> transitory situation in the lives of a part of the Islamized Albanian population, a situation, which after some time ended with the triumph of either Muslim or Christian faiths. In general this category of people remained in the Muslim faith, but there were cases in which they returned completely to Christianity.[74]

As I mentioned earlier, the 2002 *History of the Albanian people* shows that, from the beginning of its existence, Islam in Albanian-speaking regions appeared not as a monolithic religion, as in the Sunni version, but as a diverse one, with its diversity sparked off by the emergence of three sects in which Bektashism had the greatest impact on the religious structure.[75] Interestingly, Bektashism is depicted in the text in a more positive light than Sunni Islam on the grounds that it was a more liberal Islamic sect and, more importantly, was not politically imposed but emerged in Albania as the cultural choice of certain segments of the population.[76]

This liberal and eclectic image of Bektashism is attributed to the close affinities it had with many aspects of Christianity: tolerance of other religions, acceptance of the use of alcohol, the non-covering of women's faces in public, and praying twice rather than five times a day. These attributes made it 'very acceptable and appealing to the Balkan environment and especially the Albanian one, in which Christianity coexisted with strong elements of the pagan heritage of the pre-Christian period'.[77] Finally, the 2002 *History of the Albanian people* holds that Bektashism spread much faster in the late eighteenth and early

nineteenth century; it took off particularly when it was embraced by the ruler of the Pashalik of Janina, Ali Pashë Tepelena.[78]

Interestingly, the 2003 edition of *History 4* mentions both crypto-Christianity and Bektashism, whereas the 2006 version leaves them out altogether even though, as I indicated earlier, the same authors prepared both textbooks. The reasoning for this cannot simply be that the 2003 *History 4* is for social-science students who would need more information as opposed to the 2006 *History 4* for natural-science students, for the authors have left out no more than two sentences. Indeed, the 2003 *History 4* alludes to crypto-Christianity without defining it, but shows its geographical spread in the lands as a phenomenon that 'indicated that Islam was embraced in order to escape *jizia*'.[79] Bektashism, though, is cited as a good example of the religious tolerance that existed historically in the country in which 'with its democratic character of organization was closer to the religious viewpoints of Albanian Christians'.[80]

By revealing the amount of control each regime exerts over how its students view religious groups, we see a remarkable shift from Islam represented as a monolithic entity during the communist period to it being represented as a pluralist one in the post-communist period. Also, as I noted earlier, the three post-communist textbooks contain inconsistencies, which, quite apart from the question of the state controlling what students learn, points to a lack of professionalism.

The impact of Islam on the Albanian nation

Not surprisingly, all the textbooks are in agreement that the spread of Islam, by which they mean Sunni Islam, radically distorted Albania's religious equilibrium. They also immediately point out, however, that a new equilibrium emerged, facilitated by the nation's tradition of religious tolerance and lack of fanaticism. Religious tolerance is undoubtedly the mantra of Albanian historiography, for it is repeatedly brought up in the texts and reinforced by reminders about the lack of religious conflict among the communities historically. It is asserted in the 1987 edition of *The history of Albania* that the Ottoman state politically engineered the division of Albania into three different

religions – Muslim, Orthodox and Catholic.[81] It is also claimed, in the same textbook, that these religious divisions could have created political disunity, which in turn would have benefited foreign rulers[82] – a discourse suggestive of a communist regime's tendency to regard itself as key to a country's political unity in the face of ideological dangers from the outside world. However, the authors emphasize that the danger failed to materialize because 'Albanians never had any internal religious wars, as happened in other countries, because in Albania the biggest majority of the population never embraced religious fanaticism.'[83] In other words, Albanian Muslims, like the rest of their fellow countrymen, were not religious fanatics.

The 1994 *History of the Albanian people* also refers first to the dis-equilibrium and then to the newfound equilibrium that the tradition of religious tolerance facilitated. It also adds, in hindsight, that Albanian Muslims, simply by embracing the faith, helped the Albanian nation withstand the assimilation processes that Slavic and Greek nationalisms had instigated: 'For some parts of the Albanian lands that were in contact with foreign religious cultures, Slavic or Greek, such as Kosova, Albanian-inhabited territories in the east, Çameria[84] …, the Islamization of the Albanian population was a very important factor in escaping the foreign pressure of assimilation.'[85] Another crucial impact of Islam was that it transformed the profile of Albanian towns with newly constructed Islamic buildings and Muslim quarters standing beside Christian ones.[86]

Like the 1994 *History of the Albanian people*, the 2002 edition discusses the impact of Islam on Albania, but in more detail. It was significant not only confessionally but also economically, societally and culturally. Besides transforming religious practices, it affected urban architecture, marriage and funeral traditions, as well as poetry and song recitals, and many Turkish-Arabic words and expressions were introduced into the language.[87] Like the other two textbooks, this one recognizes the political implications of Islam, arguing that its impact could potentially have been dangerous, for it could have been divisive and subsequently led to the disintegration of the Albanian nation. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the 2002 edition of *The history of the Albanian people*, a new religious equilibrium was created. This was based on:

Strong foundations strengthened by the interaction of the factors of convergence, like ethno-psychological features [by this it is being suggested in the texts that Albanians have some innate, primordial tolerance of a plurality of religions – a claim that is at odds with the religious intolerance experienced in the communist period], a common language and culture. On the other hand, like Christianity (Orthodox or Catholic), Islam was a popular religion among Albanians (especially in the peasant population) who did not succumb to intolerance and fanatic doctrines.[88]

Thus, like their religious counterparts, Albanian Muslims were tolerant of religious diversity. The text praises the special role of Bektashism, which, given its affinities to both Christianity and Islam, fostered religious coexistence and unity based on ethnicity and nationality. The frequent occurrence of interreligious marriages and the fact that Albanian Muslims and Christians came together in uprisings against the Ottomans also reinforced religious coexistence.[89] Both the 1994 and 2002 editions of *The history of the Albanian people* stress the importance of the role that Albanian Muslims played in the formation of an Albanian nation by resisting the pressures of neighbouring nationalisms to assimilate.[90]

Finally, both the 2003 and 2006 editions of *History 4* cover Islam's first destabilizing and then later stabilizing effect on the Albanian nation, the changing nature of urban architecture, and how Albanians maintained their national identity in the face of assimilationist pressures from Greek and Serbian nationalisms.[91] It is interesting, however, that the 2006 edition of *History 4* fails to mention Bektashism as a specific example of religious tolerance, whereas the earlier (2003) edition of the same book does.[92]

Clearly, there is not much change between the two periods in assessing the impact of Islam on the Albanian nation. By conveying such continuity, Albanian historiography assumes to be putting forward a historical truth that was relevant in the previous period and remains relevant today without being much affected by the larger socio-political changes of communism and post-communism.

Conclusion

The findings on how Islam and Muslims are represented in secondary-school history textbooks in Albania reveal a mixed picture in both the communist and post-communist periods. We are told that the Ottoman Empire imposed Islam on Albania directly (through state violence) and indirectly (through socio-economic pressures) and that this initially had a negative effect on the population. While the conversion of the majority of Albanians to Islam distorted the religious composition of the population, once a new equilibrium had been established, *positive coexistence emerged between Muslims and other religious communities*, which, as all the texts maintain, was facilitated by a long-established culture of religious tolerance and coexistence. Hence, Albanian Muslims were not religious extremists and did not employ religion for political ends; in fact, along with their religious counterparts, they left religion out of the nationalist equation. Islam and Muslims in Albania played a pivotal role in preserving national identity and in constructing Albanian nationalism in areas under threat of being assimilated by neighbouring nationalisms – Slav in parts of Kosova, Macedonia and Montenegro, and Greek in the Albanian-inhabited parts of northern Greece.

There is, however, a difference between the Islam conveyed as a rather monolithic religion in textbooks published during the communist period, and the pluralist view of Islam advanced in one (the 2003 edition of *History 4*) out of the three textbooks of the post-communist period I analysed, though both the 1994 *History of the Albanian people* and the 2003 *History 4* touch on crypto-Christianity. Certainly, this change reflects the ideological differences between the periods. Yet, the fact that two of the post-communist textbooks, the 1994 *History of the Albanian people* and the 2003 *History 4*, discuss neither Bektashism nor Helvatism, points rather to an absence of professional rigour.

I suggest that Albanian historiography has shown pedagogical continuity in conveying to high school students in both periods a mixed representation of Islam and positive image of Muslim Albanians within the internal confines of Albanian historical experience. Such continuity is related to the fact that the contributors to Albanian historiography come from the Institute of History at Albania's Academy of Science

and, to a large extent, are the same people who were active in the previous period, who prepared the 2002 *History of the Albanian people* and still compile textbooks. While the ideological change is reflected in the post-communist textbooks through inconsistent portrayal of plural images of Islam, the historiography has so far been resistant to the other, sometimes negative, images that are circulating in contemporary Albanian national debates. Indeed, national debates triggered by the country's wish to join the European Union, as well as negative discourses on Islam following the 11 September attacks in New York, subsequently led to the country's cultural character being compared with a rather restricted view of European civilization based on its Christian heritage[93] and have elicited an uneasy balance and depiction of Islam.[94] In turn, some have branded the historiographical depiction of Islam a 'museum-like' effort, which represents it in the eyes of the West as a 'normal' object that does not need to change.[95]

It remains to be seen how these new factors and debates will affect the historiographical representation of different religions in general and of Islam and Muslim Albanians in particular. It is safe to say that Albanian historiography and its translation into educational practices will reflect Albanian nationalist, state and religious dynamics. While nationalism and the state have maintained and constitutionally endorsed the principle of secularization, the Albanian state has also, in the light of contemporary events, reasserted its right to have the upper hand over religion.

Notes

1. There are no current official figures on Albania's religious make-up because the Albanian state does not census its population on religious grounds. There are, however, only estimates based on pre-Second World War official figures, in which 70 per cent of the population are Muslims, 20 per cent Christian Orthodox, and 10 per cent Roman Catholic. Antonia Young offers a more detailed breakdown of these estimates in which Muslims represent 71 per cent, of which 55 per cent are Sunni, and 16 per cent Bektashi (with 5 per cent Shia); 19 per cent are Christian Orthodox and 10 per cent Roman Catholic (A. Young, 'Religion and society in present-day Albania', working paper, Institute for European Studies, 3 April 1997, p. 5). Robert Elsie quotes the 1942 Italian Fascist statistic in which from a total population of 1,128,143, there were 779,417 (69 per cent) Muslims including the Bektashi,

232,320 (21 per cent) Orthodox and 116,259 (10 per cent) Catholics (R. Elsie, *A dictionary of Albanian religion, mythology and folk culture*, London: Hurst & Company, 2001, pp. 123–4). However, these figures assume cultural patterns similar to the pre-war period despite the fact that during the communist period religion was abolished and that in the post-communist period not all Albanians have embraced religion: the 2005 International Religious Freedom Report suggests that only 30–40 per cent practise a religion.

2. Young, 'Religion and society in present-day Albania'.

3. 'Islamization' refers to the term that was and is widely used in Albanian historiography to describe the historical process of Islam spreading within the Albanian population during the Ottoman Empire.

4. P. Thëngjilli, 'Aspects of the Islamization in north Albania in the seventeenth century', *Historical Studies*, vol. 12, 2002, pp. 29–49.

5. N. Clayer, 'Disa Mendime mbi Fenomenin e Konvertimit në Islamizëm duke u Nisur nga Rasti i Katolikëve Shqiptarë, i Vëzhguar nga një Mision Jezuit nga Fundi i Epokës Osmane' ['Thoughts on the phenomenon of conversion of Albanian Catholics to Islam as viewed by a Jesuit mission in the late Ottoman era'], *Perpjekja*, 2006, pp. 125–44.

6. S. Dervishi and I. N. Çaushi, 'The religions in Albania: an example of the coexistence of diversities within a culture', *Historical Studies*, 2002, pp. 81–90.

7. Crypto-Christianity was a phenomenon that appeared after the spread of Islam in the Balkans, which involved the process by which communities, mainly the male part of population, who were of Christian faith, both from Orthodox or Catholic rites, professed in public to embrace Islam while in their private sphere maintained and practised their Christian rites. See F. Duka, 'The crypto-Christianity (hidden Christianity) and the Assembly of Arbni', *Historical Studies*, 2003, pp. 31–41.

8. Bektashis are considered to be one of the many 'heterodox' branches of Islam and they are closely liked to another group called the Alevis. What unites them is the common reference to the popular saint Haji Bektash, while what renders them different is the belief that Bektashis become as such by their own will whereas for the Alevis one has to be born within the community to be part of it. In addition, there is a geographical distinction: Bektashis were influenced by peoples of the Balkans whereas Alevis by peoples of Eastern Anatolia, Iran, Kurdistan and so on. Bektashis emerged in the thirteenth century in Anatolia and established themselves as one of the most influential dervish orders in the Ottoman Empire. They spread in the Balkans in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and they were closely connected to janissary troops. For more, see Clayer, 'Thoughts on the phenomenon of conversion'; and Frank Kressing, 'A preliminary account of research regarding Albanian Bektashis: myths and unresolved questions', in Karl Kaser and Frank Kressing (eds) *Albania a country in transition: aspects of*

changing identities in a south-east European country, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002.

9. Albanian historiography was firmly established only during the communist period – starting from 1945 to 1990. As will be shown in the first section of this article, its output was to a great extent influenced by the politics of the communist state, as reflected also in the attitude towards religion. In the post-communist period, there have been calls, especially from the present government (2005 onwards), to revisit Albanian historiography on the basis that it suffers from an entrenched communist legacy. Others, however, fear that this initiative is political and that it has nothing to do with ensuring historiographic objectivity.

10. K. Frashëri, *Identiteti kombetar Shqiptar dhe ceshtje te tjera* [*Albanian national identity and other issues*], Tirana: Edisud, 2006; Ismail Kadare, *The successor*, translated by David Bellos, Edinburgh: Canongate, 2006.

11. These concepts are used in the generic sense to denote a condition in which competing influences (here religious) are balanced in the case of equilibrium, or misbalanced in the case of disequilibrium.

12. Kristo Frashëri and Stefanaq Pollo, *Historia e Shqipërisë për shkollat e mesme* [*The History of Albania for Secondary School Level*], Tirana: Shtëpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor, 1987.

13. Hysni Myzyri, *Historia e popullit Shqiptar për shkollat e mesme* [*The history of the Albanian people for secondary school level*], Tirana: Shtëpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor, 1994.

14. Myzafer Korkuti et al., *Historia 4: për shkollën e mesme të profilizuar, profili shoqëror* [*History 4: for high school level, social sciences profile*], Tirana: Shtëpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor, 2003.

15. Myzafer Korkuti et al. *Historia 4: profili natyror* [*History 4: for high school level, natural sciences profile*], Tirana: Shtëpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor, 2006.

16. G. Duizings, 'Religion and the politics of "Albanianism": Naim Frasheri's Bektashi writings', in S. Schwander-Sievers and B. J. Fischer (eds) *Albanian idenitities: myth and history*, London: Hurst & Company, 2002, pp. 60–1.

17. Ibid.

18. The 'real faith of Albanians is Albanianism' was a sentence from a poem by the Albanian nationalist Pashko Vasa entitled 'O Moj Shqypni' (Oh Poor Albania), which was very influential among Albanian nationalists seeking to unite along ethnic lines and on the basis of a common language – Albanian – and to embrace secularism and leave out religion.

19. Frashëri, *Albanian national identity and other issues*, p. 152.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., pp. 152–3.

22. Elsie, *A dictionary of Albanian religion, mythology and folk culture*, p. 51.

23. M. Vickers, *The Albanians: a modern history*, London: I.B.Tauris, 1999, p. 135.

24. Elsie, *A dictionary of Albanian religion, mythology and folk culture*, p. 52.

25. Ibid., p. 28.

26. Young, 'Religion and society in present-day Albania', p. 3.

27. Elsie, *A dictionary of Albanian religion, mythology and folk culture*, p. 52.

28. A. Logoreci, *The Albanians: Europe's forgotten survivors*, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1977, p. 154.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Vickers, *The Albanians: a modern history*, p. 193.

33. Logoreci, *The Albanians: Europe's forgotten survivors*, p. 155.

34. Ibid.

35. Vickers, *The Albanians: a modern history*, p. 195.

36. Young, 'Religion and society in present-day Albania', p. 3.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 4.

39. Frashëri and Pollo, *The history of Albania for secondary school level*, 1987, pp. 54–60.

40. The textbook space that covered the theme of religion appears to be proportionately balanced with other themes in both periods.

41. Frashëri and Pollo, *The history of Albania for secondary school level*, 1987, p. 59.

42. The *timar* system was a new form of administrative organization in the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire that aimed to centralize authority in the hands of the sultan. In the context of the feudal-peasant relationship, it made the land the property of the Ottoman state. Consequently, the sultan could reward military loyalists by letting them run particular plots of land worked on by peasants, though neither loyalist nor peasant could own the land.

43. Frashëri and Pollo, *The history of Albania for secondary school level*, 1987, pp. 54–9.

44. Ibid., p. 59.

45. Myzyri, *History of the Albanian people for secondary school level*, p. 260.

46. Ibid., p. 77.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 78.

49. Korkuti et al., *History 4*, 2003, p. 100; Korkuti et al., *History 4*, 2006, p. 54.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Korkuti et al., *History 4*, 2003, p. 101; Korkuti et al., *History 4*, 2006, p. 54.

53. Peter R. Prifti, *Land of Albanians*, Tirana: Horizont, 2002, pp. 587–609.

54. Ibid., p. 587.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., pp. 588–9.

58. Ibid., p. 596.

59. The *timar* system divided the peasantry into two types: *raya* peasants and free

ones. The former were in a feudal relationship (lord-tenant) and were heavily taxed. The *raya* peasants were in those parts of the country in which the Ottoman regime had full political and military control. The free peasants, on the other hand, were inhabitants of the highlands where the regime did not have control and consequently could not include them in the *timar* system.

60. Frashëri and Pollo, *History of Albania for secondary school level*, p. 59.
61. Myzyri, *History of the Albanian people for secondary school level*, p. 77.
62. Prifti, *Land of Albanians*, p. 589.
63. Korkuti et al, *History 4*, 2003, p. 100; Korkuti et al., *History 4*, 2006, p. 54.
64. Ibid.; and Myzyri, *History of the Albanian people for secondary school level*, p. 77.
65. Myzyri, *History of the Albanian people for secondary school level*, pp. 77–8.
66. Prifti, *Land of Albanians*, p. 591.
67. Ibid., pp. 591–2.
68. Albanian historiography describes Halvetism as the second most important Islamic mystic sect after Bektashism in the Albanian lands. Its founder was Omer el Halveti from Tabriz of Iran in the fourteenth century. This order reached and spread within the Albanian population in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries (Prifti, *Land of Albanians*, pp. 595–6).
69. Ibid., p. 593. Albanian historiography mentions Rufaism as an Islamic mystic order but does not provide any further information about it. No information exists about this order in major reference books either.
70. S. Skendi, 'Crypto-Christianity in the Balkan area under the Ottomans', *Slavic Review*, vol. 26, June 1967, p. 227.
71. Frashëri and Pollo, *History of Albania for secondary school level*, 1987, p. 59.
72. Myzyri, *History of the Albanian people for secondary school level*, p. 78.
73. Prifti, *Land of Albanians*, p. 593.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., pp. 593–4.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid., p. 595. Ali Pashë Tepelena was a native Albanian who ruled the southern part of present-day Albania and a large part of present-day northern Greece from 1787 to 1822.
79. Korkuti et al., *History 4*, 2003, p. 100.
80. Ibid., p. 101.
81. Frashëri and Pollo, *History of Albania for secondary school level*, p. 59.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p. 60.
84. In Albanian historiography Çameria is a territory in northern Greece bordering southern Albania, inhabited mostly by Albanian Muslims but also with a Christian, Albanian and Greek population. The Muslim Albanian population was pushed out from the area and forcibly removed to Albania proper by the Greek authorities after the Second World War. Up to now,

these people have not been granted leave to return to their houses and properties.

85. Myzyri, *History of the Albanian people for secondary school level*, p. 78.
86. Ibid., p. 77.
87. Prifti, *Land of Albanians*, pp. 606–7.
88. Ibid., p. 607.
89. Ibid., pp. 607–8.
90. Ibid., p. 608.
91. Korkuti et al., *History 4*, 2003, pp. 100–2; Korkuti et al., *History 4*, 2006, pp. 53–5.
92. Korkuti et al., *History 4*, 2003, p. 101.
93. See Kadare, *The successor*; A. Moisiu, 'The interreligious tolerance in the tradition of Albanian people Tirana', official website of the Albanian President, November 2005; Aurel Plasari, 'Vija e Teodosit Rishfaqet: Nga do t'ia Mbajne Shqiptarët?' ['Theodosius line resurfaces: which direction will Albanians take?'], Tirana, 1992; R. Qosja, *The ideology of disintegration*, Tirana: Toena, 2006.
94. See A. Brisku, 'Occidentalising the past and Orientalising the present: Ismail Kadare's and President Moisiu's "European" Albanian identity', *Albanian Journal of Politics*, vol. 2, no. 2, 2006, pp. 82–103; Frashëri, *Albanian national identity and other issues*; A. Puto, 'Fryma romantike dhe nacionaliste ne debatin per identitetin shqiptar', *Perpjekja*, 2006, pp. 13–33; E. Sulstarova, 2007.
95. See Hatibi in Sulstarova, *Escape from the East*, p. 233.

Chapter 8

Europe in three generations of Moroccan textbooks (1970–2002)

Mostafa Hassani-Idrissi

What image of Europe do history textbooks convey to secondary-school pupils in Morocco?[1] What positive or negative features do they attach to 'Europe'? And, more specifically, what impact did the three main history education reforms in Morocco, which took place in the second half of the twentieth century, have on pupils' perceptions of Europe?

To answer these questions let me first identify the three educational reforms. The characteristics of the first reform, which took place in 1970 and introduced the first post-colonial generation of national textbooks, were Arabization, the spirit of decolonization and an appreciative acknowledgement of national history. The second reform, producing the second generation of textbooks, occurred in 1987 and was marked by a retreat into Islamic history, a search for Islamic roots and a return to teaching by objectives. In the most recent reform, introducing a third generation of textbooks and starting in 2002, the idea of one sole master narrative was rejected and replaced by a competence-related approach. Instead of offering the students a 'ready-to-wear' version of history, these textbooks renounced any preconceived narrative of the past. In other words, they aimed to shape students' intellects and prepare them to think for themselves.

With the last reform, the modernist movement gained ground on the traditionalists. For modernists, the main purpose of education was to strengthen the efficacy of the economic sector. They believed that an educational concept that was open to the world and to universal

values such as human rights offered the best chance of achieving this goal. For traditionalists, the purpose of education was to strengthen the sense of national identity, which needed to be 'rediscovered' through a 'return' to Arab/Islamic Moroccan cultural traditions.

During the 1960s, the government decided to counteract the conservative influence of the *Istiqlal* party, which wanted immediate Arabization, by supporting the modernist option grounded in strong French cooperation and an elite recruited from modernized schools. Towards the end of the 1960s and start of the 1970s, especially after several attempts had been made to overthrow the government, the traditionalist option found expression in the organization of Koranic schools, which aimed to educate thousands of children hitherto deprived of schooling. In these schools, the children were taught in Arabic and the teachers were required to be Moroccan. Needless to say, this kind of educational policy brought the government up against both the nationalist movement, which was close to the *Istiqlal* party, and the conservative religious movement.

Then, to counteract the ideological influence of the left, the religious content of the curriculum was strengthened and history courses in secondary schools, especially on European philosophy, were dropped. In Morocco people still speak of this period, when rational thought was abandoned and critical thinking discouraged in the classroom, as 'the leaden years' or years of authoritarianism.

In the 1980s a strong desire surfaced to democratize the political system and to make yet another attempt to reform the educational structure. However, time and again the theocratic conservatism of some thwarted the aspirations of others to embrace modernity and democracy and this left an imprint on the school curricula. The profane and religious, critical thinking and religious rule, thus coexisted side by side for a while and more often than not neutralized one another.

As a result of these educational reforms, different descriptions of Europe were chronologically embedded in three historical ages – antiquity, the medieval period and the modern or contemporary period. These descriptions in the textbooks presented three different images of Europe, which may be summarized as follows:

- 'Europe' evolved from the fall of Rome and the formation of European kingdoms. Before this, it merely appeared to be part of a large unit referred to as 'ancient civilizations', in which the Greeks and Romans served as models.
- Since the Middle Ages 'Europe' had been part of an entity called 'the Christian Occident', which saw the emergence of another cultural and civilizational entity south of the Mediterranean, namely Islam.
- In the modern contemporary age 'Europe' became a new geo-economic and cultural entity that progressed with the rise of capitalism, nationalism and democracy.

The three images constituted a synthesis of the knowledge on Europe that the textbooks deemed worthy to pass on. I shall question them in terms of their function for and relationship to the image that Morocco nurtured of itself. The historical periods in which the three reforms were carried through may serve as a backdrop.

Image of Europe in relation to its ancient history
In the first and second generation of textbooks, and even through the decidedly constructivist approach to learning history of the current ones, the authors tended to glorify the role of Europe and its contribution to the development of 'human culture'. Initial evidence of this glorification came from the fact that the history of European antiquity was taught throughout the entire period of secondary education. Many other cultures (including those of Persia, India and China) were dropped from the curriculum during the various reforms, but Greece was retained, along with countries regarded as important to identity formation – Mesopotamia, Pharaonic Egypt and ancient Morocco.

More emphasis was placed on the cultural contribution of European antiquity. Although Europe assumed the leading position, the influences of other cultures that existed alongside or before Greek culture were acknowledged, thus reinforcing the unity and diversity of ancient cultures in the Mediterranean region. 'During the classical period Greece's culture experienced an extensive revival, which was described as the "Greek miracle" and which resulted from the fusion

of various cultures, in whose framework Athens played a cutting-edge role.'[2] Athens and its approaches to democratic practice were granted a prominent place in all three generations of textbooks. While Athens, along with its limitations, was portrayed as the democratic model, Sparta served to exemplify a city ruled by an oligarchic military regime; Rome, on the other hand, was examined within the framework of its expansionist policy in the Mediterranean region.

The opinions the history textbooks expounded on Athens were very different from those expressed in the Islamist discourse. In keeping with the Medina model (based on a strong integration between religion, society and politics), Islamist history writing idealized and mythicized the first Muslim state. This may explain why, between 1990 and 2002, when the Moroccan educational system took a traditional turn, the history of antiquity disappeared from the basic school (*primaire et college*) curricula, as did the teaching of philosophy (for the final classes). For Islamists, the period of antiquity corresponded with the *jahiliyyah*, the 'state of infamy and ignorance of Islam' in pre-Islamic times. Islamists now use the term in a derogatory way to refer to Western society, but it was also directed at Muslims who adopted the West as a model.

Whereas Athens and Sparta represented different forms of political organization, Rome stood for colonialism and, in all three reforms, it was depicted in terms of its expansionism in the Mediterranean. While in colonial textbooks Roman history served to legitimate the colonial presence in the Maghreb,[3] the authors of textbooks from the nationalist period immediately strove to decolonize that history. They wanted to give pupils a picture of their ancestors as people who defended both their territory and their identity. This point was emphasized in several ways. First, by highlighting the slow pace of conquest, the process was interpreted as active resistance on the part of the Berbers rather than as hesitation on the part of Rome.[4] Second, by viewing Roman colonization as an appropriation of wealth, the textbook authors were able to deny that the imposition of Roman governing structures had a civilizing effect. Third, in the process of Romanization, the authors saw no evidence of any 'benefits of the Roman peace' (*Pax Romana*) in relations between Romans and Berbers.

Rather, they depicted it as an attempt 'to annihilate the Maghrebi personality'. Finally, they stressed the tenacity and resistance of the Berbers, who in other circumstances were not 'impervious' to or against foreign influence.[5]

Roman history was dropped from the new curriculum, though the history of the 'Amazigh Empire and its struggles against the Romans' was still included. This showed that the reduction in material the curricula deemed compulsory did not notably or meaningfully curtail the history of the 'other' in relation to their own history.

The image of ancient Europe is signalled through a global approach, which sometimes gives precedence to political dealings, as with the portrayal of the political structure of Athens and Sparta, sometimes to economic and social situations, as when regarding the means of production and current production conditions, and sometimes religious and cultural aspects, as with the depiction of religious thinking or of the artistic mode of thought and work procedures.

Image of Europe in relation to its medieval history

Two factors have characterized Moroccan textbooks since independence – defining oneself in relation to the other, and exalting one's own past.

In discussions on the contributions of Mesopotamia, Pharaonic Egypt, Greece and Rome to ancient civilization, each was given more or less equal weight in the textbooks, but a quite different approach was adopted when it came to looking at 'Europe' in the Middle Ages. Picturing Europe as a medieval actor allowed the authors to stress what Europe owed to Arab-Muslim civilization, to measure the radius of Islamic influence and, complementing this image of the self, to contrast it with that of a Europe lagging behind.

In the first of the three generations of textbooks the focus was basically on the inner dynamics of the European societies that gave birth to the feudal system. In the second generation, however, the spotlight shifted to relations between Europe and Islam during the Crusades, taking into account military clashes as well as commercial and cultural exchanges. This approach resulted in a series of very contrasting images.

The first of these images, linked to the Merovingian era, depicted Europe as 'obscure' at a time when the 'impulses of civilization have fallen to the lowest level of decadence'. The second, more positive, image was of the revival of the cities and formation of the European kingdoms that brought down feudalism and generated an urban class of merchants and craftsmen, the so-called 'fourth order',[6] at the heart of 'Christian European society'. The third image related to the Crusades.

In the first and second generations of history books, just after a lesson on the Crusades, a section was devoted to the influences of Islamic civilization on Europe. In the current textbooks, however, these have been conflated into a single lesson entitled 'The Crusades: conflict and contact between civilizations'. In addition, there is a dossier of supplementary texts and sources (equivalent in length to one lesson) devoted to the 'dialogue between civilizations'.

What message did the narrative on the Crusades convey? Whereas the 1970s' textbooks explicitly placed responsibility for these events on the papacy, 'which called for the Crusades to bring the Christians together under its banner to the detriment of the Muslim world'[7] and 'incited Christians to attack the Muslims with the aim of despoiling their Bait-al-Maqdis', the Muslims' holy place in Jerusalem, the second and third generation of textbooks (1987 and 2002) only voiced this responsibility indirectly through Pope Urban II's famous appeal on 27 November 1095.[8] On the other hand, whereas the authors of the earlier textbooks had no compunctions about describing the Crusaders as 'savages' or 'barbarians' and their actions as 'pillage' and 'theft',[9] the authors of the third-generation of textbooks refrained from using that type of vocabulary.

What we witness here is an interesting move. If today's educational discourse on 'conflict' is void of historically unbefitting terms, the discourse on 'civilization', once exclusively devoted to 'influences of Muslim civilization on the Christian Occident', seems anxious to argue against the notion of a 'clash of civilizations' by furthering the idea of a dialogue between civilizations.[10] As the conception of a dialogue of civilizations is a fairly recent development, the idea of the advance of Islam on the Christian Occident and the formative part played by

Arab-Muslim civilization in the Renaissance of Western Europe is persistently present. The following quotations from first-generation books make clear this approach:

- 'As compared to Muslims, Europeans were in a state of cultural retardation.'[11]
- 'This Renaissance … was but the fruit of what the Muslims transplanted into Christian countries.'[12]
- 'If the Europeans had not drawn heavily from the sources of Islamic civilization, science and art, they would never have found a way out of the backward state in which they had been locked all through the Medieval Ages when the torch of development and progress was held by Muslim hands.'[13]

Obviously, medieval history was read with a view to delivering the prestige of the past, which could reassure pupils from a country that resented the West. History textbooks aim to subdue such resentment, to render comfort to readers about their heritage. It is important to note that such reassurance and comfort were not intended to put up a barrier against Western values. On the contrary, their purpose was to create a psychological predisposition that made it easier to accept those values because Islam was projected as initiating European modernity. As von Grunebaum stated:

> For the receiving community, it is a characteristic tendency to interpret changes (whether through conquest or progress) coming from outside the community to be home grown. In general, the psychological obstacles inherent in accepting change are quickly lowered once it is understood to be one's own invention. Generally speaking, the more its foreign origin is forgotten, the deeper such loans can be considered as autochthonous. A loan can be more safely assimilated when its foreign origin is forgotten. … For that reason, people wrap loans from other cultures in their own gear as it were, whenever this is possible. One such loan may be considered the recovery of a gift made to the Occident [by Muslims] many centuries before.[14]

Image of Europe in relation to its modern contemporary history

Once the psychological terrain had been prepared, it became possible to address the modern age and discuss why Europe was more progressive and why the Muslim world lagged behind. One first-generation textbook contained a comparison between European and Muslim countries. The pupil was required to grasp the gap that had been created in economics, politics and science between European countries that were characterized as 'racing ahead in scientific and economic progress', and Muslim countries in which the 'mentality of rigidity and conservatism refuse to accept any idea of evolution and renewal from the roots':[15]

> At the economic level, there has been no novel thought [in Muslim contexts] since the time of Ibn Khaldun. The horizon of the State remains restricted to agriculture and taxes. In contrast, European states moved from feudalism to capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. In politics, medieval structures inherited from the Abbasid caliphate still dominate, and there has been no innovation of political thought or public institution. In contrast, European states worked their way towards democracy and constitutional governance. Regarding science, Muslim countries halted research and renewal (*ijtihad*). In contrast, alongside major geographic discoveries, Europe threw itself into scientific research.[16]

When we compare this discourse with that of pre-colonial days,[17] when a Muslim sense of superiority over non-Muslims still prevailed in the teaching profession, it appears that admiration of Europe and feelings of inferiority were expressed only when dealing with antiquity. Morocco's military disasters against France (at the Battle of Isly in 1844) and against Spain (at the Battle of Tétouan from 1859 to 1869), and the resentment that grew over the increase in European contacts (students and diplomatic delegations sent to Europe), burst into full disillusion during and after the colonial era. After that, the historical ideal was no longer located in the past but in Europe, causing the vision of history to become relatively 'secular'. In a society in which

tradition and modernity reciprocally impede and compete with one another, the point of the above quotation is obvious. Geared towards the future, it does not seek to reproduce the tradition it criticizes. Wishing to modify society, it invokes ideals with concepts such as industrialization, constitutional democracy and rational culture. Entrenched rigidity and conservatism are condemned; hope is placed in the intellectual elite to perform the transition from traditional society to modernity.

Except for the Renaissance and Enlightenment, Moroccan text-books accord more attention to the economic, social and sometimes political dimensions of European history. The cultural aspects seem to capture the attention of textbook authors only when they are of universal reach. Thus, the Renaissance was an exception because it allowed the sparkle of Arab-Muslim civilization to be glorified and Islamic core values to be highlighted. The authors of the textbooks understood the European encounter with antiquity as the input for modernity, namely the promotion of man in the light of his own development, a refocusing on scientific and critical minds, and the important views that led to the Reformation of the Church.[18]

With the Enlightenment came the idea of a bourgeois ideology. The great names of this period were given alongside each of their con-tributions – Voltaire with his criticism of the privileges of the Church, Montesquieu and his conception of the separation of powers, and Rousseau with his ideas of liberty, equality and sovereignty.[19]

While the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment had no reverberations in the Muslim world, the republican principles under-lying the French Revolution, which Bonaparte's 1798 expedition to Egypt forcibly introduced to Muslim territories, were able, despite resistance, to overcome Islam's intellectual defences. However, even though the Egyptian campaign came as a shock, its vibrations were not felt in the Maghreb prior to the Algerian expedition of 1830. Knowl-edge of the French Revolution was only brought to Morocco with the introduction of colonial schooling, yet schools in independent Morocco continued to offer the subject across the two levels of secon-dary education. In my opinion this had less to do with pedagogy than with diplomacy (in other words, with maintaining good relations with

France). Moroccan textbooks often compared the importance of the French Revolution with the economic impact of Britain's Industrial Revolution. They equate the French Revolution with the birth of a new political conscience, the liberation of the masses from feudal constraints, the development of private initiative, the spread of the revolutionary spirit outside France, the foundation of a public school system, and freedom of thought and speech.

The first- and second-generation textbooks set out European history in chronological order. Only in the latest generation of textbooks is the approach more structural, with the Mediterranean region taken as an observation base and 'the general transformations of the Mediterranean world and the construction of modernity from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century' brought into focus. Even if the concept of modernity is not new to Moroccan textbooks, its selection as a concept with which to structure history lessons signals an unprecedented step forward, allowing space for two novel preoccupations. Clothed in the language of the textbooks, these are:

> First, divergent transformations in the Mediterranean world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and maintaining a balance between Western Europe and the Muslim world. The textbook investigates the general evolution of Western Europe on the one hand and that of the Muslim world on the other, with the aim of outlining the gap between the two on their march towards modernity. Second, the evolution of the Mediterranean world in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with a view of the imbalance between Western Europe and the Muslim world. While the former succeeded in consolidating its place in modernity, the latter suffered from European pressure, and, due to its limited reforms, failed to escape European domination.[20]

It is emphasized that the discrepancy between the Muslim world and European West is, in the modern era, the product of scientific and technological progress achieved by the latter together with the spread of rational thought, humanism and the printing press.[21] Multiple

factors are claimed to be responsible for the Muslim world being behind Europe. The textbooks enumerate internal and external causes – political, socio-economic, intellectual and technical, as well as ecological ones (like natural catastrophes and epidemics). Pupils are invited to analyse these issues with the help of additional documents that highlight four factors in particular – the fact that the Muslim world turned away from the oceans the moment Europe started to control them; the late introduction of the printing press; monetary inflation; and finally the fact that the few reforms implemented were clothed in officialdom and therefore unable to secure sufficient social support to ensure their success.

The positive image of Europe is tarnished by another image, namely Europe the imperialist. Here, the ambivalence we already encountered in the study of early ancient and medieval Europe resurfaces. When discussing imperialism, the textbooks reveal a Europe that 'exploits' and 'pillages' the wealth of other regions and peoples of the world, a Europe that, while making 'geographic discoveries', exterminated the American Indians and their civilizations. According to the textbooks, European intervention impeded the natural development of African societies: 'in particular, the phenomenon of slavery curbed development of the African continent and weakened its capacity for production and resistance, thus leaving the door open for all sorts of modern colonizations with which the peoples of Africa have been familiar throughout the nineteenth century and after.'[22] The 1970 textbook adds: 'this is how foreign intervention in West Africa triggered the collapse of its economic foundation, disorganized its social structure and drove political organizations into decline.'[23] The 1987 textbook states: 'and whereas the triangular trade enriched Europe, it squandered and plundered the African continent and its inhabitants.'[24]

Although the authors were highly critical of Europe, they took a much milder position, especially in the most recent textbooks, when they dealt with the specific case of France during the protectorate period in Morocco.[25] In discussions about this period, the new textbooks continuously placed weight on *the struggle for independence and the implementation of territorial unity*. Despite watering down its effects,[26] the protectorate was presented as a privileged moment in Moroccan

history, representing one of the 'spaces where symbols of historical awareness could be negotiated and manufactured'.[27]

A symbol of that historical consciousness, which is more apparent now than ever before, is national territory, an entity that transcends time and players. The protectorate period offered textbook writers an opportunity to draw students' attention to that national space by presenting it as the centre of the world, worthy of devotion and sacrifice. To grant it a federal role, it was presented as a cult object (not a bone of contention) that needed protecting from foreign covetousness and its preservation or liberation warranting whatever sacrifices were required.

The new textbooks highlighted national issues and concealed the social questions that dogged the old ones. They made no mention of Moroccans aiding and abetting the French protectorate (1912–46), of the prominent people who supported the French administration, or of those who profited from the adoption of a capitalist economy dependent on the European marketplace. There was also no mention of the far-reaching economic, social and cultural changes in Morocco at that time, not even to denounce the colonial occupation. Armed or political opposition was presented as spontaneous expressions of Moroccan nationalism, regarded less as a historical fact to be analysed than as a natural phenomenon to be narrated. By this logic the treatment of the protectorate regime in both zones, French and Spanish, could only be superfluous.[28] The neglect of this period of history can only be explained by the fact that the Moroccan monarchy was 'limited to its purely ceremonial function' and the French held all the effective power.[29]

In the new textbooks, unlike the earlier ones, no attempt was made to assess the protectorate. Indeed, in one of the oldest textbooks the point was made that colonization forced the economic dependence of Morocco on foreign countries, particularly on France. It was pointed out that:

- the formation of a communications network made it easier to control the country and to transport agricultural and mining resources towards the ports;

- the colonizers, while introducing modern agriculture, took hold of the best land and neglected local needs, making difficult the export of products; and
- they created an industry that was mainly based on mining and therefore transformed Morocco into a country that exported raw materials and imported manufactured products.

The textbook went on to detail how colonial exploitation distorted the Moroccan economy and society. There was special mention of the growing social inequality, as well as of the disparity between the size of the rural population and agricultural production, which eventually resulted in a rural exodus.

Finally, the authors made it clear that colonization created not only victims but also victors, whom they referred to as 'privileged' people – the so-called *kaid*s, who took over large landholdings to the detriment of collective ownership, and the upper classes who engaged in commerce and financial speculation. Contrary to these earlier assessments, there was no attempt made in the most recent textbooks to judge the period of the protectorate.

As one might expect, there was a lot of political interest behind this position. In 1998, prior to the enforcement of the Mekachera law of 23 February 2005,[30] which was to ensure that the 'positive role' played by colonization was given due recognition in school curricula, a symposium on 'Rethinking the protectorate' ('*Repenser le protectorat*') was organized to analyse this period objectively. Another, 'From the protectorate to independence' ('*Du Protectorat à l'indépendance*') was held after the Mekachera law had been adopted. Although several French participants voiced their condemnation of the legislation, the Moroccan participants refrained from open protest; and their restraint was mirrored in the Moroccan textbooks on France, the colonizer. Charles de Gaulle, for instance, was never depicted as either a 'colonizer' or as antagonistic to national movements. Yet, since the authors of these textbooks were unable to depict him as being open to such movements, their approach remained sterile. The exceptional stature of the general who refused to allow his country to capitulate to the Nazis, even when all appeared to be lost, was not adopted as a model of

heroism or patriotism either, no doubt in an attempt to obviate the fear that it could cast a shadow on Moroccan national heroes or nullify student feelings of rejection by the colonial *métropole*.

Conclusions

In response to my initial question at the beginning of this chapter, the image of European history that textbooks conveyed to secondary-school pupils in Morocco was, to say the least, ambivalent: in certain contexts Europe was depicted as an acceptable model and in others as an unacceptable one.

If it were a matter of Europe *per se* that was being discussed, a positive image was often projected. The authors accentuated the acquisitions and accomplishments of the Greek and Roman cultures, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, as well as industrialization and modernization; they glorified modernity and democracy and Europe's history served to render homage to those values.

When it came to dealing with Europe's relationships with others, by contrast, the image was altogether different, at times even openly negative. Chapters addressing European expansion, whether in ancient history (Romans and Vandals), medieval history (Crusades), modern history (geographical discoveries), or contemporary history (European intervention in the Ottoman Empire or in West Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) seemed to hold Europe responsible for all the colonial ills – the collapse of wealth, slowing down of development and sometimes even extermination of these societies. At the same time, we saw that the stance to this negative image was moderated, even distinctly toned down in the current textbooks, compared with those of the first and second generation. The most recent generation of textbooks, written after 11 September 2001 and the 16 May 2003 bombings in Casablanca, were less inclined to tarnish the image of Europe and more disposed towards highlighting factors that might be conducive to dialogue and an opening up towards the 'other'.

As we have seen, with cycles of nationalist history marking the descriptions of Europe, speaking about the other necessarily implied speaking about oneself. Such ethnocentrism appeared in the quasi-elimination of medieval European history, in the exaltation of Muslim

civilization just prior to a section dealing with the Renaissance, and the excision of the cultural dimension from European history. Nevertheless, this kind of European history implicitly helped to Westernize generations of young Moroccans and, in certain respects, provided them with a model with which to identify.

Finally, I should point out that the first and second generation of history books were geared towards historical narrative and delivered a finished historical 'product', without giving students an opportunity to build their own knowledge, while the third generation of textbooks, by contrast, was more geared towards fostering independent thinking. The image of Europe was no longer communicated through a ready-made narrative and the didactic framework allowed students to compile their own images.

It is clear that the Moroccan textbooks reproduced stereotyped views, particularly of medieval Europe. In three generations of textbooks (spanning a period of more than three decades), which saw a significant revitalization of European history writing, especially on feudalism and the Crusades, Moroccan authors retained a rather frozen approach. No reappreciation of the history of Europe, or indeed even of Morocco, seems yet to have found its way into the school books. The reformers of history education presently seem more preoccupied with *how to teach* than with *what to teach*.

This imbalance is a major source of frustration. The authors' attempts to make new from old have only served to market a mostly outdated historical discourse.

Secondary education textbooks analysed in the text: sample used for first level of study

Grade	Generation 1	Generation 2	Generation 3
1st year	National Ministry of Education, *Atari al-Kadim* [*Ancient history*] Casablanca: Dar Attakafa/Dar Al Kitab, n.d.	National Ministry of Education, *Attarikh* [*History*] Casablanca: Dar Annachr Al Maghribiyya, 1991.	Chakir Akki et al., *Fi Rihab al Ijtimaiyyat* [*In the sphere of social sciences*] Casablanca: Maktabat Assalam Al Jadida/Addar Al Alamiyya Lilkitab, 2003.
2nd year	National Ministry of Education, *Attarikh al-Wassit* [*History of the Middle Ages*] Casablanca: Dar Annachr Al Maghribiyya, 1972.	National Ministry of Education, *Attarikh* [*History*] Casablanca: Dar Attakafa, 1992.	Chakir Akki et al., *Manar al Ijtimaiyyat* [*Guide to social sciences*] Casablanca: Top Edition, 2004.
3rd year	National Ministry of Education, *Tarikh al-Alam al-Hadith* [*History of the modern world*] Casablanca: Dar Annachr Al Maghribiyya, n.d.	National Ministry of Education, *Attarikh* [*History*] Casablanca: Dar Annachr Al Maghribiyya, 1993.	Chakir Akki et al., *Manar al Ijtimaiyyat* [*Guide to social sciences*] Casablanca: Top Edition, 2005.

Sample used for the second level of study

Grade	Generation 1	Generation 2	Generation 3
1st year	National Ministry of Education, *Tarikh al-Asr al-Hadith* [*History of the modern era*] Rabat: Dar Nachr Al Maarifa, 1988.	National Ministry of Education, *Attarikh* [*History*] Rabat: Matbaat Al Maarif Al Jadida, n.d.	M. A. Kadiri et al., *Fi Rihab Attarikh* [*In the sphere of history*] Casablanca: Maktabat Assalam Al Jadida/Addar Al Alamiyya Lilkitab, 2005.
2nd year	National Ministry of Education, *Tarikh al-Alam fi al-Karn 19* [*History of the world in the nineteenth century*] Casablanca: Dar Attakafa, n.d.	National Ministry of Education, *Attarikh* [*History*] Rabat: Matbaat Al Maarif Al Jadida, 1995.	M. A. Kadiri et al., *Fi Rihab Attarikh* [*In the sphere of history*] Casablanca: Maktabat Assalam Al Jadida/Addar Al Alamiyya Lilkitab, 2006.
3rd year	National Ministry of Education, *Tarikh al-Alam fi al-Karn 20* [*History of the world in the twentieth century*] Casablanca: Dar Al Kitab, 1985.	National Ministry of Education, *Attarikh* [*History*] Casablanca: Dar Arrachad Alhadita, 1996.	Textbooks to be provided as from 2007/2008.

Notes

1. The Moroccan school system should be regarded as an inheritance from the colonial period, for it has changed very little since independence. It comprises a first stage (six years of primary education), a second three-year stage (first level), and a third three-year stage (second level).

2. Chakir Akki et al., *Fi Rihab al Ijtimaiyyat* [*In the sphere of social sciences*], Casablanca: Maktabat Assalam Al Jadida/Addar Al Alamiyya Lilkitab, 2003, p. 18.

3. As a geographical designation, the Maghreb covers North Africa west of Libya and includes Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. As a political concept, the Union of the Arab Maghreb also includes Libya and Mauritania.

4. Before the last textbook reform, textbook authors freely used the term 'Berber'. The word described the autochthonous population of the Maghreb and was itself a heritage from Greek-Roman and Arab-Islamic historiography. But members of this group nowadays experience 'Berber' as belittling and prefer the word Amazigh ('free man').

5. Mostafa Hassani Idrissi, *Visions du passé et fonctions idéologiques dans l'enseignement contemporain de l'histoire au Maroc*, doctoral thesis in the Didactics of History, Geography and Social Sciences (1982: Paris IV) 'Le Maghreb et les Romains', pp. 55–61.

6. The three other orders consisted of the clergy, the noblemen and the principals of state.

7. National Ministry of Education, *Attarîkh al-Wassit* [*History of the Middle Ages*], Casablanca: Dar Annachr Al Maghribiyya, 1972, pp. 302.

8. Might one consider Pope Jean-Paul II's visit to Casablanca on 19 August 1985 as something that brought back this memory?

9. National Ministry of Education, *History of the Middle Ages*, 1972, pp. 304, 307.

10. Chakir Akki et al., *Fi Rihab al Ijtimaiyyat* [*In the sphere of social sciences*], Casablanca: Maktabat Assalam Al Jadida/Addar Al Alamiyya Lilkitab, 2003, pp. 76–8.

11. National Ministry of Education, *History of the Middle Ages*, 1972, p. 327.

12. National Ministry of Education, *Tarîkh al-Alam al-Hadîth* [*History of the modern world*], Casablanca: Dar Annachr Al Maghribiyya, n.d., p. 130.

13. National Ministry of Education, *History of the Middle Ages*, 1972, p. 335.

14. G. E. von Grunebaum, *L'Identité culturelle de l'Islam*, Paris: Gallimard, 1973, pp. 2, 16.

15. National Ministry of Education, *History of the modern world*, pp. 87–8.

16. Ibid., pp. 87–8.

17. Mostafa Hassani Idrissi, *La conception de l'histoire dans l'enseignement islamique précolonial au Maroc, le Cartable de Clio*, Lausanne: LEP, no. 2, 2002, pp. 253–62.

18. National Ministry of Education, *Attarîkh* [*History*], Casablanca: Dar Annachr Al Maghribiyya, 1993, pp. 22–9.
19. Ibid., p. 138.
20. M. A. Kadiri et al., *Fi Rihab Attarikh* [*In the sphere of history*], Casablanca: Maktabat Assalam Al Jadida/Addar Al Alamiyya Lilkitab, 2005, p. 16.
21. Ibid. p. 16.
22. National Ministry of Education, *Tarîkh al-Âsr al-Hadîth* [*History of the modern era*], Rabat: Dar Nachr Al Maarifa, 1988, p. 123.
23. Ibid., p. 123.
24. Ibid., p. 12 and Kadiri et al., *In the sphere of history*, 2005, p. 173.
25. A protectorate is another form of colonial subjugation. The difference with colonial rule is that existing institutions are continued on a formal level.
26. Mostafa Hassani Idrissi, 'Les temps du protectorat et de l'indépendance dans les programmes et les manuels d'histoire de l'enseignement secondaire au Maroc', in Mohammed Kenbib (ed.) *Du Protectorat à l'indépendance: problématique du temps présent*, Rabat: Faculty of Arts and Humanities, 2006, pp. 165–82.
27. Lucette Valensi, *Fables de la mémoire: la glorieuse bataille des trois rois*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1992, p. 238.
28. Idrissi, 'Les temps du protectorat et de l'indépendance', pp. 165–82. The textbook authors neither explain any differences between the French and Spanish systems of occupation nor offer a comparison between the two or an analysis of their evolution between 1912 and 1956.
29. Valensi, *Fables de la mémoire*, p. 238.
30. The law of 23 February 2005 recognizes the achievements of the French occupation. Article 4 demands that the curriculum recognizes the positive 'role' of the colonial period.

Chapter 9

Others or ours? The role of the popular media in public perceptions of Muslims in Russia after 9/11

Irina Kuznetsova-Morenko

The post-*perestroika* years witnessed a revival of religion in Russia that spread across the whole of the Soviet Union. This renewed interest in religion included a resurgence of Islam, evident from the existence at present of 7000 mosques in Russia (compared with 311 in 1986), 40 independent Muslim authorities, 40 Internet sites and scores of Muslim newspapers and journals. According to some sources, between 15 and 18 per cent of the Russian population are practising Muslims and, as a result, the Russian mass media are now focusing far more attention on the subject of Islam. Quite apart from that, the events of 9/11, the war in Chechnya and acts of terrorism on Russian soil further accelerated the interest of the Russian mass media in anything to do with Islam and Muslims. Several sensational reports in the media sparked off a wave of Islamophobia and seriously undermined public tolerance of Muslims.

Over the last decade, various groups of sociologists, journalists and political scientists have analysed discriminatory practices in the Russian media. One early initiative was the Hate Speech Project, which the Glasnost Foundation and the Moscow Helsinki Group supported.[1] At the moment, the SOVA Center, directed by Alexander Verkhovsky, is monitoring hate speeches in the Russian

media.[2] An analysis it made in the wake of the Beslan tragedy showed that among the regularly featured hate categories, the 'Muslim' one accounted for 12.7 per cent of negative statements, which is smaller than the 'Chechen' one (28.8 per cent), but larger than traditionally 'popular' ones like the 'Caucasians' (11.7 per cent).[3] Another group of researchers led by Elena Koltsova has analysed hate speech on the Russian-language Internet.[4]

In this chapter I shall follow up on these earlier projects, but also focus on media coverage of the Dubrovka hostage crisis in Moscow (in 2002) and on the struggle by Muslim women for the right to wear headscarves for their ID photographs (the so-called 'hijab case'), while observing political reactions to media representations. My research was based on data I gathered from content analysis of the mass media in Russia and Tatarstan between 2001 and 2004, in-depth interviews with journalists, and interviews with Muslim leaders.[5]

The Dubrovka hostage crisis in Moscow: 'warriors of Allah' or terrorists?

On 23 October 2002, as theatre-goers attended a musical production of *Nord-Ost* in Moscow, hostage takers held them captive and demanded that the government end the war in the Chechen Republic. The special operation mounted to free the hostages claimed 129 lives. The so-called Dubrovka hostage crisis (named after the street in which the theatre is located) was only one of a series of 'ostentatious' crimes that Chechen insurgents had committed in Russia over a period of several years. In other incidents of this nature the insurgents bombed apartments on Pushkinskaya Square in Moscow, set off explosions during a rock festival in Tushino, captured hostages in Kizlyar and Pervomaisk, bombed houses in Buinaksk and Kaispiysk, disrupted a celebratory march in Dagestan on 9 May 2002, and captured hostages *en masse* in a school in Beslan.

An 'Islamic' strand is perceived to run through all these acts of terrorism, connecting them to the ideology of the Chechen separatist movement. The capture of hostages during the *Nord-Ost* musical was the first large-scale operation in which Chechens deployed *kamikaze* women to perform the deed as an act of self-sacrifice in the name of

Islam. As one of its leaders, Aslan Maskhadov, declared: 'The Chechen people are conducting a national war of liberation against tyrants, (performing) the great Jihad on the path of Allah, (fighting) against what is actually a godless, atheist country.'

During and after the event of 23 October, other political agendas got caught up in the incident and, besides the hostage takers' demand to the Russian government to end the war, further action seems to have been taken to increase ethno-religious tension in the Russian Republic. As a result, the general public was fed a wide range of different media reports, including continuous updates on the Dubrovka situation, statements about the inconsistent positions of Russian politicians and the population at large, as well as reports by news analysts who freely commented on the operation being mounted to free the hostages.

Using content analysis, I looked at Russian and Tatar publications between October 2002 and December 2003 on the Dubrovka hostage crisis. In all, I identified 71 articles in federal Russian newspapers but only six in the local Tatar press. The reporters' lack of access to direct sources of information on the Dubrovka crisis and their prudence over matters concerning the interaction of terrorists with radical groups explains the low coverage in the Tatar press. In fact, the Tatar press only covered news headlines on the events in Dubrovka.

Throughout Russia media coverage of the Islamic factor in the Dubrovka (*Nord-Ost*) crisis was divided as follows: articles (54.7 per cent), short pieces of information (12.5 per cent), and official news (7.8 per cent), and this division reflected the average statistical distribution of material in the press. The high drama of the incident meant that the news items appeared on the first, second and last pages of each edition. Material was often found in 'chronicles of the incident' (40.3 per cent) and news headlines (35.5 per cent). The event offered the journalists involved a major opportunity to express their viewpoints on Islam.

Because headlines encourage readers to adopt a particular view of the information offered, I paid special attention to them in the research. The number of Islamophobic headlines was substantial,

2.8 1.4

23.9

70

Figure 9.1: Types of headlines on *Nord-Ost* in the Russian press.

covering about a quarter of the material, or 85 per cent from among
headlines mentioning the Islamic component (see Figure 9.1). Thus,
negative perceptions of Muslims and Islam coloured a significant
proportion of all material that made an explicit reference to the Islamic
factor in the Dubrovka hostage crisis.

The religious marking of the act became manifest in four different
ways:

• the use of Muslim terminology,
• suggestions that international Islamic organizations were involved,
• highlighting Islamic ideology as one of the main sources of the
  Chechen–Russian conflict (ethno-religious marking), and
• a discourse on *shahid* women.

First, the majority of reports on the *Nord-Ost* crisis used the term
shahid – a title for Muslims who have died fulfilling a religious com-
mandment or waging war for Islam – to refer to the terrorists.
Overexposure of the word *shahid* in the mass media transformed it into
a symbol of threat, in some cases at the suggestion of the state services
involved. For example, some popular newspapers carried statements
by special service employees to the effect that they would wrap the
terrorists' corpses in pork skins because, as they saw it, Islamic
tradition stated that 'a real *shahid* should not be touched by them'; as

one journalist blared – 'Hero in a pork skin: Baraev will not go to Allah.'[6]

Second, the presence of foreign terrorist organizations proclaiming to pursue Islamic ends was assigned a separate role in reports on the *Nord-Ost* tragedy and mentioned in 42 per cent of the material. The following is a typical example of the kind of discourse found in this category: 'Operating under modern conditions, such actions (*Nord-Ost*) are cynically remunerated by international Islamic funds and organizations. The greater their operational scale, the more it is funded.'[7]

Al-Qaeda was mentioned in 37.9 per cent of the material in this category, and the Muslim Brothers in 6.9 per cent. In single instances I also came across the Jamaat, the Islamic Jihad, the High Council of the Islamic Revolution, the Martyrs of al-Aqsa and other organizations.[8] Some 17.3 per cent of the articles directly stated that Russian Muslims communicated with foreign radical movements. The majority of popular newspapers carried the following statement purported to have come from Osama Bin Laden: 'The "№1 terrorist" has claimed that all operations that have been carried out …, as well as the capture of hostages in Moscow, are answers of Muslims protecting their religion.'[9]

Representations of foreign (non-Russian) Islam associated with terrorism in the mass media differ markedly from those of Russian Islam. *There* (in hostile foreign Muslim communities) people collect donations in mosques, implying that being a Muslim has an active element, whereas *here* Islam appears as a declaration, often as the performance of a clergy condemning terrorism. As a result, in the information society, Russian Islam is deprived of its most vital elements – community, the human factor and being 'a thing in itself'. Russian Islam is depicted as a kind of idealistic construction, a tribute to democratic freedom of conscience, but an institute behind which the community disappears. Under modern Russian conditions this is also a characteristic of other religions. Thus, the Islam represented in the mass media is the Islam from the Near East and the Caucasus.

Third, ethno-religious marking is present in practically all the Russian material on the *Nord-Ost* hostage affair. In this respect, the mass media make ample use of the cliché that stresses the ethno-

religious colouring of the Russian-Chechen opposition. While the
words 'Islam' and 'Muslim' are associated with Chechens in 50.7 per
cent of the texts, the authors speak of Russian Muslims in only 25.3
per cent of them. The ethno-religious discourse came up not only in
articles on demonstrations that showed the peaceful character of
Islam and in which a majority of Russian Muslims took part, but also
in articles that discussed the threat that Islam posed. Chechen
phobia, which is widespread in Russian society, puts a strain on
information strategies that try to overcome negative stereotypes of
the Chechens.

As I mentioned earlier, data on the Dubrovka hostage crisis were
gathered in a separate research sample and I found the Islamic factor
presented in a range of different ways. The authors mentioned Muslim
criminal and military activities in the majority of reports published on
the *Nord-Ost* drama (54.8 per cent and 16.4 per cent respectively). In
attempting to explain how this tragedy could have happened in the
heart of the Russian capital, 16 per cent of the reports considered it in
the context of Muslim religious behaviour. Of these, 17 per cent
equated Muslim conduct with terrorism and 8.5 per cent made a direct
connection between Islam and terrorism. The press claimed that Aslan
Maskhadov's[10] representatives had referred to Movsar Baraev[11] as the
commander of an Islamic special regiment. Olga Allenova, a journalist
for the magazine *Vlast*, took a different line by pointing out that
'nobody has noticed that for some years already the Muslim world has
itself become a hostage to the terrorists.'[12]

Fourth, it is a convention in journalism to thread 'positive' images
into core reports for use as information 'markers', and this was evident
in the treatment of events in Dubrovka: such 'markers' were placed on
'special' hostages like the children's doctor and peacemaker, Leonid
Roshal. At the other extreme were reports on the suicide of the
hostage takers, who happened to receive most of the attention, on the
other.

Among the 50 terrorists killed, 18 were women, none older than 23
years. Chechen insurgents deliberately use women in war and the *Nord-
Ost* tragedy was only one of 13 acts of terrorism carried out by women
in Russia. The Russian mass media were quick to pick up on the

gender aspect as a typically Chechen feature; witness, for example, the following two remarks – 'The trade mark of Baraev: he uses women *kamikaze*';[13] 'The terrorist war against Russia has a specifically female face that is not present in any other country of the world exposed to attacks by religious extremists.'[14]

In May 2003, several Chechen women suspected of having recruited *shahid* women for the *Nord-Ost* hostage drama were arrested in Ulus-Kert. The women, whom the press immediately labelled as the recruiters, provided the mass media with a convenient starting point for 'an ongoing story' about the lives of *shahid* women and their families, with a special focus on what induced them to commit the act, the arrest of their alleged recruiters and some other details that had no direct bearing on the criminal case. This resulted in an image of *shahid* women as vocal and highly emotional, and it helped to fill an informational vacuum surrounding the subjects and the underlying reasons for the tragedy.

As an example of the exceptional uses made of the image of *shahid* women to attract readers' attention, on 29 October 2002 a lengthy article under the heading 'A *shahid* named Life' appeared in *The Arguments and the Facts*. The story was about two hostages who managed to run away, but only in one paragraph was there any allusion to the title of the article, namely a *shahid* Chechen woman named Aisha, which means 'life'.

Another reason for the heightened attention to *shahid* terrorist women is the so-called Palestinization of the terrorism syndrome, which suggests the phenomenon of getting used to terror as well as to propagating fatalism, a trend that affects not only individual citizens but also the mass media. The Russian media tend to steer away both from the victims' memories of terrorist acts and from the original causes of terrorism. As one journalist put it, 'If God or Providence wants to kill you, why should you want to penetrate into the original causes of the acts of *shahid*s and *shahid* women? Fatalism discolours the ideological palette of the terrorist war and depreciates its political purposes.'[15]

The popular newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (*KP*) also gave much attention to *shahid* women by using its readers' interest in the issue to

reverse certain myths. The day after the act, *KP* reported that 'as a rule the women are hired for money, are far removed from any idea of a blood feud and, contrary to their usual depiction on television, have absolutely no romantic illusions. Frequently they are not even Muslim.'[16] Before the anniversary of the Dubrovka drama, the *KP* published a fragment from a book, *The Brides of Allah*, by the journalist Julia Juzik. How are, the writer asks, young Chechen women transformed into 'living bombs'? Her answer is as follows:

> The first conclusion: out of ten '*shahid* women', only one will be real – ideologically speaking, by all means wishing to revenge and be lost. The other nine – are bluff. … I also have inform-ation that the leaders who were responsible for forming the group received the directive to recruit ample '*shahid* women', which is very well financed.[17]

Thus, in some cases, the Russian press implicitly recognizes the *ideological* and *criminal* roots of this violence, but does not discuss it directly or explicitly.

To conclude, the image of *shahid* women constructed by the media has as much, if not more, influence on the formation of negative perceptions of Muslims as the discourse on foreign extremist groups.

The image of Russian Muslims in the 'hijab case' in the Russian and Tatarstan mass media

The next most important issue in the lives of Russian Muslims after their association in the media with the 'foreign' criminal activities of radical movements must surely be the so-called 'hijab case', in which Muslim women struggled for the right to wear headscarves for their passport photographs. The campaign, which began in May 2002, was initiated by the Union of Muslim Women of Tatarstan and led by Almira Adiatullina, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Muslima* (*Muslim Woman*). The plaintiffs' case was that, according to Islamic tradition, it is considered immodest for Muslim women to be seen in public without a scarf. In pressing for their demand, the women's representatives evoked the Russian constitution and appealed to the

Tatarstan Republic, both of which guarantee religious liberty to their citizens and neither of which forbids devotional acts. They also appealed to a number of national and international charters on human rights.

Within the year, there had been several judicial hearings on the affair and the case was even heard in the supreme courts of both the Tatarstan Republic and the Russian Federation. The request had been rejected on the grounds that it was important to uphold a Ministry of Internal Affairs ruling that applicants needed to present 'black-and-white photographs without a headscarf' if they wished to obtain a passport. On 15 May 2003, however, the case was resolved when the decision was taken in the Russian supreme court that if religious convictions were at stake it was permissible to wear a headscarf for a passport photograph.

The 'hijab case' provided the mass media with a model for representing Russian Muslims. As one journalist who followed the affair noted, it threw an interesting light on a 'special novelty' and it was an 'ongoing story'. The case can be studied from the following different angles: the stereotypes and prejudices journalists and readers harbour towards Muslims; journalistic professionalism; the ethno-religious strategies of the central and Tatar authorities; the civic position of the Muslim clergy; and the ways in which the Muslim community responds to such information.

The struggle for the right to be photographed in a headscarf for one's passport acted as a basic directive, receiving several contrasting interpretations in its journalistic treatment. Although in 41.6 per cent of cases it was presented in the form of neutral information, in 27.5 per cent it served to illustrate Muslim fundamentalism and a deviation from Russian norms of good practice, in 10 per cent it was caricatured as a curious or amusing incident, in 7.5 per cent it was perceived as being open to abuse, not only by believers but by criminal elements who might take advantage of the provision, and in only 2.5 per cent was it used to demonstrate the struggle of Muslim women to uphold their civil rights as a natural requirement. The Tatar mass media, however, was far more tolerant in its representation of the case (see Figure 9.2).

Figure 9.2: Types of journalistic treatments of 'the case of the hijabs' (%).

Representations of the 'hijab case' as a display of Muslim fundamentalism carried the assumption that a *shariah* norm had become established in secular law. The word *hijab* (as opposed to 'headscarf') appeared more often in these texts than elsewhere and newspaper or magazine articles would be given headings like – 'The Russian passport is amended according to Muslim law';[18] or 'The court considers *shariah* norms'.[19] In fact, there was a report in *Isvestiya* to the effect that 'after the judicial decision to allow Muslim women to be photographed for their passport in scarves/hijabs, the leaders of the Russian Muslims, encouraged by their success, brought up the question of Islamic principles in the economy.'[20] A recurring theme in many *Isvestiya* reports on the 'hijab case', written, typically, not by the Kazan staff reporter, but by the Moscow journalist Georgy Bovt, was already apparent in the first article he wrote on the subject:

> From a particularly innocent 'cultural logic' that requires one to cover one's head for a passport photograph … the logical chain is not all that long. Next they will demand – also through the courts – to amend the school programme according to the Koran and separate boys and girls in class. Then, according to the same norms, they will demand that many other norms of Russian conduct and professional life are corrected and this will be realized in many different spheres. In the *madrasah*s, the training of the Chechen fighting groups' future civil guardsmen

will be started openly (instead of underground as it is now). 'Charitable' funds will be created. … And then we are close to and in for a new 11 September.[21]

From the viewpoint of spreading intolerant attitudes towards Muslims, this position is most dangerous, for it creates an 'image of the enemy'.

Incidentally, most of the Russian press disregarded the fact that the Moscow Helsinki Group and Committee for the Protection of Human Rights of Tatarstan supported the Tatar Muslim women. According to a report in the newspaper *Respublica Tatarstan*, Dmitry Vohmjanin, the chairman of the committee, noted that 'in Russia, Muslim people are a significant part of the citizens of this country. Not to take into account their religious rights would mean ignoring international law and the constitution of the Russian Federation.'[22]

One individual position that is worthy of comment linked the Muslim women's struggle to the use of the ethno-religious factor by Tatarstan's ruling elites to counteract pressure from the federal centre.[23] The press not only exploited the case in hand, but also graded the ethno-political components of the conflict: in particular, attention was given to how much or how little support the president of the Tatarstan Republic, Mintimer Shaymiev, the chairman of the Tatar parliament, Farid Muhametshin, and the deputy of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan, Flura Ziatdinova gave to the women.

The weak press coverage of Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Kazan at the end of August 2002, when he referred to the affair as 'a fashion that is present today but tomorrow will be gone', revealed an absence of any attempt to acknowledge federal opposition to the conflict. Only in Tatarstan did the mass media adopt his position. The federal media spoke with a much more critical voice, saying that 'Muslim women ask not to confuse religion with fashion [and that] Tatar women await President Putin's apologies.'[24]

Another relevant issue, which the mass media failed to engage with was the treatment of the 'hijab case' as a political concession to the Muslim population of Russia. As the *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* reports:

There is an impression that the last bloody acts of terrorism in

the Chechen Republic have compelled the federal authorities
to make a number of political concessions. First, yesterday it
became known that the president of Russia has submitted for
consideration to the Spiritual Board of Muslims a project on
'the announcement of amnesty in connection with the accep-
tance of the Constitution of the Chechen Republic' … today
the Russian authorities least of all look at the experience of
the West. The main task of the Kremlin is just somehow to
ensure the stability of a society, of which Muslims make up a
significant part.[25]

Figure 9.3: Types of headlines (%).

The most explicit messages in the mass media were conveyed
through headlines, the majority of which neither associated Muslim
women with terrorist organizations nor presented Islam as a direct
threat, but they did contain a significant amount of irony (see Figure
9.3).

Irony provided a 'culturally-pertinent' show of aggression whenever
the focus shifted to a peaceful matter, with remarks like: 'Mask, I do
not know you!',[26] 'Take off that hat!',[27] or 'The main thing is a well-
fitting hijab!'[28] Interestingly, such headings often concealed completely
neutral information. In other words, the headlines attracted the special
attention of readers and encouraged them to respond ironically. In the
central press, a number of articles also carried Islamophobic headings

like 'White headscarves: the passport photograph can cause Islamic fanaticism'.[29]

A journalist from Tatarstan whom I interviewed told me that whenever there was copy to be prepared on 'scandalous' events, the Moscow journalists always took centre stage and never the staff reporters who were familiar with the situation on the ground. As he put it: 'He wrote with the usual Moscow aplomb about the matter. Well, you know, you have come, you have seen, you have looked the people over; it seems to you as if you have written, but you have not penetrated the depth, into the essence, but counted that beneath your dignity.'

The classical components of rumour creation, namely levelling, sharpening and assimilation, were present in the negative stereotyping of Muslims in the 'hijab case'. The process of rumour creation involves reducing a complex phenomenon to several familiar attributes, and then according those attributes more meaning than they had in the complex structure.[30] The image that such levelled and sharpened attributes creates has a special psychological impact on individuals.

On the whole, press coverage of the 'hijab case' conveyed a hostile image of Muslim women, although the enmity was frequently oblique. How was this 'image of the enemy' constructed? I found that the process contained the following four components:

- First, direct associations were made between Russian Muslim and Middle Eastern Muslim women invoked by words like *yashmak*[31] or '*harem*', which had no bearing on the issue – for example, 'Muslim women want to be photographed in the yashmak';[32] or 'It will not come down to the yashmak'.[33] By drawing on a deep-rooted stereotype in the consciousness of the majority of citizens, namely that the (Russian) Muslim East poses a potential threat, such inferences reinforced a negative image of Muslim women.
- Second, familiar lines from a popular Soviet film, *The White Sun of Wilderness*, were used in newspaper reports, particular in headlines. They placed the scene in the context of the Red Army's struggle to

establish Soviet authority in Central Asia. In the film, the wives of the defeated opponent wore *yashmak*s and manifested the traditional qualities of 'Eastern' women – they were portrayed as ignorant and shy. A hero in the film had fallen in love with a young woman called Gulchitay and millions of Russians were familiar with the line 'Gulchitay, reveal your face!' which journalists then changed to 'Gulchitay, cover your face!'[34] or 'Gulchitay, show us your passport!'[35] The use of this analogy had several negative consequences – it reduced the problem to comedy; it associated Russian Muslim women with a perceived 'fundamentalist East'; and it evoked the image of a *shahid* woman terrorist being condemned to death.

- Third, most of the mass media depict *shahid* women as holding staunch Islamic beliefs and being ready to assert them. Thus, women who acknowledge their belief by joining the struggle for civil rights are also seen as part of the original threat. Apart from this having become a dominant stereotype that involuntarily grips the reader, the direct identification of Muslim women struggling for the right to be photographed in a scarf with the growth of fundamentalist radicalism has had a significant impact: 'On the Internet alone there are so many opinions about the hijab – you will become engrossed. Here, terrorists from *Nord-Ost* are already remembered by bad words.'[36]

- Fourth, the next component in this correlation between images of women wearing scarves and representatives of criminal groups made reference to women terrorists who presumably had their photograph taken with their heads covered. The *Komsomolskaya Pravda* published a series of articles under the heading 'The cap of the SS Standartenfuehrer'.[37] In a lawsuit the Ansar Foundation launched against this provocation, the court hearing received no public support and the case was lost.

The Barnum effect, which is what happens when a person under the influence of respected sources opts for indistinct statements that are personally banal, can be observed in the information society that produced the 'hijab case'.[38] Also, popular newspapers failed to explain

the moral and ethical connotations of covering the head for Muslim women; journalists just referred to it as if it were a meaningless and irrational 'fact' of Islamic dogma.

There was frequent mention in the newspapers of the ethnicity of female Muslims: although the all-Russian press referred to them as 'Muslim women of Russia' in 60.6 per cent of its reports, in 45.5 per cent of them they were specifically named 'Tatar women', with 'Tatar women want to be photographed in headscarves'[39] being a fairly typical headline comment. The local press also used ethnic markers.

The various accounts of the 'hijab case' revealed a dearth of sources for acquiring data on Muslim issues. They also revealed passivity on the part of the Muslim community in coming forward with such information. In the local press, for instance, one seldom found a reference to the opinions of representatives of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan. Although Muslim activists asked the president of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaymiev, for a statement, neither the president's press service nor the Spiritual Board's management passed comment on the issue in the local mass media. This not only brings to light a shortfall in media policy on Russian Islam but also shows that Muslim leaders have no clear or uniform position, thus revealing their reluctance to contradict the dominant discourse.

The central press paid much more attention to the 'hijab case' than the Tatar media. *Izvestiya*, for instance, gave it double the amount of coverage as the popular Tatarstan newspapers *Vechernyaya Kazan* and the *Respublica Tatarstan* combined. *Izvestiya* ran expert debates and reader columns on the issue, but such a practice was absent in the local Tatar press. There was also no reaction in the popular local media to the discriminatory articles put out by the Russian press.

The representation of Islam and policy reactions
C. C. Wilson and F. Gutierrez devised a model with which to analyse discourses on marginal groups in the mass media: it was based on the observation that such discourses went through four phases – 'threat', 'confrontation', 'stereotypical representation' and 'multiculturalism'.[40] It is clear, however, that representations of Islam in the Russian mass media have still not passed beyond the 'confrontation' and 'stereo-

typical representation' stages. Even when portraying Islam in a positive light, the mass media tend to 'exoticize' the religion and its adherents.

A round table discussion that my colleagues and I organized at the Kazan House of Journalists, as well as interviews with Muslim clerics and journalists, uncovered a number of constraints in the media for democratic dialogue and problem resolution with respect to Muslims and Islamic issues. They included the following:

- journalists do not follow a uniform code of ethics;
- local journalists, who are often poorly educated, act as the conduits of political statements and policies rather than defenders of freedom of speech;
- journalists have insufficient education or practical experience to understand and work with Muslims;
- there are no local institutions to help implement the policies and media recommendations of the grand jury of the Russian Union of Journalists; and
- there is a lot of prejudice against the Muslim clergy.[41]

The political reactions to Islamophobia in the media have been different at the federal and local levels. For example, the Spiritual Board of Muslims in the Republic of Karelia (a Russian province with a very low percentage of Muslims) responded to the media coverage of the 2002 hostage crisis in Moscow by distributing a document on Russian media policy towards Islam. Then, in 2003, the Muslim Ansar Foundation of Moscow filed a lawsuit against the popular newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* for publishing an article that compared photographs in Russian ID documents of Islamic women wearing scarves with photographs of Germans wearing SS caps. Muslims from Saratov and Makhachkala sued the *Izvestiya* newspaper in 2004 over its coverage of the *Islam.ru* website. The all-Russian Muslim server *Islam.ru* monitors all articles on Islam in the Russian mass media and comments on every Islamophobic piece. The people who initiated the lawsuits clearly believed that the media were reflecting deliberate Russian policy to provoke conflict between followers of Orthodoxy

and followers of Islam. They brought the lawsuits as protests not only against specific publications but also against the wider phenomenon of Islamophobia in the Russian media, but the popular media never mentioned these allegations when covering the lawsuits. Incidentally, on 28 May 2004, the Moscow city court ruled that all newspaper comments about Muslims in Russia had been justified.

In January 2006 the Tatar parliament addressed the Russian president and Russian government on the urgent need to take steps at the federal level to prevent ethnic and religious instability in Russia. Tatarstan's deputies were able to cite repeated human rights violations motivated by ethnic and religious prejudices and accused the media of 'instilling xenophobia into public thinking' in a notorious article published in *Izvestia*[42] that accused the Tatar village of Srednyaya Yelyuzan in the Penza Province of being a Wahhabi (Salafi) base.

In March 2006 the Tatar parliament rejected a draft of the federal law, entitled 'On the principles of national policy of state', believing that its intention was primarily to defend the rights of ethnic Russians only and did not establish an all-Russian state identity. The head of the *mufti*s' board, Ravil Gaynutdin, also criticized the draft.

The general discontent of Muslims with ethnic and cultural policies in the country and the so-called 'power hierarchy' (*vertikal' vlasti*), which is particularly detested in economically developed ethnic republics like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, aggravated their fixations on the negative image of Islam in the Russian media. The relationship with the federal centre is in a state of latent conflict in which the local authorities use ethnic issues instrumentally.

Muslims who took a proactive civil position in organizations like *Islam.ru* and the Muslim Board of Karelia stood up for their rights against the dissemination of discriminatory information about Muslims. However, since civil society in Russia remains underdeveloped, such organizations remain few. Given that experts evaluate Tatarstan's democracy as one of the least developed in the country, it is hardly in a position to manifest its civil stance.

It is illegal in Russia to incite religious and ethnic hatred, which in theory entails criminal, administrative, disciplinary or any other liability prescribed by the Russian constitution, media laws and anti-extremist

laws. Besides, the Russian journalists' union has a grand jury, which is guided by Russian legislation, international regulations and the Russian journalists' code of professional ethics, and it is its duty to consider any ethical disputes that journalists might face. However, it is a commonly held view among a number of experts and independent observers that the practice of legal and ethical regulation of the Russian press is still underdeveloped. The norms of appropriate behaviour mostly remain declarations that are not enforced.

The legal and political instruments available to stop the media propagating religious intolerance have not yet succeeded in putting an end to Islamophobia. At the state level, Russian attempts to strengthen interethnic and interreligious relations and to create a comfortable environment for all religions could improve the recent situation. At the level of Muslim institutions, this implies openness of information. At the media level, it implies overcoming journalistic incompetence in highlighting religious issues and raising the ethical standards of professional journalists. The development of the latter two levels depends on civil initiative and responsibility.

Acknowledgments

Notes

1. Alexsander Verkhovsky (ed.) *Yazik moi. … Problema etnicheskoi I religioznoi neterpimosty v rossiskikh SMI* [*Me and my big mouth. … Problems of ethnic and religious intolerance in the Russian mass media*], Moscow: Panorama, 2002.

2. http://sova-center.ru

3. Alexander Verkhovsky, 'Chto Rossia dumaet ob islame?' ['What does Russia think about Islam?'], *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 29 March 2005.

4. Anon, *Yazik vrazdi v russkoiazichnom internete* [*Hate speech on the Russian language Internet*], St Petersburg: European University, 2003.

5. The Republic of Tatarstan is administratively and culturally unique. It has 3.8 million inhabitants, of which the majority is composed of ethnic Tatars (53 per cent) and Russians (39 per cent). As one of the main industrial centres of Russia, Tatarstan has large oil and gas fields, a well-developed car industry and a large chemical petroleum industry. It was also at the forefront of nationalist mobilization when the Soviet Union collapsed. From 1994 to 2000 Tatarstan considered itself a sovereign republic within the Russian confederation. The Tatars of Tatarstan adopted Islam in the tenth century. At present, it is the second largest Muslim region in Russia after Bashkortostan. Tatarstan media differ from Russian ones because of their specific attitude to interethnic and religious issues. There are many Muslim newspapers and attitudes towards Islam in the region are more tolerant than in the Russian press. These features make a comparison between the representation of Islam in the Russian and Tatarstan press very interesting.

6. Elizaveta Maetnaya, '"Viryaz" v svinnoi shkure: Baraev k Allakhu ne popadet' ['"Hero" in a pork skin: Baraev will not get to Allah'], *Moscowsky Komsomolez*, 30 October 2002.

7. Anon., 'Chuji scenery', *Profile*, 28 October 2002.

8. These also included 'the Islamic help in Baltimore', 'the Chechen Charitable Society of Jordan', 'the Chechen Society in New Jersey' and 'the International Islamic front – London'.

9. Anton Chernikh, 'Govorit I zakazivaet Ben Laden', *Commersant*, 14 November 2002.

10. Aslan Maskhadov (1951–2005) was the leader of the separatist movement and the third president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Many credited him with the Chechen victory in the first Chechen war, which allowed for the establishment of the *de facto* independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Maskhadov was elected president of Chechnya in January 1997. Following the start of the second Chechen war in August 1999, he returned to leading the guerrilla resistance against the Russian army. He was killed in Tolstoy-Yurt, a village in northern Chechnya, in March 2005.

11. Movsar Baraev (1979–2002), an active participant in a separatist movement in the Chechen Republic, held the post of commander of the Islamic regiment, the special function of which was to form part of the terrorist armed formations of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic in Ichkeria. He participated in the capture of hostages in the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow in October 2002.

12. Olga Allenova, 'Zakhvat posle antrakta', *Vlast*, 4 October 2002.

13. Julia Usik, 'Gde gotovyatsya k actam vozmezdia genshini-kamikadze?' ['Where Chechen women prepare for the punishment?'], *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 26 September 2002.

14. Mikhail Tollegin, 'Industrya suicida', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 2 September 2004.

15. Yuri Bogomolov, 'Taxi na Dubrovku zakazivali?' *Izvestiya*, 24 October 2003.

16. Anon., 'Genshin-kamikadze v Chechne gotovyat arabi' ['Female-kamikadze are trained by Arabs in Chechnya'], *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 25 October 2002.

17. Julia Usik, 'Nevesti Allakha' ['Brides of Allah'], *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 22 October 2003.

18. Yuri Bogomolov and Yuri Nikolaev, 'Glavnoe, chtobi hijabchik sidel: Rossiiski passport skorrectirovan pof musulmansky obichai' ['The main thing is that the hijab fits: the Russian passport is corrected under a Muslim custom'], *Isvestiya*, 15 May 2003.

19. Shamil Idiatullin, 'Rosiiskie musukmanki ne snimut platkov pered photografami', *Commersant*, 14 May 2003.

20. Ilya Maksakov, 'Dengi dlya diktaturi shariata' ['Money for dictatorship of the Shariyat'], *Izvestiya*, 9 June 2003.

21. Georgy Bovt, 'Platochki belie: photografia na passport mojet stat elementom islamskogo fanatizma' ['White headscarves: the passport photograph can cause Islamic fanaticism'], *Izvestya*, 2 August 2002.

22. Vladimir Smirnov, 'V platke na passport? Pogaluista!' ['In a headscarf on the passport? Welcome!'], *Respublika Tatarstan*, 16 May 2003.

23. Anon, 'Platok razdora, platok mira' ['Scarf of contention, scarf of peace'], *Isvestiya*, 13 September 2002.

24. Vera Postnova, 'Musulmanskie genshini prosyat ne putat religiu s modoy. Tatarskye genshini gdut izvenenii ot Prezidenta Putina', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 9 October 2002.

25. Oleg Nedumov, Andrey Riskin and Ivan Rodin, 'Amnistya bez platochka', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 16 May 2003.

26. Ilya Neishtadt, 'Maska, ia tebya ne znau' ['I don't know you, mask'], *Izvestiya*, 18 May 2003.

27. Marina Ozerova, 'Shlyapu snimi' ['Take off that hat'], *Moscowsky Komsomolez*, 20 July 2002.

28. Bogomolov and Nikolaev, 'Glavnoe, chtobi hijabchik sidel'.

29. Bovt, 'Platochki belie'.

30. Warren A. Peterson and Noel P. Gist, 'Rumor and public opinion', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 57, no. 2 (September 1951) pp. 159–67.

31. *Yashmak* is a Turkish type of veil or *niqab*, worn by many Muslim women to cover their faces in public. *Yashmak* can also contain a piece of black horsehair attached close to the temples and sloping down like an awning to cover the face, or it can be a veil covered with pieces of lace, having slits for the eyes, tied behind the head by strings and sometimes supported over the nose by a small piece of gold.

32. Yuri Nikolaev, 'Musulmanki khotyat snimatsya v paranje', *Izvestiya*, 7 June 2002.

33. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 17 May 2003.

34. Andrey Kamakin, 'Gulchitay, zakroi lichiko!' ['Gulchitay, cover your face!'], *Itogi*, 20 May 2003.
35. Olga Bakushinskaya, 'Gulchitai, pokazai passport!' ['Gulchitai, show your passport!'], *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 16 May 2003.
36. Inna Serova, 'Chto tam, pod hidjabom?', *Vechenyakaya Kazan*, nos 38–9, 2560–61.
37. Olga Bakushinskaya, 'Gulchitai, show your passport!'
38. D. H. Dickson and I. W. Kelly, 'The "Barnum effect" in personality assessment: a review of the literature', *Psychological Reports*, vol. 57, 1985, pp. 367–82.
39. Shamil Idiatullin and Irina Simonova, 'Tatarki khotyat fotografirovatsya v platkah' ['Tatar women want to be photographed in headscarves'], *Commersant*, 20 July 2002.
40. C. C. Wilson and F. Gutierrez, *Race, multiculturalism, and the media: from mass to class communication*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995.
41. Irina Koznetsova-Morenko and Leissan Salakhatdinova, *Islam v mediinom prostranstve* [*Islam in mass media space*], Kazan: Kazan State University, 2004.
42. Boris Klin, 'Sem' mechetei penzenskoi Mekki' ['Seven mosques of Mecca in the Penza Province'], *Izvestya*, 8 December 2005.

Chapter 10

Peripheral vision in the national curriculum: Muslim history in the British educational context

Shiraz Thobani

The interrogation of social policy following the July 2005 terrorist bombings in London led to renewed scrutiny of education in Britain insofar as it touched on Islam and Muslims. In this period, a series of official as well as non-governmental enquiries, reports and guidelines ensued that were directly or indirectly linked to the event of 7 July. While the recommendations of these interventions were wide ranging, one concern that repeatedly surfaced was the role the national curriculum played in promoting cultural diversity and civic identity in the context of Muslims and Islam.

As an immediate response to the crisis, the first of these enquiries was delegated to a taskforce of Muslim representatives, which the Home Office set up in August 2005 to identify strategies for tackling extremism. Among the reforms the taskforce suggested was the need 'to instil a more faithful reflection of Islam and its civilization across the entire education system, including the National Curriculum'.[1] At the beginning of the 2005 academic year, the Department of Education and Skills felt the need to issue guidelines on *Moving on from 7/7: advice to schools*, which included suggestions on improving the understanding of Islam and other religions:

> The curriculum provides a range of opportunities for schools to explore other faiths, cultures and languages. History and geog-

raphy, for example, are two arenas in which young people can find out about the Islamic way of life and the influence and achievements of Islamic civilizations as well as being avenues through which myths and distortions can be dispelled.[2]

In May 2006 the government commissioned a major review to investigate aspects of diversity and citizenship in the national curriculum. Sir Keith Ajegbo, who headed the review, concluded that 'not all school leaders have bought in fully to the imperative of education for diversity' and advised that schools be encouraged 'to audit their curriculum to establish what they currently teach … is meaningful for all pupils in relation to diversity and multiple identities'.[3] Concurrently, another enquiry under the leadership of Dr Ataullah Siddiqui was directed at examining the presentation of Islamic studies in British colleges and universities. A key recommendation of this report, aimed at higher education but having a significant bearing on the presentation of Islam in the school curriculum, was that:

> The Islamic Studies syllabus needs to look beyond philology/ classical texts and area studies (particularly the Middle East). The underlying unity and the evident diversity of Islamic culture and civilization in different epochs and different regions of the world (including Europe) deserve proper attention. … Islamic Studies syllabuses should focus better on theological and civilizational aspects of Islam relevant to contemporary practice of the faith.[4]

Alongside the government initiated reviews, concerned organizations and writers have produced additional reports and proposals on Islamic and Muslim education. The Open Society Institute report on Muslims in the United Kingdom, for example, views the need for a dual adjustment to the curriculum: the contextualizing of European and Christian culture in terms of world civilizations, complemented by greater inclusion of Muslim contributions to European civilization. Through this reciprocal broadening, it hopes to engender better understanding of the interdependence of cultures and civilizations,

while fostering the development of positive self images among young British Muslims within the context of European citizenship.[5]

Additional responses to the 7/7 attacks have come from Muslim organizations, most of which have actively advocated curricular reform as a means of stemming the growth of extremism in Muslim youth while also ensuring that the majority population acquires an educated understanding of Islam and Muslim societies. The Muslim Council of Britain, for instance, in its guidance to state schools, has highlighted Muslim pupils' concern about not seeing their cultures, history or values reflected in their school experience, and draws attention to the importance of emphasizing common aspects of British, European and Islamic heritage and history in the curriculum.[6] Coles and Chilvers express a similar view in their attempt to develop a culturally inclusive curriculum on Islam: 'The omission of Muslim perspectives and of genuine recognition of Islamic civilization from the school curriculum serves to undermine the confidence of Muslim pupils, and miseducates non-Muslims by implicitly denying the shared histories and narratives that make up pluralist Britain.'[7]

What we find reflected in this post-7/7 reporting, as an integral part of broader proposals for educational reform, are justified concerns on how Islam and Muslims are being represented in the school curriculum, with an underlying conviction that this aspect bears crucially on plural coexistence and communal relations between Muslims and the wider British society. While the reviews, in the main, assign responsibility to a range of subjects in the national curriculum to address issues of identity, diversity and citizenship, two areas highlighted in particular for attention are religious education and history, the former for its engagement with Islam as a world religion, and the latter for its presentation of the Muslim past.

Since the national curriculum is singled out in these investigations as a prime agency in shaping the social and cultural perceptions of the young, the question arises of what role it plays, as a whole as well as in terms of its individual subjects, in educating students on the currently contentious issues of Islam and Muslims in Britain and globally. In this chapter, I attend specifically to the subject of history in the national curriculum of England and Wales,[8] investigating it from the perspec-

tive of its portrayal of the Muslim past. This study is undertaken through the frame of secondary level texts on Muslim history based on programmes of study derived from the national curriculum. My aim is to gain an understanding of the pedagogic construction of Muslim civilizations and societies in these books in the context of the underlying policies that have informed the subject of history in the national curriculum.

The current status

History is a compulsory subject in the English national curriculum up to the age of 14, after which students are free to choose it as an option as part of their GCSE and A-level studies.[9] At Key Stage 3 (11–14 year age group), one of the broad aims of the programme of study for history is cast in the following terms: 'Pupils find out about the history of their community, Britain, Europe and the world. They develop a chronological overview that enables them to make connections within and across different periods and societies. They investigate Britain's relationships with the wider world, and relate past events to the present day.'[10]

Social diversity is identified as a key concept in the programme of study. The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA)[11] guidelines state that: 'Pupils should explore cultural, ethnic and religious diversity and racial equality. … Cultural understanding should be developed through the range of groups and individuals investigated, for example minorities and majorities, European and non-European.'[12]

Within this framework, pupils are expected to undertake a total of six programmes of study: three British, one European, and two world studies, the latter divided broadly into pre-modern and modern periods. The world study before 1900 proposes an exposure to the cultures, beliefs and achievements of an African, American, Asian or Australasian society in the past. Among the examples of topics linked to Muslim history here are Muhammad and Mecca, Islamic civilizations (seventh to sixteenth centuries), India from the Mughal Empire to the coming of the British, and the empires of Islam in Africa. The world study after 1900 is expected to draw from 'some of the significant individuals, events and developments from across the twentieth

century, including the two world wars, the Holocaust, the cold war, and their impact on Britain, Europe and the wider world.'[13] The guidelines also suggest that appropriate links be made to some of the parallel events, changes and developments in British, European and world history. A study of the political and cultural achievements of Islamic states from 600 to 1600 is cited as an example that can provide a 'contrasting overview' to the medieval period in Britain.[14]

Teachers are given practical assistance in implementing the programmes of study through schemes of work, which are non-statutory and intended as illustrative topics. Of the 22 schemes identified for Key Stage 3, two are based explicitly on Muslim history: Unit 6 – 'The achievements of the Islamic states: 600–1600', and Unit 13 – 'Mughal India and the coming of the British: 1526–1857'. The first scheme involves examining the political and cultural achievements of Muslim states during the formative and classical periods, while in the second one, pupils focus on India under the Mughal emperors and the gaining of power by the British. The latter is intended to reinforce 'the idea that civilization was not confined to Britain and Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but also existed in non-European societies.' Each of these units is expected to take between eight and fifteen hours of teaching time in total.[15]

The above overview allows us to sum up the scope of the teaching of Muslim history in the national curriculum as a whole. At the primary level (Key Stages 1 and 2), the option to study Muslim civilizations is not currently available, as it is for exploring ancient Greeks, Egyptians or Vikings. At the higher secondary level (Key Stage 4), the Muslim past features to some degree in the unit on 'Medicine through time', where an opportunity exists to discuss the contribution of medieval Muslim scholars and doctors to medical knowledge and practice. In addition, a limited amount of contemporary Muslim history finds a slot in the unit on the Arab-Israeli conflict, covered in the 'Modern World History' option at GCSE level. The fact that seven out of ten students give up studying history by the age of 14 severely curtails the outreach of this minimal coverage at Key Stage 4.[16]

In sum, Key Stage 3 constitutes the main phase when the majority of pupils have the opportunity to become acquainted with some

aspects of Muslim history. Here, however, we have to take into account that since teachers are free to select from a range of topics in the two programmes of study dealing with world studies, questions have been raised about the number of schools opting for schemes of work in which Muslim history is covered. Little empirical data are available on how widely this option is adopted in schools, but suspicions have been cast, based on anecdotal evidence, that even schools with substantial numbers of Muslim students may not be taking up this option.[17] It is likely that factors such as teachers' unfamiliarity with the subject matter and the lack of resources may be acting as major deterrents in the selection of Muslim history as a preferred elective.[18] How far current controversies on Islam may be an additional contributive factor awaits investigation.

The only other major source of information on Muslims available to students in the national curriculum is through the subject of religious education, where Islam is taught as a world religion, and defined essentially as a system of doctrines, rituals and ethics. Historical discussion here is usually restricted to the life of Muhammad, and may extend at most to the lives of the first four caliphs in the formative period. This dichotomized view of Muslim societies in history, and in a separate context, their faith and doctrines in religious education, raises implications of Islam being presented in a disembodied manner without adequate consideration of its historical development and diversification, a concern that also applies to other religions.

At Key Stage 3, in those particular cases where teachers do opt to introduce Muslim history in their classes, textbooks assume special significance as a teaching aid, being the main, readily available source of reference on this subject. In the following section, I turn to the projection of Islam and Muslims in history texts based on the national curriculum to gain a sense of the pedagogic interpretation of the Muslim past and the historiography informing it.

Muslim history in British texts

The role of textbooks in educational systems has been amply examined from various angles, including the political, economic and cultural factors that shape the production, distribution and adoption of these

texts.[19] In England, schools are generally left free to decide, within budgetary allowances, which books and resources they wish to use, there being no officially prescribed texts. Nevertheless, textbooks do form a central resource through which the national curriculum is presented, and when first implemented in the early 1990s, the major educational publishers in England were quick to realize the lucrative economic potential of this change, producing a range of instructional material to cater to the various subjects.[20]

In the case of Muslim history, the relationship between textbooks, the national curriculum and educational publishers provides a valuable opportunity to examine how mediating agencies recontextualize official policies on the history of cultural minorities in school texts. In addition to the commercial strategies publishers adopt, factors like authorship, research, validation and the involvement of Muslim communities become equally crucial in the final determination of the quality, orientation and contents of the texts. In this study, I confine myself to examining the context of official policy as informing the national curriculum and its bearing on textual constructions.

Research on the representation of Muslim history and Islam in British textbooks is limited. Rogers, summing up a series of studies on the coverage of Muslim historical periods and civilizations in school texts available in the mid-1980s, concluded that 'British textbooks are … inaccurate and deficient in their representation of Islam. Their opinions are often outdated and fail to present a balanced historical picture of the Islamic world.'[21] Burke's analysis of the portrayal of Islam in textbooks also revealed historical inaccuracies, in this case on the life of Muhammad, and the superficial if not stereotypical treatment of the subject matter, leading him to claim that very few texts on Islam were adequate for their role as 'master' references ascribed to them in schools.[22] More recently, al-Aqeeli's investigation into Arab and Muslim images in British textbooks disclosed that this portrayal was generally positive but became problematic when dealing with the Crusades and the Arab–Israeli conflict. He adds that in presenting Islam as 'a religion of strict orders', the texts may have deployed a reductionist discourse by not allowing the Western reader to grasp the reality of Islam from a fuller perspective.[23]

From a broader viewpoint, Lisa Kaul-Seidman and her colleagues set out to investigate the presentation of 'Abrahamic themes' in European schools, including the United Kingdom, and supplemented their enquiry with textbook analysis. The general findings of the study were that the three religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam were defined and identified in exclusively religious terms, with little effort made to consider their cultural dimensions. The historical presence of Jews and Muslims in Europe was either under-represented or not represented at all, and these two groups were seen as 'inherently foreign and problematic', their mention in European history tending to be in the context of contentious situations. In addition, very limited attention was paid to the transfer or diffusion of knowledge and cultural exchange between the three Abrahamic traditions and their cultures.[24] In the case of Britain, 'cultural diversity of Christians [was] provided through a far more in-depth exploration of differences in lifestyles, ways of worship, and standpoints on issues, but on Jews and Muslims through information on different denominations.'[25]

Few though these studies are, and varying in the focus and scope of their research, they all point to major and minor shortcomings in the treatment of Islam and Muslims in British textbooks. The analysis undertaken in the present study of Key Stage 3 texts on Muslim history, published in the period following the legislation of the national curriculum in 1988, continues to expose conceptual, historical and educational flaws in the way the subject is approached, as revealed below.[26]

The Muslim world in the texts examined is presented primarily through the frame of medieval history, the seventeenth century by and large providing a cut-off point. The story of Islam, in effect, stops around 1600. The crucial phase of the modern period, with its far-reaching transformations, is given minimal attention, with relatively little discussion of the profound political, economic and cultural changes experienced by contemporary Muslim societies. As a consequence, the perception of Muslims that is unwittingly instilled is linked closely to medievalism, fostering a misleading notion of a civilization fixated in the pre-modern past. Moreover, while the general treatment is chronological, there are often sweeping jumps from early

Muslim history to the classical age and the Crusades, and then to the
Ottoman phase, with crucial intervening periods left out altogether.[27]
A few texts endeavour to fill in the gaps with slightly more description,
but such coverage by no means affords a developmental perspective of
the Muslim past.

While the presence of Muslims in diverse geographical regions of
the world is acknowledged, the predominant focus is on the Near East
through coverage of the Abbasid dynasty, the Crusades and the
Ottomans. Other regions such as Spain, North Africa, West Africa,
Egypt, Persia and Central Asia, as well as South Asia and Southeast
Asia, mostly receive passing references. In exceptional cases, we find
texts that cover a selected area in more depth, such as Mughal India,
but this is certainly not the norm. The bounded portrayal of 'the Mus-
lim world' renders it as self-contained, without sufficient recognition
or discussion of the historical presence of Muslims in Europe or the
interaction of Muslim societies with European states, as for example in
the Mediterranean region since the seventh century.[28] Consequently,
the tendency to plot 'Europe' and 'the Muslim world' as dichotomous
and monolithic blocs frequently prevails over a more differentiated
and granular portrayal.[29]

Because of the Middle Eastern focus, a close though unintended
association is established between Muslimness and Arab identity,
though admittedly the texts also make some reference to the Turks.
Other cultures, such as Persian, Indian, Indonesian, Central Asian or
African, receive subdued attention or none at all. In the coverage of
internal Muslim diversity, the exploration seldom extends beyond the
Sunni–Shia branches, and in some cases, even this basic division is
overlooked. Rarely is space devoted to pointing out the rich readings
of Islam and plurality of Islamic traditions within Sunnis and Shias,
such as the four schools of law among Sunnis, the Ithna Ashari and
Ismaili branches of Shia Islam, as well as Sufi denominations, all of
which were instrumental in shaping the Muslim past. With reference to
non-Muslims, most texts affirm the presence (and tolerance) of Jews
and Christians in Muslim societies, but the concept of social inclusivity
tends to be interpreted in polarized terms.[30]

Conversely, the historical presence of Muslims in Europe, as an

integral part of European history, is not generally acknowledged other than in terms of conflict and aggression through the Crusades, the fall of Constantinople, or the reversals at Poitiers or Vienna. In many of the texts, the link between European and Muslim states is rendered through the confrontational encounter brought about by the Crusades. In some cases we find an inordinate emphasis on the technology and machinery of warfare,[31] while the productive engagement between Muslims, Jews and Christians in intellectual, economic and cultural terms receives scant attention. The cultural exchange between European and Muslim civilizations, as one of the unanticipated outcomes arising from the Crusades, provides a unique window for exploration, as does Muslim Spain, and as does the relation between classical Islam and the European Renaissance. Sadly, these topics are not always exploited for their full educational worth.

The predominant emphasis in the texts examined is on the religious and political history of Muslims. Admittedly, an attempt is made to include some social and cultural history of Muslim societies, but this is often presented in a curtailed, static and somewhat stilted manner. Culture in its deeper sense, as a fund of symbolic significance, expressed through aesthetic, literary, social and intellectual creativity, is not treated in any great depth. This tendency may arise partly from projecting the relation between Muslim civilizations and Islam as a religion in essentialist doctrinal and ritualistic terms, rather than how Islam has been appropriated in multifarious ways as an inspiring and dynamic spirit by different Muslim cultures, and how it has found diverse expressions through faith and ritual, but also through literature, art, music and other creative modes.[32]

In general, the relationship between events, ideas and historical transformations remains poorly established. Some attempt is made to refer to the concepts of continuity and change in the texts, but these are inadequately treated in relation to Muslim history.[33] Although theology, law, science and other subjects lend themselves to being explored in developmental terms – how they evolved in history and were subject to contextual forces – they are in fact construed as materializing *ex nihilo*. Social change is discussed more as an outcome of cataclysmic events, like the Mongol invasion of Muslim dynastic

empires, without a complementary examination of transformative processes internal to these civilizations. More attention could have been devoted to critical transitions in Muslim history, such as the passage from the nomadic phase to imperial rule, or, of crucial importance to understanding contemporary Muslim societies, their entry into the modern period. As a consequence, the engagement of Muslims with political, social and religious change remains an obscurity in these texts, reinforcing the prevailing perception of Islamic traditions as suspended in time. Overall, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the readers of these books are given a simplistic, if not reductionist, offering of the civilizational history of Muslims.

Historiography and underlying influences

Let me summarize the implications and conclusions arising from this analysis. British school texts in the main appear to deploy a peripheral vision, as opposed to a direct gaze, when representing the Muslim world. Muslim history on the whole is portrayed as lying on the fringes of temporal and geographical zones. It is treated as a pedagogical elective and, like the past of other migrant communities, considered semi-essential to the history curriculum. It is evidently not seen as connected to British history, despite the prolonged engagement of British colonialism as well as post-colonial interventions in Muslim regions, not overlooking at the same time the settlement of Muslims in Britain in recent times.

By its very nature, peripheral vision substitutes detail with generalized, amorphous figures, locations and happenings. History under this gaze is subjected to a high degree of generalization, homogenizing and, some would argue, reduction, in the textbook writers' encounter with culturally complex, geographically diverse and temporally extended civilizations. Periods, personalities, events and processes are left out or rendered skeletal, when from the historian's perspective, they may be pivotal to engendering a better understanding of the past. Plurality, movement and transformation, in particular, become blurred and lose their focus. What we therefore get in this oblique gaze, in a framework that privileges the national story, is bounded, marginal and somewhat flattened readings of global and regional pasts.

When histories are perceived through the peripheral lens, there may not be biases as much as ambiguities. The British texts admittedly try to render a balanced portrayal of historical evidence by including both European and Muslim sources, for the national curriculum requires students to develop historical thinking and evaluative skills. The difficulties arise as much with the explicit as with the implicit, for many of the things that need saying are left unsaid. What is said is therefore lacking, and in need of explanation or qualification. In the British context, as in other European cases, this ambivalence sits between the medieval demonization of Islam in Europe and the modern need for its domestication. Resident Muslims are seen as British, but at the same time dislocated by virtue of espousing transnational allegiances. These observations necessarily raise the question of why the history of Muslims and other minorities is treated in the national curriculum in this sectioned and peripheral manner, rather than through approaches that read the past of pluralist societies as necessarily composed of multiple, intersecting stories.

The 'problematic' of Islam and Muslims is by no means new to Britain. It dates back to the early immigration decades of the 1960s and 1970s, also known as the 'multicultural period', when controversies flared on issues such as the establishment of Muslim private schools, the accommodation of Muslim pupils in state schools, and the inclusion of Islam as a multi-faith subject in religious education.[34] The Honeyford affair, in which a right-wing headmaster criticized traditionalist Muslim parents for their 'purdah mentality' and was subsequently forced to resign, further exacerbated the question of Muslim education as it came to be perceived. A more damaging outcome for Muslims in this period was the reaction to Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, which typecast them as intolerant, book-burning fanatics in the public mind.

From a curricular perspective, what and how much of Islam and Muslim history was taught in this decentralized phase was left largely to individual schools and teachers, the curriculum being a 'secret garden' closed to politicians and policymakers. The liberalized curriculum in the state sector increasingly became a site of contestation for a variety of stakeholders, including migrant communities voicing reservations about multiculturalism's failure to represent authentically their

cultures, faiths and histories. Some sections in Muslim communities
were disgruntled, particularly by the non-confessional multi-faith Islam
presented in the statutory religious education classes where the young
were deemed to be inducted into a relativistic perspective of religions.
Alongside these concerns, conservative pressure groups produced
'Black Papers' that were severely critical of deteriorating standards in
schools, which they attributed to 'progressive' pedagogies, while also
giving vent to their fears that schools were becoming sites where
youths were being radicalized into left-wing revolutionary politics.
Among these groups was the Christian Right, which, perceiving Islam
and the other faiths as a distinct threat to the British way of life,
strategically lobbied the government in the 1980s to reassert the
primacy of Christianity in religious education.[35]

The national curriculum the neo-conservatives introduced in 1988
was therefore, at least at one level, a reaction to what were perceived as
the excesses of multiculturalism in education, within which non-
conventional subjects like Islam and Muslim civilizations were tacitly
implicated. The centralizing of the subject of history, in particular,
proved to be highly charged, an event marked by heated debate
between the New Right policymakers and the liberal left specialists, the
former insisting on reinstating the national narrative in history, under-
pinned by the ideology of cultural restorationism, and the latter
arguing to retain a skills-centred, process-oriented history with its
international leanings towards world studies.[36] The formulation of a
centralized rendition of history was intensely contested within the
national curriculum history working group set up to identify the aims
and content of the subject. It is of significance to note here that
Muslim history, in the form of 'Islam and the Arabs', was considered
in the draft report as a core topic,[37] but its final incorporation in the
history curriculum became a major point of conflict in the history
working group, as revealed by Phillips from his investigations:

> Extraordinarily, the minutes reveal only two occasions when,
> following disagreements, a vote had to be taken, namely over
> the question of the chronological order of KS2 units of study
> … and, more controversially, over the inclusion of Islam within

KS3. … In interview, two members revealed that they had contemplated resigning if this unit was left out.[38]

It is evident from the above information that some members of the working group felt that the topic of Islam was sufficiently important to warrant inclusion as a core unit, but the proposal was ultimately rejected and the coverage of Muslim history relegated to an elective status.[39] Given the chronological sequencing selected for the history curriculum – ancient, medieval and modern – the Muslim past was slotted into the Middle Ages. Thus, by default, pupils at the primary level were denied coverage of Muslim civilizations, while those at the secondary level had little exposure to Muslim societies in the modern age. The marginalized outcome was a peripheral elective on medieval Muslim realms bracketed outside the national story. However, at a more general level, the disquiet over school history being defined as predominantly 'British', with some attention to European and world history, refused to die away and persisted through the 1990s.

In recent years, this discomfort has erupted once again on numerous fronts, with the government's own educational institutions also acknowledging the need to reform the subject. Ofsted's report of 2003/4 stated that the Tudors and twentieth-century dictatorships dominated the content of post-14 history,[40] a finding the QCA confirmed.[41] The QCA report noted that black and multi-ethnic aspects of British history were given little attention, and that this undervalued their overall contribution to Britain's past and ignored their cultural, scientific and other achievements.[42] The Ofsted inspectors also found that 'insufficient time' was devoted to the British Empire, amounting to no more than just a few lessons in five years at the secondary level, with teachers being urged to raise awareness of the empire's 'controversial legacy'.[43]

Other bodies and organizations have also echoed these official concerns for the reform of history. At a conference mounted by the Prince of Wales summer school for English and history specialists in July 2003, leading historians argued that Britain's imperial past had been overlooked for too long and needed to be reintroduced at the core of the secondary school curriculum. Teaching British history

without the empire, a prominent speaker observed, was like performing 'Hamlet without the prince', reinforcing the views of several other delegates who felt that Britain's imperial adventure had been 'airbrushed' out of history.[44]

To cite another example, the Fabian Society, a left of centre think-tank affiliated with the Labour Party, has also drawn attention to the need for greater coverage of the colonial period in the history curriculum.[45] Gordon Marsden, a member of parliament, writes in the *Fabian Review* that presenting a balanced history of Britain's imperial past has often been considered 'too tricky, complex or divisive in the multi-ethnic context', despite its importance. Pointing to the strong emerging consensus among history professionals for change, he calls for a broader debate on school history to reconsider the 'old national story' and its replacement with what he calls a 'new global national' one. Marsden is convinced that only through Britons undertaking an honest examination of their 'complex and muddled past' will they be able to establish the new social connections necessary for today's globalized reality.[46]

It is evident from these and other similar widely voiced concerns that the underlying historiography informing the subject of history in the national curriculum is found wanting, belonging more to the neo-nationalism of the 1980s than to the changed globalized requirements of today. We are beginning to discover that the fault lines created in the 1990s between the national, regional and global spheres, based on the geopolitical configuration of the 'old world system', are no longer stable and are beginning to give way. They are perhaps at their most vulnerable when challenged by transnational and diasporic categories. When subjected to such stress, the national narrative reacts by reinforcing symbolic boundaries through the 'container' model of history, ring fencing narratives that are deemed to be alien and politically awkward.[47]

The case of the Muslim past in the national curriculum and its associated texts exemplifies this model of containment historiography by recontextualizing the transnational experience of Muslim societies in bounded, medieval and confrontational terms. The Muslim 'world', as we have seen, is distanced by being neatly separated from Europe,

embedded in a medieval age and therefore having little if any engagement with modernity, and cast as confrontational through conflictual episodes such as the Crusades. Many of these perspectives can be traced back to the Orientalist discourse that originated in European colonialism and became canonized in disciplinary treatments of Islam and Muslim cultures,[48] to be rekindled once again today by the inflammatory combination of militant radicalism and neo-colonial reactions.

The transnational history of Muslims exposes the cleavage between the national and global spheres in the British historical narrative from two major perspectives. First, it forces attention on the pre-national status of Muslim societies prior to colonialism and the creation of modern Muslim nation-states largely as a result of colonial intervention, bringing to the fore the historically contingent nature of modern nationhood and nationality. Second, it problematizes the presence of Muslims in Britain not only as former colonial subjects but also as communities with identities, which, through their allegiance to their Islamic faith, straddle and transcend national boundaries. This enmeshing of the destinies of post-colonial subjects with their erstwhile rulers, resulting from the dual, interrelated forces of imperialism and immigration, provokes deep ambiguities about the location and allegiance of Muslims who cannot be captured exclusively within the existing national compact of citizenship.

The application of the peripheral gaze, by its very nature, 'defocuses' and marginalizes the non-national, while remaining in denial of the meshed narratives of former colonial powers and their contemporary migrant citizens. It is a form of historiography that derives its roots from an imperial and nationalistic frame in which the sovereign nation-state is privileged as the core reference for one's identity, and which somewhat simplistically divides the world between the centre (the *patrie* or metropole) and the periphery (the former colonized regions, now dubbed the 'Third World'). Without denying the contemporary reality and continuing influence of the modern nation-state, it is increasingly difficult to justify national identities as being more privileged than those derived from class, gender, ethnicity, or religion, which cut across national boundaries. The presence of Muslims, and other communities of tradition in Britain and Europe, exemplifies the

complex, intersecting and hyphenated nature of contemporary identities, raising questions about reifying historiographies and calling instead for the deconstruction of entrenched political and cultural dichotomies.

National narratives in school curricula inevitably provoke the question of whose history is included or excluded. The neglect of the colonial period in school history in the English national curriculum exposes serious doubts on whether youngsters in contemporary Britain are being adequately educated about the political and cultural engagements of early modernity and their ramifications in the world today. In the ultimate analysis, the self-constructions of Muslims in Britain, and indeed in former colonial territories, cannot be understood without some comprehension of the political crises, economic shifts and cultural tensions that arose in Muslim regions as a result of Britain's imperial rule or intervention in these areas. Excised of its colonial past, the English national narrative renders the nation an island unto itself on the pretext that it has little to do now with what happened beyond its shores in the past, or that these happenings are no longer of any consequence in the emerging twenty-first century. Indeed, when the presence of Muslims and other migrant communities in Britain today is taken into account, such exclusionary strategies tend towards creating a history where the post-colonial subject is effectively exiled from the national narrative, although he or she may integrally be a citizen of these isles. In contemporary pluralistic societies, such outmoded historical constructions are no longer able to speak to the multivalent construction of social identities. Instead, they risk reinforcing the 'clash of civilizations' thesis by pitting exclusionary nationalisms against invasive transnationalisms. Schissler's observation in this regard is apt here:

> Admittedly, the old ways will no longer do. If the old ways of making sense of the world, and especially … national history as a 'container model' will no longer suffice because the world itself has changed dramatically, we must think about more appropriate, or simply more helpful, ways of learning about this changing world and our place in it. … World history might help

teachers and students to understand that 'the world' is not 'out there' somewhere, but that it saturates our lives and that we are part of it; it might help to endure the ambiguities of this modern world, and it might aid in resisting the temptation to turn to fundamentalism.[49]

The historiographical paradigm needs to be changed, not by doing away with the nation, but locating it within the global reality. The nation-state has not died away, but self concepts today are much more complex than in the past, calling for approaches to history that will equip students to deal with the multiple and entwined contexts they are bound to encounter in their social dealings. The government's own educational watchdog, Ofsted, recognizes this concern and sees the need to revise the curriculum so that young people can be helped to understand what it refers to as the 'big questions' of history, while also calling for an inclusive approach that explores 'more fully the story of the United Kingdom in its diversity and its relationships with Europe and the rest of the world'.[50] This imperative has been given additional backing by the Ajegbo Report, which recommends the inclusion of a strand in citizenship education devoted to modern British social and cultural history that responds to the diverse backgrounds of pupils in British schools today.[51] Whether these proposals will be given realization within the national curriculum remains to be seen.

Conclusion

In the geo-political climate of today, national history textbooks need to be interrogated on whether they are operating with petrified or dynamic models of history and identity. The last quarter of a century has witnessed profound shifts in the way the world is conceived. These changes are questioning a narcissist portrayal of space, time and culture that underpins outdated paradigms of nationalistic history. Such representations have political implications for the way people within and between nations are educated to relate to one another. Today's changing circumstances call for a more comprehensive model of history that is inclusive, interactional and engaging, rather than exclusionary. Students living in the global age need to be equipped with more

sophisticated skills of historical thinking that can help them situate their and others' intersecting stories.

If the enmeshed histories of European and Muslim civilizations are to be socially and politically educative, one needs to break out of the exclusively medieval representation of Muslim societies. While necessary, the formative and classical treatment of Muslim history alone is insufficient. Muslims cannot be understood, and ought not to be approached, predominantly through the frame of the Middle Ages. It is vital that the peripheral gaze be led to focus also on the encounter between Muslim societies and European nations in the colonial period and in recent times. Above all, for students to understand the events unfolding today, school history must deal frontally with the tensions, transactions and transformations that have come about in the modern age.

Overall, there needs to be a closer integration between British, European and world history if education is to serve its purpose of creating greater understanding between people with diverse but interwoven narratives in an age in which humankind is beginning to negotiate fundamental commonalities alongside distinctive diversities. How perceptions of the past are created will determine whether there is a reversion to the tribalisms of the past, or instead, a more informed outlook emerges of social encounters and interactions. It has now become a matter of necessity, if not urgency, to equip students with the skills to realize the human in the 'other' in an age in which a shared story of humanity is emerging.

Notes

1. Working Group, *Preventing extremism together*, August–October 2005, Association of Muslim Lawyers website, p. 5.
2. Department of Education and Skills, *Moving on from 7/7: advice to schools*, DfES website, 2005, p. 5.
3. Ajegbo Report, *Diversity and citizenship: curriculum review*, London: HMSO, 2007, pp. 6, 9.
4. Siddiqui Report, *Islam at universities in England: meeting the needs and investing in the future*, Report submitted to Bill Rammell, Minister of State for Lifelong Learning, Further and Higher Education, 10 April 2007, p. 13.
5. Open Society Institute, 'British Muslims and education', in *Muslims in the UK: policies for engaged citizens, EU Monitoring and Advocacy Programme*, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2005, p. 154.

6. Muslim Council of Britain, *Meeting the needs of Muslim pupils in state schools: information and guidance for schools*, London: MCB, 2007, pp. 18–19.

7. M. I. Coles and P. Chilvers, *Education and Islam: developing a culturally inclusive curriculum*, Leicester: School Development Support Agency, 2004, p. 6.

8. Education in Britain is regionally organized, composed of the three educational systems of Scotland, Northern Ireland, and England and Wales, each having its own curriculum. In this chapter, my reference is specifically to the English education system.

9. The national curriculum in England and Wales is divided into four stages. The primary level consists of Key Stage 1 (5–7 year-olds) and Key Stage 2 (7–11 year-olds). The secondary level consists of Key Stage 3 (11–14 year-olds) and Key Stage 4 (14–16 year-olds), leading to the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) examinations.

10. Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 'History: programme of study: key stage 3.' QCA website, 2007, p. 111.

11. The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) is responsible for maintaining and developing the national curriculum and its associated assessment schemes.

12. QCA, 'History: programme of study', p. 112.

13. Ibid., p. 116.

14. Ibid.

15. Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (2000) 'Key Stage 3 history schemes of work: units 6 and 13', QCA website, 2000.

16. Ofsted, 'History in the balance: history in English schools 2003–07', Ofsted website, 2007, p. 4. The Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) is the government's education watchdog and inspectorate agency in England.

17. N. Kinloch, 'A need to know: Islamic history and the school curriculum', *Teaching History*, 2005, pp. 25–31; Open Society Institute, 'British Muslims and education'.

18. See Kinloch, 'A need to know'; A. Kitson, 'A place for Islam in the history classroom', *BBC History Magazine*, vol. 6, no. 5, 2005, p. 86; and M. Wainright, 'Our debt to Islam', *Guardian*, 26 July 2002, all of whom have voiced their concerns regarding the very limited coverage of Muslim history in the national curriculum, as have Muslim educators (for example, S. Sheriff, 'AMR forum: "horrid" history', *Association of Muslim Researchers Newsletter*, 26 March, 2006, pp. 1–6).

19. See, for example, M. Apple, *The politics of the textbook*, London: Routledge, 1991; K. Crawford, 'Intercultural education: the role of school textbook analysis in shaping a critical discourse on nation and society', Pacific Circle Consortium, 27th Annual Conference, Hong Kong Institute of Education, 2004; and W. E. Marsden, *The school textbook: geography, history and social studies*, London: Woburn, 2001.

20. Marsden, *The school textbook*.

21. P. Rogers (ed.) *Islam in history textbooks*, Occasional Papers IX, Extramural Division, London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1984, p. 4.

22. D. M. Burke, 'Analysis of school textbooks on Islam', *Muslim Education Quarterly*, vol. 3, no. 4, 1986, pp. 85–6.

23. A. M. S. al-Aqeeli, 'Arab and Muslim image in the public education textbooks of Britain', Paper presented at the international conference held in Cairo, 12–14 December 2004, on 'The Image of Arab-Islamic Culture in European History Textbooks', 2005.

24. L. Kaul-Seidman, J. S. Nielsen and M. Vinzent, *European identity and cultural pluralism: Judaism, Christianity and Islam in European curricula. Recommendations*, Bad Homburg vor der Höhe: Herbert-Quandt-Stiftung, 2003, pp. 29–30.

25. L. Kaul-Seidman, J. S. Nielsen and M. Vinzent, *European identity and cultural pluralism: Judaism, Christianity and Islam in European curricula. Supplement: country reports*, Bad Homburg von der Höhe: Herbert-Quandt-Stiftung, 2003, p. 98.

26. The sample examined covered most of the history texts available on this specific subject from major publishers and currently in circulation in British schools. These texts included P. Bartley and H. Bourdillon, *Medieval Islam*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993; J. Child, *The rise of Islam*, Oxford: Heinemann, 1993; J. Child, N. Kelly and M. Whittock, *The Crusades*, London: Heinemann, 1992; C. Hatt, *The Crusades*, London: Evans Brothers, 1999; P. Kernaghan, *The Crusades: cultures in conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; F. Macdonald, *The world of Islam up to the 1500s*, London: Collins Educational, 1991; F. Macdonald, *The Crusades*, London: Collins Educational, 1992; P. Mantin and R. Mantin, *The Islamic world: beliefs and civilisations 600–1600*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; and H. M. Martell, *The world of Islam: before 1700*, London: Evans Brothers, 1998. For analytical categories and evaluative criteria related to Islam and Muslim history, see Coles and Chilvers, *Education and Islam*; J. V. Wiele, 'The necessity for a contextual approach in the methodology of religious school textbook analysis: a case study on the basis of the theme of Islam', *Pedagogica Historica*, vol. 37, no. 2, 2001, pp. 369–90; and J. V. Wiele, 'Mapping the road for balance: towards the construction of criteria for a contemporary interreligious textbook analysis regarding Islam', *Journal of Empirical Theology*, vol. 17, no. 1, 2004, pp. 1–35.

27. Macdonald, *The world of Islam up to the 1500s*, for example, moves fairly rapidly from 'Muhammad's world' and the spread of Islam, to Damascus and Baghdad, with a final unit on 'Islam and other cultures' into which the Crusades, Mongols and Ottomans are compressed. Mantin and Mantin, *The Islamic world*, devote four units to Muhammad and the early period in comparison with two topics for the Abbasids, one for the Ottomans, and a single topic entitled 'From the Taj Mahal to Timbuktu'.

28. The terminology used in the textbooks is revealing of the bounded conception of cultural geography pertaining to Muslim societies and civilizations. Terms such as 'the world of Islam' and 'Muhammad's world' (Macdonald, *The world of Islam up to the 1500s*), 'the Islamic empire' (Bartley and Bourdillon, *Medieval Islam*), and 'the Islamic world' (Mantin and Mantin, *The Islamic world*) are used frequently in the textbooks.

29. An exceptional attempt to deconstruct these monolithic blocs is to be found in Child et al. (*The Crusades*) who display a map (pp. 10–11) showing diverse empires and states in both regions.

30. Macdonald (*The world of Islam up to the 1500s*) is one of the few authors who sees the need to present social relations in the medieval period in a broader context, comparing the treatment of Jews in Muslim lands with those living in Christian Europe (p. 25).

31. Child et al. (*The Crusades*), for example, dwell on the following topics: the siege of Jerusalem, the Crusader states, taking the Cross, power and wealth, getting to Jerusalem, and soldiers of God.

32. Some texts on the Crusades give a detailed picture of domestic life in Europe, whereas the treatment of social life in Muslim states is meagre by comparison (see, for instance, Kernaghan, *The Crusades*). The books on Muslim civilizations, by contrast, such as Bartley and Bourdillon (*Medieval Islam*), portray a richer view of Muslim life.

33. Mantin and Mantin (*The Islamic world*) is one of the few texts to include a topic explicitly on the theme of change, but it is linked to the Crusades and the Mongol invasion (pp. 36–7).

34. S. Thobani, *Islam in the school curriculum: symbolic pedagogy and cultural claims*, London: Continuum, forthcoming.

35. Ibid.

36. R. Phillips, *History teaching, nationhood and the state: a study in educational politics*, London: Cassell, 1998. The dominance of political and national history in British education prior to 1945 increasingly gave way to social and economic readings of the past. In the early 1980s, a counter-movement to restore national history began with the Conservatives (see K. Crawford, 'A history of the right: the battle for control of national curriculum history 1989–1994', *British Journal of Educational Studies*, vol. 43, no. 4, 1995, pp. 433–56; and V. Little, 'A national curriculum in history: a very contentious issue', *British Journal of Educational Studies*, vol. 38, no. 4, 1990, pp. 319–34).

37. Phillips, *History teaching*, p. 65.

38. Ibid., p. 76.

39. In 1990, the final report of the history working group proposed Muslim history as an optional study unit at Key Stage 3. Kinloch states that it was dense with 'essential' and 'exemplary' information, and as it suffered from a lack of resources, few schools opted to teach it. In 2000, a simplified framework was presented by the QCA in the form of a scheme of work,

focusing on the achievements of Muslim states between 600–1600 (Kinloch, 'A need to know', p. 26).

40. Ofsted, 'The annual report of Her Majesty's chief inspector of schools 2004/05, history in secondary schools', Ofsted website, 2005.

41. Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 'History: 2004/5 annual report on curriculum and assessment', QCA website, 2005, p. 19.

42. Ibid., p. 6.

43. BBC, 'Teach more about British Empire', 11 July 2004, BBC website.

44. N. Pyke, 'Schools ignore it – but is it time for the empire to strike back? History teachers urged to include imperial past', *Guardian*, 5 July 2003.

45. Fabian Society, 'Reluctance to teach history of empire should end, say MPs and historians', Fabian Society website, 2005.

46. Ibid.

47. Crawford, 'Intercultural education'; H. Schissler, 'World history: making sense of the present', in H. Schissler and Y. N. Soysal (eds) *The nation, Europe and the world: textbooks and curricula in transition*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2005.

48. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage, 1979.

49. Schissler, 'World history', p. 241.

50. Ofsted, 'History in the balance', pp. 6 and 8.

51. Ajegbo Report, *Diversity and citizenship*, p. 14.

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the Orenburg Mohammadan Spiritual Assembly's district, convened for popular interpretation of texts of the Koran in Mohammedan confessional schools (mektebs and madrasahs)], Ufa.

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